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Foreword 
The United States today possesses a capable fleet of cargo and crew-carrying launch 
systems, managed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of 
Defense, and the private sector. Emerging technologies offer the promise, by the turn of the 
century, of new launch systems that may reduce cost while increasing performance, reliability, 
and operability~__···· . 
Continued exploration and exploitation of space will depend on a fleet of versatile and 
reliable launch vehicles. Yet, uncertainty about the nature of U.S. space program goals and the 
schedule for achieving them, as well as the stubbornly high cost of space transportation, makes 
choosing among the many space transportation alternatives extremely difficult. Can existing 
and potential future systems meet the demand for launching payloads in a timely, reliable, and 
cost-effective manner? What investments should the Government make in future launch 
systems and when? What new crew-carrying and cargo launchers are needed? Can the Nation 
afford them? 
This special report explores these and many other questions. It is the final, summarizing 
report in a series of products from a broad assessment of space transportation technologies 
undertaken by OTA for the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
and the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. In the course of the assessment, 
OTA has published the special reports, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide and 
Round Trip to Orbit: Human Spaceflight Alternatives; the technical memorandum, Reducing 
Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices; and the background papers, Big 
Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost Space Transportation Option? and Affordable Spacecraft: 
Design and Launch Alternatives. 
In undertaking this effort, OTA sought the contributions of a wide spectrum of 
knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information, others reviewed 
drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time and intellectual effort. OTA 
also appreciates the help and cooperation of NASA and the Air Force. As with all OTA reports, 
the content of this special report is the sole responsibility of the Office of Technology 
Assessment and does not necessarily represent the views of our advisors or reviewers. 
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Legislative Options for Space Transportation 
Space Program Futures 
Congress could choose to support the development of one or more of many different types of sp: 
transportation systems. To determine which of these alternatives is most appropriate, Congress must first Irli 
some broad decisions about the future of the United States in space. A commitment to key space program g( 
will entail a similar commitment to one or more launch systems. 
If Congress wishes to: Then it should: 
Limit the expansion of 
NASA and DoD space 
programs: 
Develop the capability to 
launch small- and inter-
mediate-size payloads 
quickly and efficiently to 
support DoD and civilian 
needs: 
Deploy Space Station Free-
dom by the end of the 
century, while maintain-
ing an aggressive NASA 
science program: 
Continue trend oflaunch-
ing heavier communica-
tions, navigation, and sur-
veillance satellites and/or 
pursue an aggressive Stra-
tegic Defensive Initiative 
test program: 
Deploy a full-scale space-
based ballistic missile de-
fense system and/or dra-
matically increase the num-
ber and kind of other mil-
itary space activities: 
Establish a permanent 
base on the Moon or send 
humans to Mars: 
viii 
Maintain existing launch systems and limit expenditures on future deve!lj 
ment options. Current capabilities are adequate to supply both NASA. 
DoD if the present level of U.S. space activities is maintained. 
Continue to support the development of small and intermediate capa( 
launch systems. The U.S. private sector has the financial and techni 
capacity to develop such systems on its own if a market for launch! 
small payloads exists. 
Continue funding improvements to the Space Shuttle and other existing spa 
transportation systems and/or begin developing Shuttle-C: The existil 
Space Shuttle can launch the Space Station, but will do so mo 
effectively with improvements or the assistance of a Shuttle-C. AlthoUl 
Shuttle-C might not be as economical as other new cargo vehicles at h~ 
launch rates, it would be competitive if only a few heavy-lift missi9ns II 
required each year. . 
Commit to the development of a new cargo vehicle for use early in the 2 
century. Although existing launch systems could be expanded to m. 
such growth in payload weight, if demand is high, new, advanced systel 
would be more reliable and cost-effective. 
Commit to the development of a new cargo vehicle such as the Advanc~ 
Launch System. Current launch systems are neither sufficiently econOR 
cal to support full-scale space-based ballistic missile defense deploymel 
nor reliable enough to support a dramatically increased military spa 
program. 
Commit to the development of a new cargo vehicle(s) (Shuttle-C, Advancffl:l 
Launch System, or other system) and continue funding advanced, crew~ 
carrying launch systems. Any major initiative beyond the Space Statio~ 
involving humans in space will require new launch systems. ' 
Improving U.S. Space Transportation Systems 
Whichever broad program goals are selected, if Congress wishes to continue to improve the safety, 
reliability, performance, and/or economy of U.S. launch systems, it has a number of possibilities from which 
to choose. Several are listed below; they are not mutually exclusive, nor is the list exhaustive. Congress could 
decide to proceed with one or more from each list of options. Because of the long lead times for the 
development of space transportation systems, some decisions will have to be made in the next year or two. 
Others can wait until the middle of this decade or later. 
If Congress wishes to: 
Improve cargo launch 
system reliability or 
performance: 
Improve Space Shuttle sys-
tem safety, reliability: 
Maintain a sustainable Shut-
tle launch rate of 9 to 11 
launches per year: 
Reduce risks to successful 
Space Station assembly: 
Develop the technology base 
and plan for building new 
crew-carrying launch 
systems: 
Provide for emergency crew 
return from the Space 
Station: 
If Congress wishes to: 
Build safer, more reliable 
crew-carrying launch 
systems: 
Improve cargo launch 
system reliability and 
reduce costs: 
Increase operability: 
Near-Term Decisions 
Then it could: 
• Fund development of technologies in the Advanced Launch System and 
other programs. 
• Fund development of Liquid-fueled Rocket Boosters (LRBs). 
• Fund continued development and improvement of Advanced Solid Rocket 
Motors (ASRMs) and alternate turbopumps for the Space Shuttle Main 
Engines. 
• Fund installation of built-in test equipment in the Shuttle and more 
automated test equipment in launch facilities. 
• Fund the purchase of at least one additional orbiter to be delivered as soon 
as possible (1996), and direct NASA to reduce the number of Shuttle flights 
planned per year. NASA could reduce Shuttle flights by: 
a. postponing or cancelling some planned Shuttle launches; or 
b. relying more on cargo-only launch vehicles, such as Titan IVs. 
• Direct NASA to develop and use Shuttle-C to carry some Space Station 
elements to orbit. (This would reduce the total number offlights required.) 
• Continue to fund planning and technology development and test efforts 
such as: 
a. the Advanced Manned Launch System studies; 
b. the National Aero-Space Plane program (NASP); or 
c. the Advanced Launch System (ALS) program. 
• Fund a program to develop a U.S. crew emergency return vehicle. 
• Support joint development with Space Station partners of vehicle for 
emergency return. 
Far-Term Decisions 
Then it could: 
• Fund development of safer, more reliable launch systems to augment or 
succeed the Shuttle. These might include: 
a. a Personnel Launch System (PLS), or 
b. an Advanced Manned Launch System (AMLS), or 
c. vehicles derived from the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) program. 
• Fund development of launch vehicles or systems (e.g., ALS engines) that 
could be manufactured, integrated, and launched by highly automated 
methods with improved process control. 
• Fund development of vehicles designedfor quick turnaround, such as those 
considered for an Advanced Manned Launch System or possible succes-
sors to the proposed National Aero-Space Plane test vehicle (X-30). 
ix 
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Major Launch Systems Discussed in This Report: 
Existing Systems 
Delta II Expendable Launch Vehicle 
(ELV)-manufactured by McDonnell 
Douglas, it is capable of lifting over 
11,000 pounds to low Earth orbit (LEO). 
Developed for the U.S. Air Force from 
earlier Delta versions, the Delta II is also 
available commercially from McDonnell 
Douglas. Its first launch took place in 
August, 1989. 
Atlas II ELV --capable of lifting about 
14,500 pounds to LEO. Manufactured by 
General Dynamics under contract to the 
Air Force, the Atlas is also available in a 
commercial version from General Dy-
namics. Its first commercial launch is 
scheduled for summer, 1990. 
Titan III ELV-a commercial launch 
vehicle capable of lifting up to 32,500 
pounds to LEO, manufactured by Martin 
Marietta. Its first commercial launch 
occurred on December 31, 1989. 
Titan IV ELV-manufactured by Mar-
tin Marietta under contract to the U.S. 
Air Force, it is capable of lifting about 
39,000 pounds to LEO. It was first 
launched on June 14, 1989, and carried a 
military payload. 
Space Shuttle-a piloted, partially reus-
able launch vehicle capable of lifting 
about 52,000 pounds to LEO. The Shut-
tle fleet now consists of three orbiters; a 
fourth is being completed. 
Potential Future Launch Systems 
Shuttle-C-an unpiloted cargo vehicle, 
derived from Shuttle systems. with a 
heavy-lift capacity of up to 150,000 
pounds to LEO. It would use the existing 
expendable external tank and reusable 
solid rocket boosters of the Shuttle. but 
replace the orbiter with an expendable 
cargo carrier. 
Advanced Launch System (ALS~ 
totally new modular launch system un4 
study by the Air Force and NASA. A! 
would be capable of launching a range'j 
cargos at high launch rates and redud 
costs. 
Cr~w Emergency Return vehic::1.'." 
vehicle that would provide for ere 
escape andretum from the Space Stati . " 
independent of the Shuttle, in case'~ 
crew medical emergencies or major Spaoij 
Station failures.:1 
Personnel Launch System. (PLSH 
new concept for a crew-carrymg vehicle 
launched atop expendable launch vehi-
cles. It would be less complex and less 
expensive than the Shuttle. A PLS could 
transport crew to and from space, and 
might also serve as an emergency return 
vehicle. 
Advanced Manned Launch System 
(AMLS)-an advanced successor to the 
Shuttle, available after the year 2005. 
System concepts vary from partially 
reusable through fully reusable vehicles; 
National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) 
-a proposed reusable vehicle that could 
be operated like an airplane from con-
ventional runways, but fly to Earth orbit 
powered by air-breathing, or air-breathing/ 
rocket engines. The Air Force and NASA 
are working on designs for an experi-
mental version of this vehicle, the X-30. 
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Chapter 1 
Executive Summary 
'1"'-'" 
.... 
.... ----
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
The Apollo 11 spacecraft lifts off from Kennedy Space Center atop the Saturn 5 launcher. July 16. 1969. on its way to the Moon. 
Four days later the United States landed two men on the Moon. The Saturn 5 launch vehicle was capable of lifting 
more than 200.000 pounds to low-Earth orbit. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Nation's recovery from the space transporta-
tion crisis of 1986, which brought the U.S. launch 
fleet to a standstill, is well under way. The United 
States now has an operating, mixed fleet (figure 1-1) 
comprised of reusable Space Shuttle orbiters and 
expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). The govern-
ment and the private sector have invested in new 
launch technologies and established a fledgling 
private launch services industry. Yet concerns over 
launch system reliability, operability,1 capacity, and 
cost remain. Over the next few years, Congress will 
be faced with making critical decisions affecting the 
future of U.S. space transportation systems.2 Con-
gress' decisions will depend directly on: 
• what future course the Nation wants to follow 
in space; and 
• understanding whether existing and planned 
launch systems, and their component technolo-
gies, are adequate to support the chosen direc-
tion. 
This report summarizes OTA' s assessment of 
advanced space transportation technologies; it was 
requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation and the House Commit-
tee on Science, Space, and Technology. Previous 
publications from this assessment (box I-A) have 
examined a range of U.S. launch options, ways of 
reducing launch operations costs, the "Big Dumb 
Booster" concept, crew-carrying launch systems, 
and spacecraft design. 
The report examines the space transportation 
needs of publicly supported space programs, as 
executed by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the Department of 
Defense (DoD). However, private sector space 
activities are slowly growing in importance. Hence, 
the report also explores aspects of the private 
sector's role in space transportation, both as contrac-
tor for the government's needs and as commercial 
supplier of launch services. 
ll.e .• flexibility and ability to meet a schedule. 
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THE U.S. FUTURE IN SPACE 
Except for the field of satellite communications, 
essentially all U.S. space activities continue to be 
characterized and managed by the Federal Govern-
ment and supported with public funds. The Federal 
Government invests in space activities in the expec-
tation that they will serve U.S. interests by: 
• demonstrating international leadership in space 
science, technology, and engineering; 
• contributing to economic growth; 
• enhancing national security; 
• supporting the pursuit of knowledge; and 
• prompqng international cooperation in sci-
ence~3./ 
Over the years, the United States has pursued a set 
of goals for its civilian and military space programs 
that derive from these broad policy principles. It has 
established systems in space for worldwide com-
munications, global Earth observation, and scien-
tific activities, including solar system exploration 
probes and landers. It has also sent men and women 
to work in space. Space transportation systems are 
critical elements in realizing these missions. 
The U.S. future course in space is uncertain, 
especially in light of the tremendous political and 
economic changes in progress around the world and 
the strong pressures to reduce Federal spending. 
Will the Government cut back on civilian and/or 
2 A space transportation or launch system includes the launch vehicle. the buildings. launch pad. and other launch facilities. and the technologies and 
methods used for launch. 
~~ational Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. sec. I; U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Civilian Space Policy and Applications. 
OTA-STI-I77 (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1982). pp. 35-38. 
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Figure 1-1-Primary Launch Vehicles of the World 
U.S. launch vehicles 
Scout 
LEO 475 Ibs. 
GTO NA 
Delta 
7,800Ibs. 
3,500 Ibs. 
Foreign launch vehicles 
Vostok Soyuz 
(SL-3) (SL-4) 
Delta 2 
11,000 Ibs. 
4,000 Ibs. 
Proton 
(SL-12/13) 
Atlas 1 
12,000Ibs. 
5,200Ibs. 
Energia 
(SL-17) 
LEO 11,000 Ibs. 17,000Ibs. 43,000Ibs. 220,000Ibs. 
GTO NA NA 8,000 Ibs. NA 
KEY: GTO = Geostationary Transfer Orbit; LEO = Low Earth Orbit 
SOURCE: OffiCA of TAChnolonv A ... .". ... "m .. nl 1 aan 
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14,500Ibs. 
6,000 Ibs. 
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(SL-17) 
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Ariane 3 
NA 
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March 3 
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military space programs, or will it continue to build 
steadily on our previous accomplishments? Alterna-
tively, will the United States embark on sharply 
expanded programs of human exploration (box I-B) 
or space-based defense? This report provides a guide 
to the opportunities for, and impediments to, sup-
porting a range of goals with existing and future 
launch systems. Because the lack of a clear future 
course for U.S. space activities makes the scale and 
character of future demand for space transportation 
highly uncertain, it is not sensible to choose among 
space transportation options without first selecting 
the specific goals to be served. OTA concludes that 
a national dialog is urgently needed to establish 
the future course of the publicly supported space 
program and to outline the preferred means of 
accomplishing program goals. 
If Congress and the Executive decide to follow 
the current course of steady growth in civilian 
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and military space activities, no new launch 
systems" would be needed before the first decade 
of the next century to meet demand for launch of 
cargo and people.5 Taken together, the existing 
launch fleet is capable of launching at least 900,000 
pounds6 to low Earth orbit (LEO) per year, which is 
about 37 percent more payload than the United 
States expects to launch in 1990,7 the first year that 
all of its . major launch systems will be fully 
operational.8 Nevertheless, new systems may be 
desirable to meet specific needs, such as crew 
rescue, or to reduce the dependence of the Space 
Station project on the Shuttle. Even if the steady 
growth in payload demand is limited to a few 
percent per year, the Nation's space transporta-
tion systems could be managed to reduce average 
launch costs. The Government spends at least $5 
billion per year on space transportation for civilian 
needs alone. It would be prudent to place greater 
4However. additional Shuttle orbiters or new facilities to launch existing systems may be needed, as explained later. 
SFor a 3 percent per year growth rate or Ie&'!. 
6In 1992-based on 9 Shuttle, 18 Delta n. 4 Atlas II, 4 Titan III, and 6 Titan IV launches per year, at a 9().percent manifesting effICiency. 
70rA assumed 8 Shuttle, 12 Delta II, 2 Atlas II, 1 Titan III. and 2 Titan IV flights. 
'The years of 1984 and 1985 were the last two in which U.S. launch systems were fully operational. It appears that 1990 will mark the first year since 
1985 that all major U.S. launch systems can be expected to operate on a sustained schedule. In addition, new private launch systems will be tested in 
1990. 
20-807 90 : QL 3 - 2 
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emphasis on improving the reliability, operability, 
and payload capacity of existing launch systems, for 
example, by incorporating new technologies into 
launch vehicles and launch operations procedures. 
If, on the other hand, the Nation decides to invest 
in a permanent lunar base, exploratory missions to 
Mars, or a large-scale, space-based ballistic missile 
defense, new cargo launch systems would be neces-
sary, including a heavy-lift launcher.9 Either a lunar 
base or a mission to Mars could also require new 
crew-carrying launch vehicles, and would necessi-
tate systems capable of transferring payloads and 
people between orbits. New, advanced launch sys-
tems could add $10 billion to $20 billion in 
development costs alone to the price tag for any 
major space program initiative.1O The timing and 
scale of government investments in new space 
transportation systems will depend directly on the 
commitment to the goals being defined for public 
space programs. 
Because the Nation cannot afford to invest in all 
the good ideas proposed for improved or new launch 
systems, Congress and the Administration will have 
to choose from among a wide range of options. Some 
choices must be made in the next 2 to 3 years. Others 
can wait longer. However, as argued earlier, all 
space transportation decisions will depend di-
rectly on the Nation's vision for its future in 
space. The following sections present options to 
meet a range of near-term and far-term space futures. 
Near-Term Space Transportation Options 
For the coming decade, the primary space trans-
portation issue is how to enhance U.S. access to 
space by improving the reliability and operability of 
existing systems-the Shuttle and ELVs. Whether 
the future launch rate is high or low, higher 
reliability for all launch systems (box I-C) and 
improved safety and operability for the Shuttle 
would increase the ability of current systems to meet 
program needs. Reducing launch costs would also 
reduce the impact of space transportation on the 
Federal budget (for equivalent demand levels) 
and might lead to more etTective use of space. To 
be most useful to the Nation, decisions about the 
following options should be made within the next 
2 to 3 years. 
• Fund improvements in expendable launch vehi-
cles (ELVs). Improved assurance against pro-
gram cost overruns and delays can be gained by 
improving the reliability and operability 01 
existing ELVs, which are based on designs 
originally developed in the 1950s and 1960s, 
The Advanced Launch System (ALS) Prograrr: 
has been studying technologies and methods tc 
enhance launch system operability, reliability 
and payload capacity. Incorporating the mosl 
promising of these technologies and method! 
in existing ELV systems,ll if feasible, woul~ 
improve the ELV fleet and give launci 
manufacturers and operators valuable ex, 
perience in using them. 
• Limit the Shuttle's launch rate to a regular 
sustainable rate. Attempting to meet NASA'! 
goal of 14 Shuttle launches per year12 woul< 
increase the cumulative risk to orbiter crews 
and to space program costs and schedules 
Furthermore, because it is reusable anc 
carries a crew, the Shuttle is not necessaril: 
the most appropriate choice for launchinl 
satellites and space probes, and for doinl 
many space science observations and exper 
iments. The presence of a crew necessaril: 
shifts NASA's primary concern from the mis 
sion's scientific objectives to the safe launcl 
and return of its crew. Hence, additional, costl: 
requirements are added to the payload, and tl 
the mission as a whole. The Shuttle launc 
schedule could be limited to a regular, sustaina-
ble rate of 8 to 10 launches per year13 by 
restricting Shuttle flights to payloads requiring 
human crews. NASA is already pursuing a 
strategy of restricting Shuttle payloads to those 
9NASA's recent Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars (Washington. DC: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, November 1989) states that supporting the development and operation of a lunar base and the exploration of Mars would require .,space 
transportation capacity of two to four times the mass that can now be delivered to orbit per year. ' 
10 As noted later in this report. these new launch systems might nevertheless make it possible to achieve sharply reduced operating costs. 
lISome of these improvements, such as fault-tolerant subsystems and artificial intelligence process controls, may also be appropriate for inclusion 
in the Shuttle system. 
12After orbiter Endeavour (OV-105) enters service in 1992. 
i30TA 'sestimate is based on the need to maintain a rate high enough to maintain flight-ready launch operation crews but low enough to avoid stressing 
those same crews. Such a rate should also allow for occasional surge to meet civilian or military needs and provide sufficent down-time to make major 
changes to the orbiters as required. 
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Box l-C-CopingWith Launch Risks 
Launching payloads to orbit has always carried a high degree of risk-to people, cargo. and financiers. One 
of the critical near-tenn needs for space transportation will be to reduce these risks. As .demonstrated by the long 
standdown following thelosses of Challenger and the Titan and Delta expendable launch vehicles in 1985 and 1986, 
major launch failures will have a Significant negative impact on public and private space activiti,es, causing loss of 
income for private companies that depend on space assets for their business, reduced effectiveness of national 
security programs. and erosion of public confide~ce in U.S. space efforts. OTA estimates that the standdown and 
recovery from Challengeralone costU.S. taxpayers more than $15 billion. 
Demonstrated success rates fOJ'U.S.·launch systems, including the Shuttle. range between 85 and 97·percent, 
yet U.S. plans, in both NASA and DoD, are optimistic and make little allowance for launch failures. In particular, 
the heavy U.S. dependence on the Space Shuttltr1 raises questions concerning the ability ·ofthe existing Shuttle 
fleet to meet its allocated share of .the demand for space trallsportation services. The Shuttle fleet has never 
met projected flight rateS and the existing fleet is unlikely to meet NASA's goal of 14 nights per year in the 
199Os, as a result either of launch operations delays, or orbiter attrition as a result of Shuttie faUures. 
Attempting to meet such a high rate increa~s the risk to human lives, to NASA's budget, and to other NASA 
programs, especially Space Station. 
The United States should expect the partial or total loss of one or more Shuttle orbiters so~etime in thenext 
decade. Public reaction .to the loss of Challenger demonstrated again that there are qualitative differences between 
public attitudes toward launching people and launching cargo into space. If the United States wishes to send people 
into space on a routine basis. the Nation wOl have to come to grips with the risks of human spaceflight Airl~s 
occasionally fail catastrophically but people continue to fly. The United States should exert its best efforts to ensure 
flight safety and prepare itself for handling further losses that wiUlikely occur. If the Nation perceivesthatthe ri~ks 
are too high, it may decide to reduce the current emphasis on placing humans in space until more reliable launchers 
are available. 
IThe Shuttle accounts for more than half of the Nation's existing payload capacity. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
requmng the Shuttles' unique capabilities. 
However, this curtailment will take several 
years to execute because payloads already 
designed for Shuttle launch cannot, without 
excessive modification and reintegration costs, 
be launched on an ELV.14 The restriction will 
also cost more in the short run than launching 
on the Shuttle because the Government will 
have to purchase ELV launch services 15 entail-
ing substantial redesign and re-integration 
costs.16 However, if NASA can establish a 
Shuttle launch rate that improves the probabil-
ity of recovering the orbiter after each launch, 
in the long run the Government could save 
money and also reduce the risk to Shuttle 
crews.17 
• Fund additional orbiters. Even if NASA sus-
tains a Shuttle rate of 8 to 10 launches per year, 
because of the risk of Shuttle a.ttrition, addi-
tional orbiters may be needed just to carry out 
current plans, including construction of the 
planned Space Station (box 1-0). The actual 
reliability of the Shuttle system is unknown, 
but may lie between 97 percent and 99 
percent. If reliability is 98 percent, the 
Nation faces a 50-50 chance of losing an 
14The size and/or weight of some payloads require them to be laWlched on the Shuttle. OpponWlities for Titan IV to carry civilian payloads appear 
to be severely limited, the result. in part. of limited production and launch facilities. Planned DoD payloads currently fill the Titan IV manifest through 
the year 2000. 
lSNote that flying payloads on ELVs would not necessarily reduce the risk of losing the payload. Demonstrated launch success rates for EI..vs are 
slightly lower than for the Shuttle. LaWlch services on the commerciallaWlchers. Delta. Atlas Centaur. and Titan III. are available for NASA's purchase. 
16For example. the COSlllic BackgroWld Explorer (COBE) Satellite, which was originally scheduled for laWlch on the Shuttle. was redesigned to fit 
OIl anELV at a cost of $30 million to 40 million. COBE was laWlched into a 900-kilometer polar orbit on Nov. 18.1989. on a Delta ELV. Among other 
astrophysical observations. COBE will make two total surveys of the sky of the faint backgroWld radiation that scientists believe is a remnant of the 
original Big Bang. some 15 billion years ago. 
17Developing a Shuttle-C cargo vehicle based on the Shuttle system would also make it possible to off-load certain payloads from the Shuttle (see 
Shuttle-C option below). 
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additional orbiter in the next 34 flights (3 to 
4 years). To reduce the risk of attempting to 
carry out the Nation's goals with only a 
3-orbiter fleet, Congress may wish to purchase 
one or more additional orbiters. A new orbiter 
would cost between $2 billion and $2.5 billion, 
and if ordered in fiscal year 1991, could be 
ready no earlier than 1996 or 1997 . 
• Fund a program to improve the safety and 
reliability of the Shuttle. In many respects, the 
Shuttle is not yet operational and can still be 
improved in a variety of ways. Much like the 
B-52 bomber, which has steadily grown more 
capable and remained operational for over 30 
years, the ability of the Shuttle orbiters to stay 
in service can theoretically be extended for 
another two decades. NASA is working on 
technologies that could enhance Shuttle safety 
and reliability as well as longevity. For exam-
ple, NASA is improving the construction of the 
Shuttle main engines, has begun a program to 
build more reliable, higher capacity, Advanced 
Solid Rocket Motors, and is installing new, 
more fault-tolerant computers. A long-term, 
integrated program of improvements to the 
orbiter and other subsystems would be more 
effective in fostering Shuttle reliability and 
safety than a piecemeal program. An integrated 
improvement program should also devote re-
sources to enhancing the management of 
launch operations, which would increase Shut-
tle's operability and might reduce operations 
costs. Congress may wish to require NASA to 
prepare an integrated plan for accomplishing 
these objectives . 
• Fund development of the Shuttle-C. For launch-
ing payloads that exceed the payload capacity 
of the Shuttle and the Titan IV, the Nation will 
eventually need a heavy-lift launch system. It 
could build a heavy-lift cargo system in the 
near term by developing a cargo launcher based 
on Shuttle technology (Shuttle-C). Shuttle-C 
would generally reduce the risk to the 
orbiter fleet of flying large payloads. Be-
cause it would be capable of lifting heavy 
payloads, Shuttle-C could also reduce the 
total number of flights required to construct 
Photo credit: General Dynamics Corp. 
An Air Force Atlas lifting off from the launch pad. 
the Space Station. In the far term, a Shuttle-C 
could carry a variety of large payloads for 
building a lunar base or supporting an explora-
tory mission to Mars. NASA asserts that 
developing a Shuttle-C would cost about $1.1 
billion18 and could be completed by 1995, if 
started in 1991.19 Infrastructure costs, which 
are included in this figure, would be minimal 
because Shuttle-C would use the same launch 
pads and many of the same facilities as the 
Shuttle.20 However, launch costs would be 
18Jn 1991 dollars. This figure does not include the estimated $480 million for the first Shuttle-C launch. 
19NASA officials appear to be divided over the advisability of pursuing Shunle-C. some believing that the Shunle will be adequate. others concerned 
that new systems. including Shuttle-C. should be developed. 
20ifthe Shuttle launch rate were kept at about 8 to 10 launches per year. 2 to 3 Shuttle-C launches per year could be accommodated if improvements 
to existing facilities. costing about $300 million. were made. 
relatively high, so the Shuttle-C would be most 
cost effective at relatively low launch rates (2-3 
per year). NASA estimates each launch of a 
Shuttle-C would cost over $400 million. 
• Develop a crew rescue vehicle for Space 
Station. Crews living and working in the 
planned Space Station could be exposed to 
substantial risk from major failures of the 
Station. Because the Shuttle cannot respond in 
a timely manner to emergencies, the United 
States may need a means independent of the 
Shuttle to rescue crews from the Space Station. 
A rescue vehicle would add $1 billion to $2 
billion in development and procurement costs 
to the Space Station. Additional costs would be 
incurred in developing the necessary support 
infrastructure, which might include ground 
operations hardware and personnel at the mis-
sion control site, landing site crews, and the 
necessary subsystems and logistics support to 
resupply, replenish, and repair a rescue vehicle 
on orbit. To decide whether a risk-reducing 
effort is worth the investment required, 
Congress must be advised about how much 
the investment would reduce the risk. Even 
if an alternate crew return vehicle were 
built, and worked as planned, it would not 
eliminate all risks to station crewmembers. 
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To assist in making such a decision, the risks 
and costs of building a rescue vehicle should 
be weighed against the risks and costs of 
other hazardous duty in the national inter-
est. Th reduce costs that would accrue to Space 
Station development, it may be prudent to 
cooperate with one or more of our Space 
Station partners in jointly developing a crew 
rescue vehicle, or adapting one of their crew-
carrying vehicles, now under development, for 
the purpose. 
Far-Term Space Transportation Options 
Although upgrading the current fleet ofELVs and 
the Shuttle would improve their operability and 
might even reduce space transportation costs, new 
systems will ultimately be needed if the Nation 
wishes to improve the U.S. capacity to launch 
payloads and crews. Emerging technologies otTer 
the promise of new launch systems and of 
significant evolutionary improvements in exist-
ing systems during the early decades of the 21st 
century. These improvements could reduce the 
costs of manufacturing, logistics, and operations 
while increasing reliability, operability, and per-
formance. Developing new systems that use ad-
vanced technology would entail high cost risk and 
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Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
ThA nthitAr A''''n'I .. lift~ nfffrnm Kennedv Soace Centercarrvino the Galileo spacecraft on the first stage of its journey toward Jupiter. 
technical risk and would require a sustained technol-
ogy development program. Yet new systems could 
also bring substantial benefits to U.S. launch capa-
bilities. The appropriate time to start develop-
ment of any new system will depend on the 
perceived future demand for space transporta-
tion services, the readiness ofthe technology, and 
the system's cost in competition with alternative 
means of performing comparable missions-
including existing launch systems. The long lead 
times necessary to develop a new system and 
construct necessary supporting facilities require 
begining development some 5 to 10 years before a 
system is needed.21 
Congress could fund the development of: 
• Advanced Launch Systems (ALS). Through the 
ALS program, the Air Force and NASA seek to 
develop a reliable, flexible family of medium-
and high-capacity, low-cost launch vehicles to 
serve government needs. They expect to capi-
talize on advanced materials and manufac-
turing and launch processing technologies, to 
increase launch rate and reduce acquisition, 
maintenance, and operational costs. They also 
21For example. the decision to begin development of the Space Shuttle was made in 1 fJ72. and the orbiter Columbia made its fU'St flight in April 1981. 
plan to include the ability to launch vehicles at 
a higher than average rate for a short time (i.e., 
surge). A decision to proceed with ALS 
development would depend on whether 
there will be sufficient anticipated demand 
to justify development and procurement of a 
new, high capacity launcher, or whether the 
value of improved efficiency in launching 
currently planned payloads would justify 
investing in new systems. Because it would be 
significantly different in design and operation 
than current launch systems, and would use a 
wide variety of new technologies, development 
of an operational ALS carries a significant cost 
and schedule risk.22 
The ALS program has been funded almost 
entirely by DoD, which has decided not to 
pursue development of the ALS at this time; 
DoD plans to continue technology develop-
ment of propulsion and other crucial enabling 
technologies. If ALS technology development 
continues to be funded by Congress and the 
Executive, the DoD could be in a position to 
start full development of the ALS in the mid or 
late 1990s, if necessary. 
• A Personnel Launch System (PLS) or Advanced 
Manned Launch System (AMLS). Even if 
NASA makes substantial improvements to 
the Shuttle, eventually a replacement will be 
needed if the United States decides to con-
tinue its commitment to maintaining crews 
in space. A decision to replace the Shuttle 
should be based on the age and condition of the 
Shuttle fleet and the estimated benefits to be 
gained from developing a new crew-carrying 
launch system. NASA is exploring the technol-
ogies, systems, and costs required for develop-
ment of two new launch systems. Although 
concepts for the two proposed systems overlap, 
their general focus is different. PLS designers 
are considering several concepts, ranging from 
ballistic entry vehicles to a small "space-
plane." A PLS vehicle would carry very little 
cargo and could be launched atop a large 
expendable booster. AMLS designs favor a 
reusable vehicle larger than the PLS, but 
smaller and easier to refurbish and launch than 
the Shuttle, and capable of carrying both crew 
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and cargo (about 20,000 pounds). An AMLS 
might be launched by a reusable booster. 
A PLS could be developed and tested sooner 
than an AMLS and might be needed to back up 
or replace the Shuttle. Developing and operat-
ing a PLS would likely cost less than an AMLS. 
If it entered the fleet before the Shuttle is 
retired, a PLS could assist in providing more 
reliable access to space for humans. In addition, 
a version of the PLS vehicle might serve as a 
Space Station crew escape vehicle. The choice 
between an AMLS and a PLS will depend on 
cost and the need for an alternative to the 
Shuttle. 
• An Aerospace Plane. Developing a fully reusa-
ble piloted vehicle that could be operated like 
an airplane from conventional runways, but fly 
to Earth orbit powered by a single propulsion 
stage, as envisaged for the· National Aero-
Space Plane (NASP), would provide a radically 
different approach to space launch and a major 
step in U.S. launch capability. If successful, an 
aerospace plane could provide increased flexi-
bility and reduced launch costs. NASA and the 
Air Force are jointly developing the technology 
base that could lead to an X-30 experimental 
aerospace plane, which would incorporate ad-
vanced air-breathing propulsion as well as 
rocket propulsion. Developing a successful 
X -30 test vehicle may cost more than $5 
billion.23 Proponents argue that benefits to U.S. 
industry and U.S. competitiveness may more 
than repay that investment. 
Until an X-30 flies successfully to orbit and 
back, estimated costs for building an opera-
tional vehicle based on technology demon-
strated in the X-30 will remain highly uncer-
tain. At the present time, the Air Force has 
shown the greatest interest in an operational 
aerospace plane, primarily because it would 
provide quick response to emergencies and fast 
turnaround in preparation for reflight. While 
very attractive from an operational point of 
view, building such a vehicle poses large 
technological and cost risks. Either a PLS or 
AMLS could be developed sooner than an 
aerospace plane based on X-30 technology. 
Other proposed launch systems, including 
22As noted earlier. reducing launch costs by means of ALS or any other new launch system may require increased payload demand. 
23The NASP Program Office estimates X·30 costs for two test vehicles and supportive infrastructure at $3 billion to $5 billion. OTA regards these 
estimates as a lower limit. 
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small launch systems and the ALS, may 
provide stitT economic competition to an 
aerospace plane, because they may also 
serve DoD needs for launching most pay-
loads quickly at much lower investment cost. 
• Other Advanced Concepts. NASA and 000 are 
funding studies of a variety of highly advanced 
launch concepts, including all-rocket, single-
stage-to-orbit vehicles, laser propulsion, and 
chemical ram accelerator techniques. Although 
each of these concepts has strong proponents, 
each will also need considerable additional 
study before its costs and benefits will be 
sufficiently understood to determine whether or 
not it is an appropriate candidate for develop-
m~nt. Nevertheless, research on advanced con-
cepts and related technologies could eventually 
lead to a cost-effective future launch system 
and will be of broad importance in maintaining 
U.S. innovation in launch technologies. For 
example, previous studies of single-stage-to-
orbit vehicles have cast doubt on their ability to 
perform efficiently because the necessary light-
weight, high-strength materials were not avail-
able. However, recent advances in the develop-
ment of the necessary advanced materials in the 
NASP program suggest that single-stage-to-
orbit rocket-propelled vehicles may yet prove 
feasible. 
REDUCING SPACE 
TRANSPORTATION COSTS 
Reducing launch costs and improving opera-
bility are the two most important issues to 
address as the Nation considers the development 
of any new launch systems. Launching payloads to 
low Earth orbit on existing launch systems costs 
from $3,000 to $10,000 per pound. Placing them in 
geosynchronous orbit can cost up to $20,000 per 
pound. Thus, reducing launch costs will play a 
critical role in making space activities more afforda-
ble and productive. It is especially important in this 
era when there are strong pressures to reduce Fede3 
budget deficits. Making launch systems more flexi," 
ble and more capable of meeting a schedule coul" 
also contribute to reduced operating costs. Howevet1 
the costs of designing and procuring spacecraft llI1 
often much higher, per pound, than launch costs! 
Attention should also be given to decreasing space: 
craft costs (box I-E). ' 
NASA, the Air Force, and the private sector have 
been working on methods of reducing both nome 
curring and recurring launch costs. For example 
new manufacturing and construction methods cou14 
lower the cost of building new launch vehicles. Yet¥ 
because launch and mission operations ma, 
constitute a sizable fraction of the cost of launch;: 
ing payloads into orbit,24 system designers anel 
policymakers must give greater attention ttl 
launch operations and support, and to ho\'l 
launch vehicle and payload designs interact. Fo 
many aspects of launch operations, the broad opera 
tional experience of the airlines and some of thl 
methods they employ to maintain efficiency rna; 
provide a useful mode~ for space operations (00",. 
I-F). However, even If the launch systems artS;· 
designed for reduced operational costs, it will ~i; 
difficult to improve operations and support without',· 
making significant changes to the institutions cur-" 
rentlY responsible for those operations.25 
Harnessing industry's innovative power in a 
more competitive environment could lead to 
reduced launch costs and more etTective use of 
U.S. resources for outer space. By promoting 
private sector innovation toward improvements in 
the design, manufacture, and operations of launch 
systems, the Government could reduce the cost of 
Government launches, yet relatively few incentives 
to involve private firms exist today. Current U.S. 
space policy, which directs NASA, and encourages 
000, to purchase launch services rather than laund 
vehicles from private firms is a promising frn' 
step.26 Yet, despite the fact that both agencies arc 
moving toward purchasing launch services, change 
24The cost of operations range from 15 to 45 percent of launch costs. depending on the complexity of operations. For example. operations costs fc 
the Atlas or Delta ELV are about 15 percent of launch costs; operations costs of the Space Shuttle. which also include costs of flight operations as we 
as launch operations. because the orbiter is reusable and piloted. reach at least 45 percent of the total. See U.S. Congress. Office of Technolol! 
Assessment. Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28 (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printill 
Office. September 1988). p. 13. 
2SReducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, op. cit.. footnote 21. Adapting airline practices. which have been develope 
over several decades of experience. and based on millions of hours of flight time. will take considerable imagination and innovation. 
26When the Government purchases launch systems. it must maintain a large staff to operate the launchers. or to oversee contractors who do so. f 
purchasing launch services. the Government gives up most of the responsibility (and therefore cost) for overseeing details of launch manufacture and 
operation. 
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Bqx l-E-Retlucing Spac't"'/(Cjf~ 
Although reducing the costs of space transportation is extre~ly~~inbringingdOwn~costs of 
exploring and exploiting outer space. reducing payload costs,especiallyfor ~~sateUites. isalso vitally important. 
For these payloads,·launch.cos~ are .• wical1yonly.a small petcelltageof ... · . costs of a program •. beCJusethe 
costs of designing and building spacecraft are extremely high. NASA-and... . acecraft typically COil between 
$160,000 and $650.000 per pound.1 For commercial satellitelaunc:hesto~~~cbronQUSQrl>it. where spacecraft 
costs. and launch costs arecompJlfabl~.reducing both is important~Pri~~~tition between fit:ler optics cable 
systemS and satellite communications systems for the highly com~tive.f\tl!lJltic and .Pacific routes ~e the 
reduction of overall program costs especially important to co~unic::Ilti~~ll:ite companies. . 
Spacecraft COsts can be reduced by· innovative design: 
• allowing them to· be much heavier. so ~xpensive weight reductiOntec~ues are not.need.ed (fatsats);2 
• making them very light and litpiting them to fewer tasks (lightsats)j 
• building very small spacecraft (microspacecraft) that could be launchei:llike cannon shells for specialized 
tasks. 
Each of these appr()aches wouldimpose different requirements on launchs~~~s. ~ongtess may wish tootder 
a comprehensive study of th*and other innovative approaches tOsp~raft desip. 
IThese estimatesinelude amOl1izedspacecraft pro.-ameosts. . . .• . . .. . ...••.......••.. 
2The gains acnieved1tetc ilPpear to betelatively smaUcmnpared to the overallcostoj'~:paylo4ld andlauncb~ce:U;S.Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, Ajfordable Space.craft: De.sign and lm,I/lCh, Alter.itt!,f. PTA-BP-1SC-«l <WasbingtoQ,.OC; U.S, 
Government Printing Office. January 19!}(l),pp. 12-16. . 
SOURCE: Office of Te~hnOlogy.Asse~t, 1990. 
Box I-F -Airlines OpertltW_,Precepts 
• Involve operations petsqnnel jn <iesign changes, 
• Develop detailed· ·c,peraUons.cost . esti~tion 
models. 
• Stand down to traceandrepairfailur~sonlywhcm 
the evidence points to.a.major ~e.neric failure. 
• Design for fault tolerance. 
• Design for maintainabi,lby. 
• Encourage competitive pricing. 
• Maintain strong training prqgnuns. 
• Use automatic built7in ¥he.ckout of subsystems 
between flights. 
SOURCE; Office of Technology Assesstnent,l990. 
is relatively slow, in part because NASA and DoD 
managers are reluctant to cede greater control over 
the fate of extremely expensive payloads to the 
private sector.27 
Low-cost space transportation options that are 
designed to achieve minimum cost rather than 
maximum perfonnance28 may merit further study, 
particularly if their development meshes with other 
space transportation efforts such as those to develop 
a liquid rocket booster for the Shuttle, or new 
engines for the ALS. 
One way to stimulate the private sector's innova-
tive creativity would be to issue a request for 
proposal for ALS-type launch services and have 
industry bid for providing them. Such an approach 
assumes minimum government oversight over the 
design and manufacturing processes. It would also 
require the aerospace community to assume much 
greater financial risk than it has taken on in the past. 
Another option that might lead to lower launch 
costs would be for the government to issue space 
transportation vouchers to space scientists whose 
experiments are being supported by the govern-
ment. 29 These vouchers could be redeemed for 
transportation on any appropriate U.S. launch vehi-
cle, and would free scientists to choose the vehicle 
they thought most suitable to the needs of the 
27Bruce D. Berkowitz, "Energizing the Space Launch Industry," Issues in Science & Technology, Winter 1989-90, pp. 77-83. 
28~.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Big Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost. Space Transponation Optwn?~ackground Paper 
(Washington, DC: International Security and Commerce Program, 1989). 
29Molly Macauley, "Launch Vouchers for Space Science Research," Space Policy, vol. 5, No.4, pp. 311-320. 
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spacecraft. This policy would free space scientists 
from dependence on the Shuttle, and might increase 
opportunities for researchers to reach space. 
The small launch vehicle concepts being devel-
oped by the private sector in response to the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency's Advanced 
Satellite Technology Program ("lightsats") promise 
another avenue for cost reductions. They provide the 
means for small payloads to reach orbit for a 
relatively low cost per launch.3o In this case, the 
Government provided a market sufficiently large to 
induce private firms to develop the vehicles using 
private funding.31 
LIFE-CYCLE COSTS OF SPACE 
TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS 
Estimates of life-cycle costs, which include the 
nonrecurring costs required to develop and build a 
new launch system as well as future recurring 
procurement and operating costs, provide the best 
economic measure of the worth of a new investment 
compared to other possible options. The overall cost 
of Earth-to-orbit transportation over the next three 
decades will include, at minimum, the costs of 
launching vehicles of existing types, at least until 
they are superseded. Almost certainly, some vehi-
cles will fail catastrophically, leading to direct, 
indirect, and intangible costs. If the Government 
elects to launch at higher rates, additional facilities 
will be needed to prepare and launch vehicles. 
If the Government elects to develop and use new 
types of launch vehicles, U.S. taxpayers must fund 
their development, production, and operation, as 
well as construction or modification of the facilities 
that would be needed to launch them. Next-
generation vehicles will also incur some risk of 
failure, although how much cannot now be estimated 
with confidence. Nevertheless, investment in devel-
oping new types of vehicles could yield later payoffs 
in performance, operability, and safety, as well as 
lower cost of operation and risk of failure, compared 
to current vehicles. 
To decide whether proposed investments inl 
proving the Nation's Earth-to-orbit transportaij 
system could be justified on economic ground~; 
predicted savings in the out-years, OTA estim_ 
the life-cycle cost of each of several alternativej 
The life-cycle cost includes costs of developingri 
types of launch vehicles (if any), purchasing reu 
ble elements of launch vehicles, building ~ 
additional launch facilities required, launch opE 
tions (including purchase of expendable law 
vehicle elements), expected costs oflaunch vebl 
failures, and the risk of cost overrun ("cost ris) 
OTA considered only expenditures that would 
incurred between 1989 and 2020.33 OTA calculi 
the present value of the estimated life-cycle COSI 
discounting future expenditures to reflect the 10' 
opportunity cost of obligating a future dol 
relative to spending a dollar now. 
Figure 1-2 presents OTA's estimates of • 
present value of life-cycle cost of each of 'j 
alternative vehicle mixes for each of three s~ 
transportation demand scenarios. The rankingi 
alternatives according to present value of life-cy~ 
cost, and the net benefit of each alternative relati' 
to continued use of current vehicles, depends on ~ 
demand for space transportation. The differences 
life-cycle cost are small in the low-growth demaJ 
scenario, especially when compared to the unc~ 
tainty represented by cost risk. However, the c~ 
estimates clearly favor the Advanced Launch Syl 
tern in the expanded demand scenario, which I 
eludes low-growth demand plus rapidly increas~ 
demand for launches of heavy cargo, such .•• ~ 
formerly contemplated for deployment of a Ph~i 
Strategic Defense System (SDS). Options for al~ 
base or a Mars expedition could result in denuuj 
analogous to the expanded demand scenario. Al~ 
natives for a lunar base and Mars expedition 8j 
currently being weighed by the National Spac 
Council, NASA, and others. The DoD continues ,I 
assess options for development and deployment~ 
SDS. 
3OFor many small launch systems. the cost to launch a pound of payload is relatively high. Nevertheless. small systems may provide a cost-efJcctl 
launch for owners of small payloads who would otherwise have to launch their payload as a secondary payload on a multiple-payload launch into all 
optimum orbit. ' 
31Initial flights of Orbital Sciences Corp. Pegasus. an air-launched vehicle capable of carrying 600 to 900 pounds into low Earth orbit. are schedul 
for spring 1990. 
32por additional details on space transportation costs. see box I-G. 
330TA has little confidence in projections of demand to or beyond 2020. but chose 2020 as an accounting horizon to capture most of the discoun 
out-year savings (5 percent real discount rate) from vehicles that would not be operational until about 2005. 
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Box l-G-Additio1ltlllnjo17lUllion on Costs in Other OTA Reports 
LaunCh Options for the Future describes in greater detail the· mission 1llOOeis and launch system options. OTA 
• considered and the methods OTA used to estimate the life-cycle costs.quoted in.this report. 
• Reducing Launch Operations Costs. di$cusses criteria used for comparing space tran/iPortatlon options, and 
confidence bounds on launch vehicle reliabilities. 
• Big Dumb Boosters assesses proposals for designing unmanned. expendable launch vehicles to minirnizecost. 
• Round Trip to Orbit discusses additional options for piloted launch. vehicles, and uncertainties in estimates of 
Shuttle reliability, on which expected Shuttle failure costs depend $eDsitively. . 
• Affordable Spacecraft discusses payload costs, assesses proposals for reducing them, and discusses their effects 
on demand for space transportation. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
AND COOPERATION 
This decade has seen the rise of intergovernmental 
competition in space transportation (figure 1-1). The 
Soviet Union. Europe, Japan. and China operate 
launch systems capable of reaching space with 
sizable payloads. A number of experts have raised 
doubts about the capability of the U.S. private sector 
to compete for launch services in the world market. 
especially in the face of a relatively small market for 
commercial launch services and competition from 
some foreign companies, which receive greater 
government subsidy than do U.S. firms. The U.S. 
Government could assist the U.S. private sector 
by negotiating with the governments of other 
nations to ensure a competitive environment for 
launch services in which prices and other eco-
nomic factors reflect the true costs of providing 
those services. Alternatively. the U.S. Government 
could assist U.S. industry to the same degree and in 
a similar manner as other nations assist their own 
launch services industry. The U.S. Government also 
has a stake in reducing its own costs for space 
transportation. It could therefore provide modest 
funding to encourage private sector innovation for 
s.treamlining the manufacturing and launch opera-
hons processes and improving productivity. 
Although the United States has always main-
~ne~ a vigorous program of international coopera-
hon m space in order to support U.S. political and 
economic goals, it has cooperated very little with 
other countries in space transportation, in large part 
because most launch technology has direct military 
applications. In addition, before other countries had 
developed indigenous capabilities, the United States 
was pleased to have them depend on us for launch 
services. If launch demand does not increase mark-
edly by the turn of the century, and the U.S. supply 
of launch vehicles remains sufficient, there may be 
little reason to change the U.S. stance toward 
cooperation in space transportation. However, if the 
Nation wishes to expand its activities in space, the 
costs of space endeavors would quickly reach the 
level where a much greater degree of international 
cooperation, including cooperation in space trans-
portation, could be highly desirable. 
As it debates the direction and magnitude of 
the space program, Congress will have to decide, 
as a matter of policy, how much of our publicly 
supported space program we want to pursue 
alone and how much we wish to involve foreign 
partners. International cooperation lessens our abil-
ity to use space to demonstrate national technologi-
cal prowess, but can place the United States in a 
position to help guide the direction of global space 
development. Cooperation could also reduce the 
cost to the United States of a particular project, 
though it would generally increase the project's total 
cost. However, for potential foreign partners to 
join with the United States in such projects, the 
United States will have to demonstrate that it not 
only has the willingness to cooperate on major 
projects but the institutional mechanisms to 
follow through. Our partners' recent experience 
with the United States on Space Station34 and on 
di 34~ome .Euro~an and Japanese delegates to the 40th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, October 1989, expressed considerable 
ssattsfaction WIth U.S. actions in Space Station development and worried that the United States was becoming an unreliable partner. 
13 3sJeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Europe Delays Soho Spacecraft Work Until U.S. Approves Joint Project MOU," Aviation Week andSpace Technology, Nov. DC 1989. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,lnternational Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities (Washington, 
: U.S. GOvenunent Printing Office, 1985), for a general discussion of U.S. cooperative agreements, mechanisms, and problems. 
Figure 1-2-Dlscounted Llfe-Cycle Costs of Space Transportation Options 
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This figure shows the present value, in fiscal year 1989 dollars, of the estimated life-cycle cost of 
each of six space transportation options in each of three scenarios· for growth of U.S. Government 
demand for transportation to and from low Earth orbit: 
• Low-Growth: launch rate grows about 3 percent per year to 41 launches per year by 2010, then 
remains constant through 2020. 
• Growth: launch rate grows about 5 percent per year to 55 launches per year by 2010, then 
remains constant through 2020. 
• Expanded: launch rate grows about 7 percent per year to 91 launches per year by 2010, then 
remains constant through 2020. 
All options assume continued use of current vehicles-Titan IVs for heavy cargo, Delta II and/or 
Atlas-Centaur II Medium Launch Vehicles for light cargo, and Space Shuttles for round-trip 
miSSions (piloted launches or return of cargo to Earth)-except as noted: 
• Titan IV: no exceptions. 
• Enhanced Baselme: upgrade Titan IVs and Shuttles to increase reliability and reduce cost. 
• Low-rate Shutt/e-C: develop the Shuttle-C expendable, unmanned, heavy-cargo launch vehicle, 
and launch three per year starting 1995. 
• High-rate Shuttle-C: develop the Shuttle-C and launch them at whatever rate is required to 
replace Titan IVs, starting 1995. 
• Advanced Launch System: develop unmanned Advanced Launch System (ALS) vehicles and 
launch them at whatever rate is required to replace Titan IVs, starting 2005. 
• Advanced Manned Launch System: develop Advanced Manned [aunch System (AMLS) 
vehicles and launch them at whatever rate is required to replace Shuttles, starting 2005. 
*Demand for piloted and light-cargo launches is the same in all scenarios; the scenarios differ 
only in demand for heavy-cargo launches. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
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· missions35 may diminish their interest in 
sCIence . ' h h U' ed pursuing cooperative projects WIt t e O1t 
States. 
Potential areas for cooperation in space transpor-
tation include: 
• The use of European and Japanese vehicles to 
supply Space Station. The European Space 
Agency has developed a capable launch system 
(Ariane IV) and is now developing a much 
more powerful Ariane V. Either vehicle could 
be used to supply the Space Station. Japan is 
developing its H II launch system, which will 
be roughly comparable to the existing Ariane 
IV. The United States could benefit by 
sharing responsibility for resupply of the 
Space Station with its international part-
ners. 
• Cooperation with the Soviet Union, Europe, 
and Japan in space rescue.IThe Soviet Union 
is presently the only country beyond the United 
States with the capability to launch people into 
space. However, as noted, Europe and Japan are 
working on crew-carrying systems. Agree-
ments on docking standards, and procedures for 
space rescue, could increase astronaut safety 
for all nations and lead to more extensive 
cooperative activities in the future. Initial 
meetings have been scheduled to discuss the 
nature and extent of such cooperation. Both this 
cooperative project and the use of foreign 
vehicles to supply the Space Station have the 
advantage that they risk transferring very little 
U.S. technology to other participants. 
• Joint development of a crew rescue vehicle for 
the Space Station. The United States could be 
even more innovative in cooperating with other 
countries. For instance, as noted earlier, it may 
decide to provide an emergency crew escape or 
return vehicle for the Space Station. If properly 
redesigned and outfitted, the European spa-
ceplane, Hennes, might be used as an emer-
gency return vehicle late in this century. Early 
in the next century, the planned Japanese 
HOPE spaceplane might also serve that same 
purpose.36 However, such international cooper-
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Photo credit: Japa". .. National $pac» Development AgtIncy 
A Japanese Mu-3S-3 solid rocket launches the 
interplanetary probe SUISEI toward Halley's 
comet in 1985. 
ation would also require a degree of interna-
tional coordination and technology sharing for 
which the United States has little precedent. 
• Joint development of an aerospace plane. With 
strong encouragement from their private sec-
tors, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom 
are working separately toward development of 
aerospace planes. The level offoreign sophisti-
cation in certain areas of advanced materials, 
advanced propulsion, and aerodynamic compu-
tation is on a par with U.S. work. A joint 
development program with one or more of 
these partners might allow the United States to 
achieve an aerospace plane faster and with 
lower cost to the United States than the United 
States could on its own. Although a joint 
3SJeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "Europe Delays Soho Spacecraft Work Until U.S. Approves Joint Project MOU," Aviation Week andSpace Technology, Nov. 
13, 1989. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), for a general discussion of U.S. cooperative agreements, mechanisms, and problems. 
~HOPE is not currently being designed to carry crew. If the Japanese were interested in cooperating with the United States in this area, it may be 
feastble to redesign HOPE for the purpose. 
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project would risk some technology transfer, if 
properly structured, such a joint project could 
be to the mutual benefit of all countries 
involved. 
• U.S. use of the U.S.S.R. Energia heavy-lift 
launch vehicle. The U.S.S.R. has offered infor-
mally to make its Energia heavy-lift launch 
vehicle available to the United States for 
launching large payloads. As noted throughout 
this report, the United States has no existing 
heavy-lift capability. Thus, the Soviet offer 
could assist in developing U.S. plans to launch 
large, heavy payloads, such as fuel or or othel 
non-critical components of a Moon or Mars 
expedition. Concerns about the transfer of 
militarily useful technology to the Soviet 
Union would inhibit U.S. use of Energia for 
high-technology payloads. As well, NASA 
would be understandably reluctant to propose 
use of a Soviet launcher because such use might 
be seen as sufficient reason for the United 
States to defer development of its own heavy-
lift vehicle. 
Chapter 2 
Space Program Futures 
Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Earthrise as seen from above the Moon on Apollo 17, the last crew-carrying lunar flight. If the United States establishes a lunar base 
sometime at the beginning of the next century, Earthrise would be a familiar sight for the inhabitants of such a base. 
INTRODUCTION 
A the result of long-term constraints on the 
Fed:ral budget, the Nation can ~ursue only a few of 
th many good space transportatIon concepts that are 
e posed today. Until the Nation chooses what it P~nts to accomplish in space, and what the U.S. 
:Xpayer is willing to pay for, neither the type nor 
number of necessary launchers and facilities can 
be estimated with accuracy. Possibl~ driving 
forces behind additional space transportatiOn capa-
bilities to support publicly funded space activities 
include the Space Station, space-based ballistic 
missile defense, a permanent lunar base, and landing 
people on Mars. Some hav~ suggested that ~ore 
modest Government expendItures are appropnate, 
especially in the face of pressing domestic needs, 
until we have reduced our current budget deficit and 
reversed our foreign trade imbalance. Congress, the 
Administration, and the American people as a whole 
are faced today with making choices among these or 
other, alternative options for the U.S. future in space. 
The tremendous economic and political changes 
now taking place in the Soviet Union, Eastern and 
Western Europe, the Pacific Rim nations, indeed in 
the entire world, suggest that charting a course will 
be fraught with considerable uncertainty about the 
future, and the United States' place in the world 
economy. It will be important to weigh the future 
course of our Government's space activities in the 
context of these uncertainties. A failure to debate 
these choices vigorously and to select among them 
decisively will nevertheless result in some sort of 
national space program, but one that may not serve 
the long-term political and economic interests of the 
United States as well as a carefully considered 
policy. 
This chapter focuses on the broad implications for 
space transportation of following specific space 
program futures; they were chosen by OTA to span 
the range of policy options open to the United States. 
Chapter 2 
Space Program Futures 
Later chapters present launch technologies and 
systems and assess their economic and technological 
implications for the future of U.S. space activities. 
SPACE PROGRAM OPTIONS 
The choice among policy options such as those 
summarized below will determine the demand, and 
hence costs, for U.S. space transportation. The 
options are not necessarily exclusive; for example, 
Options 2 and 4 could be pursued at the same time. 
Option 1: Continue Existing NASA and DoD 
Space Programs. 
This option assumes that NASA would continue 
with its current plans to build the planned Space 
Station and launch several large space-based obser-
vatories and robotic planetary spacecraft by the end 
of the century. It also assumes that no DoD or NASA 
spacecraft would weigh more than current launch 
vehicles could lift. 
The United States possesses a capable fleet of 
launch vehicles and the facilities necessary to 
meet current launch demands and provide for 
limited near-term growth. By 1992, the year the 
Shuttle orbiter Endeavour comes on line, planned 
space transportation capability (table 2-1) would be 
sufficient to lift about 900,000 pounds of payload 
into low Earth orbit (LEO) I per year, assuming there 
are no major delays or failures. 2 By comparison, in 
1984 and 1985, the last years all U.S. launch systems 
were fully operational, the United States launched an 
average of about 600,000 pounds into orbit. 
Launching 900,000 pounds to LEO each year 
would cost the Nation about $7 billion per year for 
transportation alone, assuming no major failures 
occur.3 However, as the launch failures of 1985, 
1986, and 1987 illustrate,4 space transportation is 
risky. No launch vehicle is 100 percent reliable; 
launch success rate, which is an indicator of 
reliability, varies from 85 to 97 percent (table 
2-2). If space transportation capacity is limited to 
Ilb a reference orbit 110 nautical miles high, inclined to 28.5' from the equitorial plane. 
~To reach 890,000 pounds per year the United States would have to launch payloads equivalent to 9 Space Shuttle flights, 6 Titan IVs, 4 Titan Ills, 
5 Titan lIs, 4 Atlas Us, 12 Delta lIs, and 12 Scouts. 
3This estimate, in fiscal year 1989 dollars, includes the expected costs of operations and failures. but no amortized nonrecurring costs or cost risk. 
4Between November 1985 and March 1987. the United States had lost two Titan Ills. one Delta, one Atlas Centaur. the orbiter Challenger, and their 
~YlOadS as a result of technical or hwnan failures. Loss of Challenger also resulted in a loss of seven crewrnembers. These failures, and the recovery 
3 c:m them, cost the United States an estimated $16 to $18 billion. Arianespace, the French launch company, also sustained a launch failure of an Ariane 
m May 1986. which cost insurers, Arianespace, and the European Space Agency well over $100 million. 
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Table 2-1-Maxlmum Lift capability of U.S. Launch Vehicles Using Existing Manufacturing and Launch FaCilities 
Launch vehicle 
Scout ............................ . 
Titan II ........................... . 
Delta II (3920)"': .................... . 
AtlaslCentaur .......... , .......... . 
Titan III .......................... . 
Titan IV ......................... .. 
Space Shuttle .................... . 
Total .......................... . 
Mass delivereda 
570 
5,500 
7,600 
13,500 
27,600 
39,000 
52,oooe 
Production rateb 
12 
5 
12 
5 
10 
6 
n.a.f 
Launch ratee 
18 
5 
18 
4 
4 
6 
9 
Capability«! 
6,840 
27,500 
91,200 
54,000 
110,400 
234,000 
486,460 
992,400 pounds 
x90 percent manifesting efflCiency!l = 890,000 pounds 
Bpounds delivered to a 110 nm circular orbit at 28.50 inclination, unless otherwise noted. 
bMaximum sustainable production rate with current facilities, in vehicles per year. 
!:Maximum sustainable launch rate with current facilities, in vehicles per year. 
dMass delivered X the lessor of the maximum production rate or the maximum launch rate. 
8"fhis figure is an average of the three existing orbiters' performance to a 110 nm circular orbit (OV102: 45,600 pounds; OV103 and OV1 04:49,1 00 pounds). 
fNot applicable since the orbiter is reusable. No orbiter production is currently planned beyond the Challenger replacement. 
9Vehicles often fly carrying less than their full capacity. Manifesting efficiency is the amount of lift capability that is actually used by payloads or upper stages. 
Volume constraints, scheduling incompatibilities, or security considerations often account for payload bays being less than full by weight. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
Table 2-2-Launch Vehicle Success Rate 
Launch vehicle 
Scout ...................... . 
Delta· ..................... . 
Atlas Centaur·· .............. . 
Titan ....................... . 
Shuttle .................... .. 
·Does not include flights of Delta II. 
"Does not include flights of Atlas II. 
Total launches 
112 
182 
66 
145 
33 
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration & U.S. Air Force. 
Overall 
88 
93 
85 
95 
97 
Percentage successful 
Last 20 attempts 
95 
95 
85 
85 
95 
Lower COnfidence Bounds on Reliability for 95 Percent Confldence (in percentage)' 
Launch vehicle Based on all launches Based on last 20 launches 
Scout .................................... . 
Delta ..................................... . 
Atlas Centaur .............................. . 
Titan ................... ~ ................ . 
Shuttle ................................... . 
• Exact, nonrandomized, one·sided lower confidence bounds. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
vehicles currently in the fleet and on order, the 
United States runs a significant risk that some 
planned missions-most notably the Space Sta-
tion--could be delayed, disrupted, or lost be-
cause of technical difficulties or accidents. If such 
risks are deemed too high, additional space 
transportation capacity may be needed before the 
end of the century just to carry out current 
plans.s Near-term additional :apacity could be 
provided by one or more additional Shuttle 
orbiters or a Shuttle-C. 
82 
89 
76 
91 
86 
78 
78 
66 
66 
78 
Even if growth of the Nation's space programs is 
moderate (less than 3 percent per year in terms of 
total mass lifted to low Earth orbit), it would be 
prudent to continue to improve the reliability and 
capacity of current systems by incorporating new 
technologies into launch vehicles and launch opera-
tions. A continuing program to make such improve-
ments to systems and facilities could cost a billion 
dollars per year. In addition, the United States 
may need a means independent of the Shuttle for 
returning crews from the Space Station in case of 
SNote, however, that purchasing extra space transportation capacity carries a certain cost risk. If the extra capacity were not needed, the expenditures 
would have been wasted. 
A crew emergency return vehicle and etne~ge~~J~s to support it would add between $1 
t1!e. ac I d $2 billion in development costs to 
bdbon an . d th NASA'S space transportauon bu get over. e next 
ad Plus an unknown amount of operaung costs. dec e, 
Option 2: Limit growth of NASA's activities for 
humans in space. 
This option would defer beginning construction 
of the Space Station until the early part of the. 21 st 
ntorY and place greater near-term emphasIs on 
ce . 1 l' I ace science and robouc p anetary exp oratIOn. t ~ould require only six to eight Shuttle flights per 
year and reduce NASA's need for a heavy-lift launch 
vehicle such as Shuttle-Co 
Limiting Space Shuttle flights to eight per year 
would reduce space transportation costs for 1989-
2010 by about $10 billion, compared to space 
transportation costs for OTA's Option I, in which 
the Shuttle flight rate would increase to 12 per year 
by 2005.6 Probably, even more would be saved on 
other NASA accounts, because 65 to 70 percent of 
NASA's budget goes to support space activities 
involving people in space-a fraction that will 
increase as Space Station funding grows. 
The United States possesses the technology to 
improve the capabilities of existing launch vehicles 
and facilities through evolutionary modifications. 
Even if overall space transportation demand fell well 
below U.S. capability, the incremental improve-
ment of current vehicles and facilities could 
provide a low-cost means to enhance U.S. launch 
capabilities. Evolutionary improvements will be 
most effective if they are guided by a long-term 
plan that includes both a concrete goal and the 
steps to reach it. 
Option 3: Establish a lunar base or send crews to 
Mars. 
On the 20th anniversary of the Apollo Moon 
landing, President Bush announced his intention to 
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support "a sustained program of manned explora-
tion of the solar system and the permanent settle-
ment of space."7 His vision includes the construction 
of the Space Station during the 1990s and the 
establishment of a permanent lunar base, as well as 
human exploration of Mars sometime in the next 
century (box 2-A). 
A long-term program of this magnitude would 
require building new heavy-lift cargo systems, such 
as the Shuttle-C or the Advanced Launch System 
now under study, or even larger ones,s and would 
require new crew-carrying systems. It would also 
need orbital maneuvering vehicles and reusable 
orbital transfer vehicles.9 In addition to scientific 
instrumentation, crew accommodations, and propul-
sion units, cargo would consist of large amounts of 
fuel and supplies to support both Moon or Mars 
crews and the necessary Earth-orbit infrastructure. 10 
Such a program would continue the strong domi-
nance of government in the development and 
deployment of space infrastructure and require 
considerable growth in the U.S. budget for the 
civilian space program. 
Option 4: Continue the trends of launching 
increasingly heavier payloads and/or pursue 
an aggressive Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) test program. 
The size and weight of spacecraft for communica-
tions, navigation, reconnaissance, and weather ob-
servations have been increasing slowly and have 
been forcing the lift capacity of launch systems up 
with them. An aggressive SDI test program would 
also require vehicles of greater weight capacity than 
we now possess. 
Although it would be feasible to expand the lift 
capacity of current launch systems to meet such 
growth in payload weight, if demand is high, new, 
advanced systems may be more reliable and cost-
effective. This option would require moderate 
growth in the Nation's capacity to launch payloads. 
6U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 1988). However, the average cost per launch would increase somewhat. 
1President George Bush, Speech at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, July 20,1989. 
8National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Report of the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars (Washington, DC: 
November 1989), sec. 5. 
9 An orbital maneuvering vehicle is designed to move payloads around in space within a single orbit. An orbital transfer vehicle would transfer 
payloads from one orbit to another, e.g., from low-Earth transfer orbit to geosynchronous orbit. 
IOJ.e., orbital maueuvering and orbital transfer vehicles, and other supporting elements. 
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Box 2.A-5pace Transportation and the Human Exploration InitilltiJle 
On July 20, 1989, 20 years after man first set foot on the Moon, President Bush announced 
his intention to support" a sustained program of manned exploration of the solar system and the 
permanent settlement of space."! In particular, the President suggested establishing a permanent 
base on the Moon after the tum of the century and exploring Mars sometime later. The President's 
initiative follows through on a recommendation first made to President Nixon by the Space Task 
Group in 1969,2 and reexamined in the 1986 report of the National Commission on Space,3 and 
in NASA's "Ride" report of 1987.4 
Shortly afterward, NASA began a 9O-day study to frame alternative strategies for 
accomplishing these goals. NASA's report starts with the assumption that "reliable access to 
space will be provided through a mixed fleet of launch vehicles that includes the Space Shuttle, 
existing expendable launch vehicles, and planned heavy-lift launch vehicles."s It also assumes 
that the Space Station will serve as an orbital space transportation node. 
The transportation needs of the Human Exploration Initiative would be substantial. NASA 
estimates that in order to establish the lunar outpost, it would need a vehicle having a lift capacity 
of about 60 metric tons (132,000 pounds), capable of launching a payload 7.6 meters in diameter 
and 27.4 meters long. With three Space Shuttle Main Engines, the proposed Shuttle-C could carry 
such a payload. NASA estimates total payload mass per year necessary to support construction 
and operation of the lunar outpost would equal 110 to 200 metric tons, depending on whether or 
not the lunar transfer vehicle is reusable, and whether those missions carry cargo and crews, or 
cargo only. About three Shuttle-C flights would be sufficient to accomplish this task. 
For the Mars mission, NASA estimates it would need a vehicle capable of lifting 140 metric 
tons (308,000 pounds). This large heavy lift vehicle is about 50 percent larger than any vehicle 
yet proposed for the ALS program and about twice as large as the largest Shuttle-C NASA has 
contemplated. Building such a vehicle would require a new development effort, including 
development of high-thrust liquid engines. Yearly masses delivered to orbit to support the Mars 
mission are estimated to range between 550 and 850 metric tons (1,210,000 to 1,870,OOOpounds) 
depending on mission type and the place in the overall mission schedule. 
According to NASA, the existing ELY fleet, with a few enhancements, could support "all 
the robotic lunar and Mars missions that are required before the human missions begin.'t6 
However, some of these missions might be made cheaper or simpler if a heavy-lift vehicle were 
already available. For heavy-lift capacity prior to the end of the century, NASA expects to use 
its planned Shuttle-Co After that, larger, cheaper vehicles would be required to carry out the 
Human Exploration Initiative. 
Other groups, including the Aerospace Industries Association, and the American Institute 
of Aeronautics and Astronautics, are exploring space transportation and other requirements for 
the initiative. For example, a group working at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has 
suggested that the mass requirements for a Mars mission might be vastly smaller than NASA has 
proposed.7 As these and other interested groups develop their proposals, space transportation 
requirements will be an essential pan of planning for a return to the Moon or the exploration of 
Mars. 
IPresident George Bush. Speech at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum. July 20.1989. 
2Space Task Group. The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future. September 1969. 
3Nationai Commission on Space, Pioneering the Space Frontier (New York. NY: Bantam Books, May 1986). 
4Sally K. Ride. Leadership and America's Future in Space. a report to the Administrator (Washington. DC: 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. August 1987). 
5Nationai Aeronautics and Space Administration. Report of the 9O-Day Study on HUlNJn Exploration of the Moon 
and Mars. p. 5-1. 
6Ibid .• p. 54. 
7 Lowell Wood. "The Great Exploration: Assuring American Leaderhsip in Manned Exploration of the Solar 
System," briefing presented to the National Space Council. Nov. 29. 1989. 
. 5. Develop the capability to launch OP:~I_a~d intermediate-size payloads quickly 
and efficiently to support DoD needs. 
DoD space policy calls for the developme~t of a 
h system or systems, to launch satellites at launc' ·th . ed 
substantially reduced c~sts. ~l lO~re~. resp~n-
. ess capability, rehablhty, avmlabllIty, mmn-Slven, . . . I th b'l' tainability, and flexibilIty, p us e a. I Ity to operate 
. peace, crisis, and war. The Arr Force Space ~ommand (AFSPACEC?M). has stated ~at to 
perform its mission, pnmanly the operauon of 
satellites, it would need the ability to schedule a 
launch within 30 days, change out. pay~oads on 5 
days' notice, and launch 7 satellItes 10 5 days. 
AFSPACECOM noted that "the DoD's inability to 
provide launch support at heighten~d conflict l~vels 
has been highlighted by both polIcy emphasis on 
warfighting capability and by the constriction of 
DoD's launch capability caused by recent Space 
Shuttle and expendable launch vehicle ground-
ingS."ll The proposed Advanced Launch System 
(ALS), with its family of launch vehicles, could help 
meet the requirement for responsiveness-at least in 
peacetime. ALS is also being designed for a "surge" 
rate higher than average in order to recover from a 
backlog or to respond in crisis. 
It may be impractical to assure launch support in 
wartime,12 but if such support proves practical, it 
would probably require additional launch systems to 
complement the ALS. For example, the National 
Aero-Space Plane (NASP) Program is examining 
the potential for building a highly responsive launch 
system that could fly to orbit with a single propul-
sion stage from a conventional runway. If the 
experimental X-30 that would be built in this 
program proves successful, it might lead to opera-
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tional vehicles that are more responsive than an ALS 
and potentially as survivable as, say, SR-71 aircraft. 
Small, transportable rockets, such as the Pegasus 
or Taurus,13 could provide a survivable, responsive 
capability to launch payloads, such as "lightsats"14 
much sooner, but neither they nor operational 
aerospace planes could launch the largest satellites 
that have been proposed. U.S. Space Command is 
currently conducting an Assured Mission Support 
Space Architecture study to evaluate the potential 
role of lightsats and survivable launch. 
Option 6: Deploy a full-scale space-based ballistic 
missile defense system and/or dramatically 
increase the number and kind of other military 
space activities. 
Deployment of a full-scale, space-based missile 
defensel5 would require large cargo vehicles that are 
relatively inexpensive to launch. In 1988, the Air 
Force Space Command stated that: 
... deployment of a [SOl] Strategic Defense Sys-
tem ... will require payload capability and launch 
rates beyond the capacity of present systems. 
... even if available, such lift capability and launch 
rates would not be affordable at today's launch 
cost. 16 
This remains true in 1990. The Administration has 
not yet decided on the form a Strategic Defense 
System would take, but AFSPACECOM established 
its requirements for ALS payload capability per 
launch (220,000 poundsl7) and per year (over 5 
million pounds) to accommodate the numerous 
payloads that a Phase I Strategic Defense System 
might require and the very heavy payloads that a 
Phase II Strategic Defense System might require.18 
A Phase I Strategic Defense System, by itself, might 
IlAir Force Space Command,AFSPACECOM Statement of Operational Need (SON) 005-88 for an Advanced Launch System (AU), Aug. 12, 1988. 
lZThe Air Force Space Command recognizes that a wartime launch capability is not the only means of providing wartime mission capability; 
alternatives include proliferation, hardening, or defense of satellites, or reliance on· terrestrial systems. None of these, including wartime launch, can 
assure capability to perform all missions in wartime; see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, 
and Arms Control, OTA-ISC-281 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, 1985). 
13See later section (ch. 4) entitled Small Launch Systems. Pegasus is being designed to launch up to 900 pounds to a 110 nautical mile orbit inclined 
to 28·. Taurus should carry up to 3,000 pounds to a similar orbit. 
14See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Affordable Spacecraft--Design and Launch Alternatives, OTA-8P-ISC-60 (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, January 1990), ch. 4. 
ISUnder current plans, the full-scale, space-based ballistic missile defense structure would only be undertaken in Phase II of deployment. 
16Air Force Space Command, op. cit., footnote 11. 
22017Specifically, AFSPACECOM requires launch of 160,000-pound payloads to polar orbit; a rocket that could do that could also launch 200,000 to 
,000 pounds to a low-inclination, low-altitude orbit. 
DCI8por examples, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, SD/: Technology, Survivability. and Software, OTA-ISC-353 (Washington, 
: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1988), pp. 148-153. 
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require much less capacity,19 especially if a limited 
system intended primarily for protection from a few 
accidental launches is deployed. Current U .S.launch 
systems can launch only about 52,000 pounds per 
launch and 890,000 pounds per year.20 
In some form or another, each ofthese alterna-
tives has been championed by one or more 
advocates. Choosing among them and following 
through with the necessary funding will require 
political and economic consensus on the part of 
the American people and continued, focused 
attention from Congress and the Administration. 
Meeting the space transportation needs of specific 
programs is only part of the reason for making 
changes to the current launch systems. Other, more 
qualitative, goals serve to guide policy choices, and 
may be even more important in setting the Nation's 
agenda in space. For example, Congress may wish to 
fund the development of critical new capabilities or 
improvements to the quality of space transportation, 
or Congress may wish to ensure that funding serves 
a broad national objective of maintaining leadership 
in space activities. 
PEOPLE IN SPACE 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the 
U.S. civilian space program is its emphasis on 
activities by people in space, to demonstrate U.S. 
leadership in the development and application of 
high technology. Since the early days of the Apollo 
program, the "manned" space efforts of the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) have served as a major driver of the 
direction and spending of its space activities. Today, 
NASA's projects involving people in space, primar-
ily the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs, 
consume about 70 percent of NASA's budget. 
Critics of NASA's emphasis on humans in space, 
especially individuals in the space science commu-
nity, have questioned the wisdom of continuing to 
emphasize these aCUVIUes because of the heavy 
explicit and implicit demands they place on the. 
civilian space budget.21 In particular, critics note that 
using the Shuttle to launch the Hubble Space 
Telescope and large solar system probes, like 
Galileo and Ulysses, subjects space science to 
unnecessary reliance on the Shuttle's ability to meet 
a launch schedule, and exposes the crews to unnec-
essary danger. Costs for launching such payloads are 
generally higher on the Shuttle than with ELVs. 
These critics point out that Europe and Japan, while 
spending considerably less on space than the United 
States, have nevertheless achieved noteworthy sci-
entific and technological results. However, support-
ers of maintaining the human presence in space 
argue that such activities provide essential visibility 
for the U.S. space program and underscore Amer-
ica's international technological leadership: 
The [manned] space[flight] program is a visible 
symbol of U.S. world leadership; its challenges and 
accomplishments motivate scientific and technical 
excellence among U.S. students; and it provides for 
a diverse American population a sense of common 
national accomplishment and shared pride in Ameri-
can achievement.22 
Current administration space policy calls for 
demonstrating U.S. leadership by expanding 
"human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit 
into the solar system," and developing "the Space 
Station to achieve permanently manned operational 
capability by the mid-1990s. "23 This policy directs 
NASA to improve the Space Shuttle system and start 
the Space Station by the mid-1990s. It also directs 
NASA to establish sustainable Shuttle flight rates 
for use in planning and budgeting Government space 
programs, and to pursue appropriate enhancements 
to Shuttle operational capabilities, upper stages, and 
systems for deploying, servicing, and retrieving 
spacecraft as national requirements are defined.24 
Recently, President Bush announced his intentions 
to complete the Space Station before the end of the 
century, establish a permanent Lunar base at the 
19In u.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. July 1988), OTA assumed that 50 Titan IV launches per year, in addition to launches for other missions. would suffice to 
deploy and maintain a representative Strategic Defense System. This corresponds to 2 million pounds per year. 
2IlIbid., p. 3, table 2-1. 
21Robert L. Park. "America's $30 Billion Pie in the Sky," Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1990, p. B3; Robert Bless. "Space Science: What's Wrong at 
NASA," Issues in Science and Technology, winter 1988-89, pp. 67-73; Bruce Murray. "Civilian Space: In Search of Presidential Goals." Issues in Science 
and Technology, spring 1986, pp. 25-37. 
22John M. Logsdon, "A Sustainable Rationale for Manned Space Flight," Space Policy, vol. 5,1989. pp. 3-6. 
23The White House. Office of the Press Secretary, "National Space Policy," Nov. 2,1989. 
24Ibid. 
. . of the next century, and later send crews 
beglllfilng 25 
to explore Mars. 
hi ving each of these goals would be expen-
. ~ I e the Apollo era, the Nation had the well-
Slve. n f 1 d' h M fin d political goal 0 an mg a man on t e oon d~~ a decade and returning him safely, a goal that 
WI . ed the rest of the space program and a large ~m; et commitment with it. If the budget for space 
u ti~itieS were unlimited and if the needs of the 
8Carious space interests could all be met equally well, ~en many space program goals might be usefully 
ursued at the same time. However, as a result of the ~urrent budgetary stringency, and many demands on 
the Federal budget, Congress must choose among 
competing ideas for the United St~tes to demonstrate 
its leadership, rather than attemptmg to demonstrate 
leadership across the board as it once did.26 
In contrast to U.S. civilian activities, the military 
space program has spent relatively little on crews in 
space, despite numerous efforts over the years by 
some to identify military missions that would 
require crews. Indeed, DoD has recently reaffrrmed 
that it has no requirements for crews in space, 
although the Air Force has articulated requirements 
for piloted aerospace vehicles. Production of a 
piloted aerospace plane for military use, such as is 
contemplated for a follow-on to the current National 
Aero-Space Plane Program, would reverse DoD's 
historical stance. 
...-- Expanded commitment to crews in space, as 
contemplated by NASA and the Air Force, would 
require increasing budgetary outlays and require the 
development of new crew-carrying space vehicles. 
These systems would be costly to develop, but might 
return their investment over time if operational costs 
can be kept extremely low. 
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To illustrate the problem Congress faces, the 
Space Shuttle system and the Space Station, both of 
which require crews, dominate NASA's budget for 
the 1990s.27 As noted in a 1988 Congressional 
Budget Office report, simply to maintain NASA's 
"core program," which includes these major pro-
grams, but no large additional ones, will require 
NASA's overall budget to grow from $10.5 billion 
in fiscal year 1989 to about $14.4 billion in fiscal 
year 1995.28 NASA plans to spend about $2.5 billion 
per year for investment in its space transportation 
system, including improvements to the Shuttle, an 
advanced solid rocket motor, and in-orbit transporta-
tion vehicles. Operating the Shuttle will cost at least 
$2.0 billion per year. Anything new, such as an 
additional orbiter beyond OV-105, major modifica-
tions to the Shuttle, a Shuttle-C, a Personnel Launch 
System, or an emergency crew return vehicle, will 
add to these costs. 
Spaceflight is inherently risky. As noted in a 
previous section, the exact reliability of the Shuttle 
system is uncertain, but experts estimate that it lies 
between 97 and 99 percent. Therefore, the United 
States may expect to lose or severely damage one or 
more orbiters within the next decade, perhaps with 
loss of life. One of the major challenges for the U.S. 
civilian space program will be to learn how to 
reconcile America's goals for the expansion of 
human presence in space with this potential for loss 
oflife. In particular, if the United States wishes to 
send people into space on a routine basis, the 
Nation will have to accept the risks these activities 
entail. If such risks are perceived to be too high, 
the Nation may wish to reduce its emphasis on 
placing humans in space. 
2S"Remarks by the President at the Twentieth Anniversary of Apollo Moon Landing," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 20, 1989. 
Prin~U.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Civilian Space Policy and Applications, OTA-STI-177 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
ung Office, June 1982), ch. 3. 
. 27Most of President Bush's requested 20 percent budget increase for NASA in fiscal year 1990 derived from increases to build the Space Station, which 
IS now scheduled for completion in 1999. 
2SU.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The NASA Program in the 1990s and Beyond (Washington, DC: May 1988), pp. x-xiv. 
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Photo credit: u.s. Air Force 
The Titan IV launch vehicle lifts off from Space Launch Complex 41 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. 
This launcher will be the workhorse launcher for the Air Force for at least the next decade. 
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Space Transportation Demand and Costs 
Projections of demand for U.S. transportation to 
and from low Earth orbit vary from about 600,000 
pounds to more than 4 million pounds of payload per 
year. The lower projections are based on an assump-
tion that the tonnage launched annually will grow 
slowly for the next two decades.lrhe higher projec-
tions are based on an assumption that the United 
States will undertake an ambitious space initiative, 
such as deployment of a space-based missile defense 
system, establishment of a manned base on the 
Moon, or a manned expedition to Mars. Because 
there is no broad consensus on the desirability of 
these proposals and on the willingness to pay for 
them (nor even on how much they would cost), 
post-1995 demand for U.S. space transportation is 
highly uncertain.! This uncertainty makes rational 
choice among options for improving the Nation's 
space transportation systems extremely difficult. 
Nevertheless, failing to choose an alternative now 
could leave the United States incapable of meeting 
future needs, or paying for excess capacity. 
In the face of such uncertainty, OTA analyzed the 
space transportation needs for three scenarios (called 
mission models) for growth of demand: 
• Low-Growth: launch rate grows about 3 per-
cent per year to 41 launches per year by 2010, 
then remains constant through 2020. 
• Growth: launch rate grows about 5 percent per 
year to 55 launches per year by 2010, then 
remains constant through 2020. 
• Expanded: launch rate grows about 7 percent 
per year to 91 launches per year by 2010, then 
remains constant through 2020.2 
These mission models represent, respectively, the 
approximate demand that would likely result from 
efforts to: 
- maintain the existing course of NASA and 
DoD space programs (option 1),3 
- deploy the Space Station in the mid-1990s 
while expanding the NASA science pro-
gram and continuing the trend oflaunching 
heavier military satellites (options 4 or 5), 
or 
- send humans to Mars and establish a base 
on the Moon, or deploy a layered ballistic-
missile-defense system in orbit (options 3 
or 6). 
The mission models differ only in demand for 
heavy-cargo launches; they are identical in postu-
lated demand for light-cargo launches and piloted 
missions. By largely ignoring the weights, sizes, and 
destinations of individual payloads, these simplified 
mission models help focus OTA's broad-brush 
analysis on the sensitivity of costs to gross demand.4 
OTA calculated the life-cycle cost of servicing the 
demand postulated by each mission model with each 
of five different combinations of types ("fleets" of 
launch vehicles-box 3-A).5 Although intangible 
benefits such as "space leadership" may be 
weighed in comparing the options, the most appro-
priate economic yardstick is life-cycle cost (box 
3-B), discounted to reflect the opportunity cost to the 
Nation of diverting funds from competing demands 
on the Federal budget. 
THE MOST ECONOMICAL 
OPTIONS 
Figure 3-1 shows OTA' s estimate of the dis-
counted life-cycle cost of each of five space trans-
portation options in each of the three OTA mission 
models. Estimated life-cycle costs increase with 
increasing demand, even though cost per pound of 
payload (not shown) would decrease with increasing 
demand. 
lEstimates of demand through 1995 are relatively accurate. because the lead time for payload development is so long. 
2Presumably. Govenunent demand for space transportation would depend on space transportation costs. but there have been few efforts to forecast 
the price elasticity of demand for space transportation. For two examples. see DoD and NASA. National Space Transportation and Support Study 
1995-2010. Annex B: Civil Needs Data Base. Version 1.1. Volume I-Summary Report. Mar. 16. 1986. pp. 3-31.3-32: and Gordon R. Woodcock. 
"Economics on the Space Frontier: Can We Afford It?" SSI UpdJJte (Princeton. NJ: Space Studies Institute. May/June 1987). 
3Option 2 would fit within this scenario, but would save about $10 billion by reducing the total mass of payload launched to orbit. 
4A more detailed analysis would examine the sizes and weights of expected payloads and match them up with expected launch vehicles. However. 
in most cases. pursuing such a detailed analysis for periods beyond 5 or 10 years would yield no additional insight, as the characteristics of payloads 
that far in the future are extremely poorly known. 
sSee also U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Launch Options/or the Future: A Buyer's Guide. OTA-ISC-383 (Washington. DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. July 1988). table 1-1. 
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1J~;,x 3·A-Mixed Fleet Options 
. th"e United States will probably want to perfonn such a variety of 
In the future, as 10 the ~ast. f ftypes of launch vehicles-a "mixed fleet"-will be needed, for 
missions iJ1 spa~. ~at. a vanety ~n(ly. The current mixed fleet includes the Scout, Delta, Atlas, and 
operational flexlb~hty I~ not ecoll td yversions of each), as well as the Shuttle and a few new, small, 
Titan launchers (1Ocluding seve~ le# such as the Conestoga and Pegasu~. In the near ~ture, most 
privately d~veloped l~unch vehie i~n, Shuttle, and Medium Launch Vehicles (the Medium Launch 
payloads will be carned by the l' dId the Medium Launch Vehicle II from the Atlas). 
y, hi I . derived from the Delta. a . ul be 
e eels . 'Iflg these launch systems, or develop1Og a new one wo d 
To estimate wheth~r Improv~ compared the life-cycle costs of servicing postulated Gove~ent 
economical, OTA has estimated a11 n'lixed fleets. OTA considered using one of the mixed fleets 10 two 
demand with each of five diffe~flt p xed-fleet options were considered (see figure 3-1). Although most 
different ways; hence a total ofsl" 111 "stem under consideration, or the primary cargo vehicle (e.g., Titan 
options were named after the neW S~anned launch vehicles would be used in each option: 
IV) a mixed fleet of crewed and U . 
' . '1"t~~m IVs for heavy cargo, Delta II and/or Atlas-Centaur II Medium 
• Titan N: Continue to use ~go and Space Shuttles for round-trip missions (manned launches 
Launch Vehicles for light C ' 
Or return of cargo to Eartlt)· . . . Sh tl . 
'. edi ,ately begm upgrading Titan IVs and Space ut es to 10crease 
• Enhanced Baseline. IJ1lITl ~eanwhile, use Titan IVs for heavy cargo, Delta II or Atlas-Centaur 
reliability and reduce co.st. for light cargo, and Space Shuttles for round-trip missions. 
II Medium Launch Vehicles , . , d h di~tely begm develop1Og Shuttle-C expendable, unmanne , eavy-
• Low-rate Shuttle-.C: Imm~ 9~5, begin launching three per year to carry some cargo that would 
cargo l~unch vehicles. In Ti-1an IVs, Medium Launch Vehicles, and Space S~~ttles . . C~ntinue 
otllerwlse be launched. 011 ~unch Vehicles, and Space Shuttles for the remaIn10g missions. 
to use Titan IVs, MedlUJll cJJately begin developing expendable, unmanned, Shuttle-C heavy-
• High-rate Shuttle~C: lnuJl~~95, begin launching them at whatever rate is required to replace 
cargo launch vehicles. III carry some cargo that would otherwise be launched on Medium 
Titan IVs. They would also Shuttles. Continue to use Medium Launch Vehicles and Space 
. Launch Vehicles an~ ~pac~Ssions. .. 
Shuttles for the remaInIng. :;6egin developing unmanned Advanced Launch System (ALS) 
• Adv?nced Laun~~ .Sy~te"i~~ for them to supersede Titan IVs in 200~. They would also carry 
vehtcles and factittles 10 t er.vise be launched on Medium Launch Vehicles ~n~ Spa~ ~huttles. 
some cargo that woul~ oth La,..nch Vehicles and Space Shuttles for the remaImng mtSSlons. 
Continue to use Medium ch System: Begin developing Advanced Manne~ Launch Sy~tem 
• Advanced M~nned Lau"UitJes in time for them to supersede S~a~e Shuttles 10 2005. Contmue 
(AMLS) vehicles and fac . r1l Launch Vehicles for one-way miSSions. 
use Titan IVs and MedlU 
to . h ~ the Scout, Conestoga, and Pegasus-are expected to carry a small 
Small launch vehicles-suC a?i and contribute a small fraction oftotallaunch cost. They were not 
fraction of. total Go~ernment'paY~~eet options for this reason, not because of any judgment that they 
explicitly 10cluded 10 the mtxed cl missions. 
would be uneconomical for selecte 
en~' 1990. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology AssessJ1l .,.. _______________________ --' 
Figure 3-1-Dlscounted Llfe-Cycle Costs of Space Transponatlon Options 
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This figure shows the present value, in fiscal year 1989 dollars, of the estimated life-cycle cost of 
each of six space transportation options in each of three scenarios' for growth of U.S. Government 
demand for transportation to and from low Earth orbit: 
• LDw-Growth: launch rate grows about 3 percent per year to 41 launches per year by 2010, then 
remains constant through 2020. 
• Growth: launch rate grows about 5 percent per year to 55 launches per year by 2010, then 
remains constant through 2020. 
• Expanded: launch rate grows about 7 percent per year to 91 launches per year by 2010, then 
remains constant through 2020. 
All options assume continued use of current vehicles-TItan IVs for heavy cargo, Delta II and/or 
Atlas-Centaur II Medium Launch Vehicles for light cargo, and Space Shuttles for round-trip 
missions (piloted launches or return of cargo to Earth)--except as noted: 
• Titan IV: no exceptions. 
• Enhanced Baselme: upgrade Titan IVs and Shuttles to increase reliability and reduce cost. 
• LDw-rate Shuttle-C: develop the ShutUe-C expendable, unmanned, heavy-cargo launch vehicle, 
and launch three per year starting 1995. 
• High-rate Shuttls-C: develop the ShutUe-C and launch them at whatever rate is required to 
replace Titan IVs, starting 1995. 
• Advanced Launch System: develop unmanned Advanced Launch System (ALS) vehicles and 
launch them at whatever rate is required to replace TItan IVs, starting 2005. 
• Advanced Manned Launch System: develop Advanced Manned launch System (AMLS) 
vehicles and launch them at whatever rate is required to replace ShutUes, starting 2005. 
"Demand for piloted and light-cargo launches is the same in all scenarios; the scenarios differ only in demand 
for heavy-cargo launches. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
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Box 3-B--Cost Components 
Life-cycle cost-appropriately discounted to reflect risk and opportunity cost-is the most important 
economic criterion by which to compare different launch vehicle architectures. For each mission model examined 
here, the option that has the lowest discounted life-cycle cost would be most economical, if the assumed discount 
rate were appropriate and if the required funding were available. However, the most economical launch architecture 
might be deemed unaffordable if it would require more spending in a particular year than the Executive would 
budget or than Congress would authorize and appropriate for the purpose. 
Life-cycle costs include both nonrecurring and recurring costs. The nonrecurring costs include costs of design, 
development, testing, and evaluation (DDT &E), production of reusable vehicle systems, and construction and 
equipping of facilities. The recurring costs include all costs of platmed operations, including production of 
expendable vehicle systems, as well as expected costs of failures. In general, early nonrecurring investment is 
required to reduce total discounted life-cycle cost. 
Failure cost, a component of life-cycle cost, deserves special mention because: 1) it can be as great as the 
balance of life-cycle cost, 2) it is sometimes excluded from cost estimates, and 3) it is random-hence 
uncertain-and depends sensitively on the reliabilities of the launch vehicles used. These reliabilities are themselves 
very uncertain-even for vehicles that have been launched more than a hundred times, and especially for vehicles 
that have never been launched. Expected costs of failures are calculated from estimates of vehicle reliabilities and 
estimates of the costs that would be incurred in the event of a failure (see box 3-C). 
Cost risk is included in the cost estimates quoted here. Cost risk was defined in the Space Transportation 
Architecture Study (STAS) as a subjectively estimated percentage increase in life-cycle cost (discounted at 5 
percent) that the estimator expects would be exceeded with a probability of 30 percent, assuming certain ground 
rules are met. Basically, cost risk is intended to represent likely increases in life-cycle cost caused by unforeseen 
circumstances such as difficulties in technology development or facility construction. However, cost risk as defined 
in the STAS does not include risks of cost growth due to mission cancellations, funding stretch-outs, or standdowns 
after failure, which were excluded by the ground rules of the study. The cost risk estimates by OTA also exclude 
risks of mission cancellations, funding stretch-outs, and standdowns after failures; estimation of these risks in a 
logically consistent manner will require more sophisticated methods than were used here, or in the STAS. However, 
OTA's cost risk estimates do include the risk of greater-than-expected failure costs. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. 1990. 
Box 3-C-Failure Costs 
The cost of failures makes a substantial contribution to understanding the life-cycle costs of a launch system 
relative to any other. A system with a high purchase cost may nevertheless be cheaper in the long run than a 
lower-cost system if the former exhibits much high~r reliability. Even if both reliability and acquisition costs are 
equivalent, the life-cycle costs could be very different if one system requires a much longer standdown for analyzing 
and correcting a failure than another. 
The expected cost of failures of launch vehicles are calculated by multiplying the number of launches planned 
by the estimated probability offailure on a single launch (one minus the estimated reliability), then multiplying the 
result by the estimated cost per failure. Cost per failure will generally include cost of accident investigation and 
corrective action. It may also include costs of replacing and reflying lost payloads, replacing reusable vehicle 
components, and delays pending completion of accident investigation. 
In the Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS), operations costs were estimated assuming that 
operations would be continuous (i.e., no "standdowns"), and failure costs were estimated assuming that all lost 
payloads would be replaced and reflown. The same assumptions were made in this report. Accident investigation 
costs were included, but launch operations were not assumed to be suspended pending their completion. To assume 
that a fleet would stand down pending completion of accident investigation requires that the opportunity costs of 
delaying missions be estimated. Moreover, because some missions would be canceled as a result of the delay, 
life-cycle costs would have to exclude missions not flown. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. 1990. 
If facilities and fleets are sized for demand 
appropriate to the Low Growth scenario, all of the 
options OTA considered6 would have comparable 
life-cycle costs. The estimates of expected life-cycle 
costs of different options differ by only a few percent 
of the estimated uncertainties ("cost risk") in those 
estimates. Moreover, the theoretically most econom-
ical choice depends on the accounting horizon 
assumed (Le., the last year for which estimated 
recurring costs are cumulated). Building an Ad-
vanced Launch System (ALS) to supersede Titan 
IV s is most economical for the nominal accounting 
horizon (2020), but improving current vehicles 7 
would be most economical if the accounting horizon 
were instead 2010 (see figure 3-2). 
The probability that building an ALS would be 
most economical increases with increasing demand. 
In the Expanded demand scenario, the ALS is 
estimated to yield savings (relative to continued use 
of Titan IVs) comparable to the estimated cost risk 
of the ALS option. 
If demand for cargo flights were as in the 
Low-Growth mission model but crew-carrying 
flights were limited to 8 per year (policy option 2), 
all mixed-fleet options would cost between $9 
billion and $10 billion less than indicated in figure 
3-1 for the Low-Growth mission model, except that 
the AMLS option would cost about $7 billion less. 
Thus demand for launch services is the most 
important determinant of the economic value of 
investing in new launch systems. An ALS is likely 
to be most economical at high launch rates, but if, 
instead, demand grows slowly above current launch 
rates, all of the options OTA considered would have 
comparable life-cycle costs. The reader is cau-
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tioned that current methods of estimating launch 
system costs are subjective and unreliable, and 
that large development projects for new space 
transportation systems are not likely to achieve 
their cost or technical objectives without continu-
ity in commitment and funding. 
The costs of options that include operational 
aerospace planes are highly uncertain and should be 
estimated by methods designed specifically to ac-
count for such uncertainties (see below). 
Cost Estimation 
OTA derived the estimates in figure 3-1 using the 
methods described in Launch Options for the 
Future.s The nominal cost-estimating relationships9 
were used, but those for Shuttle-C, the ALS, and the 
AMLS have been revised. 
OTA now assumes Shuttle-C development will 
cost $985 million, in fiscal year 1988 dollars.1O A 
Shuttle-C could be launched with two or three 
engines; if it carries no more payload than a 
two-engine Shuttle-C could carry, a three-engine 
Shuttle-C could tolerate a failure of one of its Space 
Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs) and hence could be 
more reliable than a two-engine Shuttle-C. OTA' s 
cost estimates are for a three-engine Shuttle-C, 
which NASA estimates would cost $424 million per 
launch, if launched with engines that have been used 
one time on a Shuttle flight. ll NASA has not 
estimated the reliability of a three-engine Shuttle-
C;l2 OTA's cost estimates are based on an assumed 
reliability of 97 percent. l3 NASA estimates a first 
launch could be attempted 54 months after authority 
to proceed (with development) is granted;14 OTA 
assumes operational launches will begin in 1995. 
6Congress prohibited development of the Transition (or Interim Advanced) Launch System; see 101 Stat. 1066. 
7The Shuttle, Titan IVs, and Delta lIs or Atlas-Centaur lis. 
sU.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 5. Launch Options/or the Future contained some errors, most notably: (1) The 
inadvertent use of Design, Development, Testing and Evaluation (DDT &E) cost for the cost of procuring reusable hardware led to overestimation of 
the costs of the Transition, ALS, and Shuttle options. The magnitude of the errors in life-cycle cost estimates was smaller than the estimated uncertainty; 
correcting them did not change the rank of the most economical option for each mission model. OTA is indebted to Mitch Weatherly of General Dynamics 
Space Systems Division for pointing out anomalies that led to OTA's discovery of this error. (2) The statement on p. 40 that "Shuttle-C would pay for 
itself after being used for Space Station deployment alone" is incorrect; cf. box 7 -3 on p. 69: "Shuttle-C ... could provide useful flexibility ... at a small 
premium in life-cycle cost." 
9lbid., table A-I. p.82. 
10$1.114.3 million in fiscal year 1991 dollars-Jack Walker, MSFC, facsimile transmission. Jan. ll. 1990. 
11$479.5 million in fiscal year 1991 dollars-ibid. 
12Ed Gabris. NASA HQ. Code MD. personal communication, Jan. 17. 1990. 
13"Shuttle/Shuttle-C Operations. Risks. and Cost Analyses." LSYS-88-008 (El Segundo, CA: L Systems, Inc., July 21. 1988), postulated a reliability 
between 97.5 and 98.9 percent, with 98 percent the "average." OTA multiplied this "engineering estimate" by 99 percent to account for the unreliability 
of humans and other unmodeled systems and processes. See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. footnote 5, p. 85. 
14Ed Gabris, NASA HQ. Code MD, personal communication, Jan. 17. 1990. 
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Figure 3-2-5ensitlvlty of Life-Cycle Costs to Accounting Horizon 
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SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
OTA now assumes ALS development will cost 
$7.3 billion (in fiscal year 1988 dollars), facilities 
(including one pad) will cost $3.9 billion plus $150 
million times the peak annual ALS launch rate in 
excess of 25 per year, operations will cost $70 
million per launch (of which about $17 million will 
be for the expendable launch vehicle), and the 
"engineering estimate" of reliability on ascent is 
98.4 percent. 15 The estimates of recurring cost per 
launch and reliability are for a liquid-fueled version 
of the proposed ALS expendable launch vehicle at a 
rate of 10 per year. 16 
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OTA assumes Advanced Manned Launch System 
(AMLS) costs will be as estimated for the proposed 
Shuttle II described in Launch Options for the 
Future but now assumes AMLS will begin operating 
in 2005. NASA is considering several alternative 
concepts as follow-ons to the Shuttle, including the 
AMLS and Personnel Launch System (PLS)P 
NASA has awarded Rockwell International a con-
tract to flesh out several alternatives, estimate their 
costs, and help weed out the less promising ones. 
The estimates in figure 3-1 include costs incurred 
from 1989 to 2020. In Launch Options for the 
15The ALS Joint Program Office estimates that operation could begin in 1998. but a recurring cost of $70 million per launch would not be achieved 
until 2005. 
16As before. and as for other launch vehicles, OTA assumes the operational reliability on ascent will be 99 percent of the engineering estimate of 
reliability, and the operational reliability on return, given successful ascent, will be 99 percent. 
17See ch. 7. For a more detailed description of these alternatives. see: U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Round Trip To Orbit: Human 
Spaceflight Alternatives--Special Report. OTA-ISC-419 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1989). pp. 53-56. 
Future, OTA did not accumulate recurring costs 
after 2010, because demand after 2010 is highly 
uncertain. Hjlliev~L, not aC<::J!UljJlating~Q.!its bey<mg 
2010migliiunfairlypenalize options that~II!f!\!g~_ 
advancedn-Slenij:becauselfaIlow-s onlY-S years for 
die-annual savings expected from an ALS or AMLS 
to pay back the substantial initial investment that 
would be required to reduce annual costs. Hence it 
is also instructive to compare life-cycle costs over a 
longer life cycle. Figure 3-2 shows the life-cycle 
costs of the same options for accounting horizons 
ranging from 2010 to 2020, and shows that extend-
ing the accounting horizon did not significantly 
affect the ranking of the options: all are roughly 
comparable at Low-Growth launch rates, while an 
ALS is estimated to be significantly less costly than 
the other options at Expanded launch rates. 
AEROSPACE PLANES 
OTA has considered an option for developing and 
using aerospace planes incorporating NASP tech-
nology to supersede the Shuttle and complement 
Titan IVs. Aerospace planes, if successful, could be 
operated with greater responsiveness, flexibility, 
and economy than could rocket-powered launch 
vehicles. 
However, it is not yet possible to estimate the 
life-cycle cost of such an option in the conventional 
manner, which depends on extrapolating or interpo-
lating curves showing how subsystem costs depend 
on design parameters, such as subsystem weight. 
Similar curves are obtained for the costs of opera-
tional procedures as functions of labor and equip-
ment requirements. Such curves are obtained by 
fitting a curve of a given type-e.g., a line-to 
points representing the costs and weights (etc.) of 
technologically similar subsystems that have been 
built and the costs of which are known. 18 However, 
the experimental X-30 and operational vehicles 
derived from NASP technology, which would use 
air-breathing engines for propulsion most or all of 
the way to orbit, would have systems so unlike any 
previously developed that no data points exist to 
which cost curves for key systems, such as engines, 
could be fit. Further, the feasibility of such aerospace 
planes remains unproven. Hence subjective engi-
neering judgment must playa greater role than usual 
in estimating the costs of operational vehicles. 
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Moreover, the reusability of operational vehicles 
would make the average cost per flight extremely 
sensitive to parameters such as maintenance man-
hours per sortie and the probability of catastrophic 
failure, both of which OTA regards as extremely 
uncertain. These quantities were underestimated in 
the case of the Space Shuttle, the orbiter of which 
was designed for 100 flights. This led to underesti-
mation of average cost per flight. As currently 
envisioned, operational aerospace planes would be 
designed to last 500 flights, so their average cost per 
flight will be more sensitive to greater-than-
expected probability of catastrophic failure. Cur-
rently, the NASP Joint Program Office assumes that 
the probability of catastrophic failure will fall 
between 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent. The average 
cost per flight will also be sensitive to shorter-than-
expected wearout life. Airplanes, of course, are 
designed for many more uses, but extensive reliabil-
ity and maintenance data for technologically similar 
airplanes is usually available. 
Building and flying X-30s would demonstrate the 
feasibility of single-stage, air-breathing, rocket-
assisted, reusable launch vehicles and would provide 
data for anchoring cost estimates. It would also 
provide data on which reliability estimates could be 
based. Partially subjective but logically consistent 
methods will be needed to predict operational 
aerospace plane reliability on the basis ofX-30 flight 
test data (see app. A). 
Making aerospace planes extremely reliable will 
be important for reasons other than cost, because 
they might fly many-perhaps half-ofthe missions 
that Titans would otherwise fly, as well as the 
missions that the Shuttle or an AMLS could accept. 
Thus aerospace plane crews would have greater 
exposure to risk than would Shuttle or AMLS crews. 
The life-cycle cost of an option that includes 
spaceplane development, flight testing, and-if 
successful-production and operation, will depend 
not only on the actual reliability ofthe plane but also 
on the reliability the plane is required to demonstrate 
in flight tests and on the type and level of confidence 
with which it is required to demonstrate that 
reliability (see app. A). 
18See u.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28, 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988), app. A, for a discussion of cost-estimating relationships. 
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Photo credit: u.s. Air Fo~ 
The first commercial Titan lifts off from space launch complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. This commercial Titan carried 
a Japanese communications satellite and a Skynet communications satellite for the British Defense Ministry. 
EXPENDABLE LAUNCHERS 
Originally developed in the 1960s from interme-
diate-range ballistic missiles (lRBMs) and intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the three primary 
U.S. expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) have 
evolved into launchers capable of launching pay-
loads of 7,600 pounds to 39,000 pounds into low 
Earth orbit (LEO)--{figure 1-1).l Though the Delta 
II, Atlas II, and Titan III were developed with 
Government funds, commercial versions of these 
vehicles are now owned and operated by private 
Photo credit: McDonnell Doug/as Corp. 
Delta expendable launch vehicle, lifting off from Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station, carrying the Delta Star 
("Wooden Stake") Spacecraft for the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization. 
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firms, which sell launch services to the Government 
and other domestic and foreign buyers (box 4-A). 
The U.S. Air Force owns and launches the Titan IV. 
The Air Force also operates the launch complexes 
for all medium-lift ELVs, whether for Government 
or commercial launches. 2 
Until the Shuttle was developed, these ELVs were 
the only means the United States had for placing 
payloads into orbit. During the early 1980s, when 
the United States was pursuing a policy to shift all 
payloads to the Shuttle, the Government decided to 
phase ELVs out of production. Although the Gov-
ernment had in theory turned its ELV fleet over to 
the private sector for commercial exploitation, it had 
priced Shuttle launch services so low that private 
launch companies were unable to make a profit 
competing with the Government.3 However, follow-
ing the loss of Challenger, policymakers realized 
that policies that forced reliance on a single launch 
system and prevented private launch companies 
from entering the market were unwise.4 Hence, the 
Nation now follows a policy requiring a "mixed 
fleet" (both Shuttle and ELVs) to support Govern-
ment needs, and a concomitant policy encouraging 
private ownership and operation of ELVs. The 
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (Public Law 
98-575), assigned the Department of Transportation 
(DOT) responsibility for overseeing commercial 
ELVoperation. 
THE SPACE SHUTTLE 
Designed to carry crews as well as cargo to space, 
the Space Shuttle is a piloted vehicle capable of 
lifting 52,000 pounds to LEO.s It is the Nation's 
largest cargo carrier. It was the world's first partially 
reusable Earth-to-orbit launch vehicle. Begun in 
1972, the Space Shuttle was first launched in April 
1981. As of February 15, 1990, NASA has launched 
the Shuttle 33 times, but experienced one tragic 
failure when one of Challenger's Solid Rocket 
Boosters burned through in January 1986. 
lFor example, a series of upgrades has increased the Delta's payload capability from several hundred pounds to 7,600 pounds (for the Delta 3920). 
2The launch services companies reimburse the Air Force for use of the launch complexes for cornrnerciallaunches. 
3See the extensive discussion of Shuttle pricing in the mid-1980s and the contradictory policy of encouraging the private sector in: U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessrnent,lnternalional Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, OTA-ISC-239 (Springfield, VA: National 
Technical Infonnation Service, July 1985), ch. 5. 
4See John M. Logsdon, "The Space Shuttle Program: A Policy Failure?" Science, vol. 232, pp. 1099-1105. 
sTo a standard orbit 110 nautical miles high, at 28.5" inclination. 
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The United States today depends entirely on the 
Space Shuttle for transporting crews to and from 
space. In space, the Shuttle functions as a vehicle for 
launching spacecraft, and also serves as a platform 
for experiments in science and engineering. During 
the late 1990s, NASA intends to use the Space 
Shuttle to deploy and service the planned Space 
Station. 
As the Nation looks toward the future of piloted 
spaceflight, it may wish to improve the Shuttle's 
reliability, performance, and operational efficiency. 
Eventually, additions to the Shuttle fleet or replace-
ment Shuttles will likely be desirable. This section 
summarizes the major issues related to maintaining 
and improving the Space Shuttle. 
Shortcomings of the Space Shuttle 
The heavy U.S. dependence on the Space Shuttle 
raises questions concerning the longevity of the 
Shuttle fleet and the risk that orbiters might be 
unavailable when needed. 
• NASA's Flight Schedule. NASA has estimated 
that 14 Shuttles can be launched per year from the 
Kennedy Space Center with existing facilities,6 
yet it has never launched more than 9 Shuttles per 
year. Some experts7 doubt that 14 launches per 
year can be sustained with a 4-orbiter fleet 
without adding new facilities and launch opera-
tions staff. 
6Enclosure to letter from Darrell R. Branscome, NASA Headquarters, to Richard DalBello, Office of Technology Assessment, Mar. 31, 1988. 
'National Research Council, Committee on NASA Scientific and Technological Program Reviews, Post-Challenger Assessment of Space Shuttle 
Flight Rates and Utilization (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, October 1986), p. 15; Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, Annual Report 
(Washington, DC: NASA Headquarters, Code Q-l, March 1989), p. iv. 
Keeping the • • turnaround time," or total shifts 
required to prepare an orbiter again for launch 
after a flight, short is essential for reducing the 
cost per flight and increasing the sustainable flight 
rate. NASA will have difficulty reaching and 
sustaining a rate of 14 flights per year unless it is 
able to tlnd ways of sharply reducing its current 
turnaround time.8 Its present goal of 14 flights per 
year assumes a processing schedule having little 
margin for contingencies. Yet NASA is not 
achieving the reductions of turnaround time it had 
anticipated, especially for the orbiter. 9 In addition, 
some NASA officials have expressed concern that 
the planned 90-day standdown for each orbiter 
every 3 years, to make structural inspections and 
modifications, may not be sufficient to accom-
plish all necessary work. 
• Inflexibility. If NASA were to prove capable of 
launching 14 Shuttle flights per year, scheduling 
launches at the maximum sustainable launch rate 
would leave no margin to accommodate a sudden 
change in launch plans or to fly extra missions on 
a surge basis.10 If more margin were reserved in 
Shuttle launch schedules, an orbiter could be on 
hand to be outfitted quickly for an unplanned 
mission_ However, even with more margin, pre-
paring an orbiter for an unscheduled mission, such 
as a Space Station rescue, could take as long as a 
few months because of the lead time required for 
mission planning, orbiter processing, and crew 
training. 11 If the Nation wishes to improve the 
safety of its crew-carrying space flight pro-
gram while increasing its flexibUity, NASA and 
the Def'ense Department will have to allow 
more lDargin in Shuttle launch schedules 
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(which implies fewer launches per year) and 
provide alternative ELVs. 
• Risk of Attrition. Each time NASA launches the 
Shuttle it incurs a risk of losing an orbiter from 
equipment failure or human error. The Shuttle's 
success rate is 32 out of 33 flights, or 97 percent 
(table 2_2).12 Estimates of Shuttle reliability 
generally vary between 97 and 99 percent. For 
example, the late Richard Feynman, a member of 
the Presidential Commission appointed to investi~ 
gate the Challenger accident, called the ShUttle 
" ... relatively unsafe ... , with a chance of failure 
on the order of a percent. "13 A NASA contractor 
estimated that post-Challenger Shuttle reliability 
lies between 97 and 98.6 percent, with the most 
likely cause of failures identified as propulsion 
failures during ascent.14 One NASA division 
estimated that on the Galileo mission, which was 
launched October 1989, the orbiter had a 99.361 
percent probability of remaining intact Until 
deployment of the Jupiter-bound Galileo space 
probe began,15 yet another NASA division esti~ 
mated the probability would likely lie between 35 
in 36 (97.2 percent) and 167 in 168 (99.4 
percent).16 If Shuttle reliability is 98 per~nt, 
launching Shuttles at the rates now planned 
would make it unlikely that Space Station 
assembly could begin before another orbiter is 
lost (figure 4-1). 
Options for Reducing the Risks 
of Depending on the Shuttle 
• Reduce the Shuttle flight rate. The Nation could 
restrict Shuttle payloads to those requiring hUman 
intervention, and fly other payloads on El..Vs. 
&Por instance. NASA is designing the Advanced Solid Rocket Motor. which is now under development. to be capable of much quicker assembl)' than 
the existing redesigned solid rocket motors. 
9NASA Kennedy Space Center briefmg. Apr. 26. 1989. 
10When a launch accident or other incident causes a long delay in spacecraft launches. it may become necessary or prudent to fly off any backlog of 
payloads as quicldy as possible after recovery in a "surge" of launchcs. 
llNonnally. Shuttle crews. payloads. and specific orbiter are chosen up to 2 years prior to a flight. in order to provide enough time for payload 
integration and crew training. 
12por comparison. success rates experienced by expendable launch vehicles range between 85 and 95 percent (table 2-2). 
13"Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident." app. F. (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
1986); R.P. Feynman. What Do You Care What Other People Think? (New York. NY: W.W. Norton & Co .• 1988). p. 236. 
14J..-SystelDs. Inc .• Shuttle/Shuttle-C Operalions, Risks, and Cost Analyses. LSYS-88-008 (El Segundo. CA: 1988). 
15Qeneral Electric Astro Space Division. Final So/ety Analysis Repon II/or the Galileo Mission. doc. 87SDS4213 (Valley Forge. PA: General Electric 
Astro Space Divisioo. August 1988). However. NASA supplied no rationale for its estimates of failure probabilities from which General Electric 
calculated this probability. and NASA instructions had the effect of masking the overall W1Certainty. 
16NASA Headquarters. Code QS./ndependenl Assessnumt ofShuttle Accident Scenario Probabilities/or the Galileo Mission. vol. I. April 1989. Th~ 
probability of orbiter recovery after the Galileo mission would be comparable to the missioo success probability. because the most likely CllUSes of a 
missioo failure would probably destroy the orbiter. 
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Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Space Shuttle orbiter Atlantis lands at Edwards Air Force Base after completing a successful 5-day mission in which astronauts 
deployed the Galileo planetary spacecraft. destined for Jupiter . 
This would reduce the Shuttle flight rate and 
orbiter attrition. For example, the recently 
launched Galileo spacecraft, which is destined to 
explore Jupiter's atmosphere and moons,17 could 
have been launched on a Titan III or Titan IV. 
Except for many materials processing or life 
science experiments, which require human atten-
tion, most payloads could be launched on unpi-
loted vehicles. The Air Force has now re-
manifested most of its payloads previously sched-
uled for the Shuttle on the Titan IV, which made 
its maiden flight on June 14, 1989.18 
• Purchase one or more additional orbiters. If it is 
judged more important to have four orbiters 
available in the mid-1990s than to have high 
launch rates now, Congress may wish to allow for 
the potential loss of an orbiter by ordering one or 
more additional orbiters as soon as possible and 
limiting Shuttle launch rates. 
• Improve the safety and reliability of Shuttle 
orbiter. Purchasing an additional orbiter of the 
same design as Endeavour (OV -105), which is 
scheduled for delivery in 1991, would not reduce 
the risks to which Shuttle orbiters, crews, and 
payloads are now exposed. However, the safety 
and reliability of the orbiter could be improved 
(table 4-1). In addition, the orbiter could be 
modified to remain in orbit longer by adding 
additional life support equipment, and to carry 
additional payload by substituting lighter materi-
als in current structures. 
• Improve the reliability of other Shuttle compo-
nents. As the Challenger loss demonstrated, the 
safety of the crew may depend critically on the 
reliability of systems other than the orbiter and on 
the practices and judgments of personnel. NASA 
has already improved the design of the solid 
rocket booster that failed during Challenger's last 
17Launched on Oct. 18. 1989 on the orbiter Atlantis. Once Galileo was designed for launch on the Shuttle. changing it to allow launch on an ELY 
would have been prohibitively expensive. 
ISConsiderable additional experience with assembling. processing. and launching Titan IV will be necessary before it will be considered an operational 
vehicle. 
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Figure 4-1-Probablllty of Retaining 3 or 4 Shuttle Orbiters Over Time 
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Shuttle reliability is uncertain, but has been estimated to range between 97 and 99 percent.1 If the Shuttle reliability is 98 percent, there 
would be a 50-50 chance of losing an orbiter within 34 flights. At a rate of 11 flights per year, there would be a 50 percent probability of losing 
an orbiter in a period of just over 3 years. The probability of maintaining at least three orbiters in the Shuttle fleet declines to less than 50 
percent after flight 113. 
Although loss of an orbiter would not necessarily result in loss of life, it would severely impede the progress of the civilian space program, 
as it would likely lead to a long standdown of the orbiter fleet while the cause of the failure as determined and repaired. 
1 L.Systems, Inc., Shutt/e/ShuttJe-C Operations, Risks, and Cost Analyses, LSYS-88-008 (EI Segundo, CA: 1988). 
SOURCE: Office of Technol09Y Assessment, 1990 
ascent and sucessfuUy employed the redesigned 
solid rocket motors (RSRMs) in 8 flights since 
September 1988. NASA is currently working on 
an Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM) that 
will replace the RSRM. It has also studied the 
feasibility of replacing the Shuttle's solid rocket 
motors with Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRBs). 
NASA's studies indicate that developing Shuttle 
LRBs might cost about twice as much ($3 billion) 
as developing ASRMs. Nevertheless, LRBs may 
be safer than ASRMs because liquid engines can 
be ignited and checked before lift-off, then shut 
off if faults appear. 19 If one, or even two, liquid 
engines were to fail after lift-off, they could be 
shut down, allowing the Shuttle to land at an 
alternative landing site. They can even be throt-
tled during launch without incurring loss of life. 
Although a solid rocket motor could be designed 
to have its thrust terminated during flight, doing 
so on the Shuttle would lead to destructive thrust 
Table 4-1-$elected Possible Improvements 
for New Orbiters 
Sillety and reliability 
• Improved propulsion 
• Simplified hydraulics 
• Increased strength skins 
• Improved attitude control 
• Suppressed helium overpressure 
Cost reductions 
• Simplified cooling 
• Modernized crew displays 
• Improved tile durability 
• Modernized telemetry 
Performance 
• Extended duration orbiter 
• Weight reduction 
• Local structure strengthening 
• Global Positioning Satellite receiver-computer for navigation 
SOURCE: Rockwell International Corp. and Office of Technology Assess-
ment, 1990. 
19Richard DeMeis, "Liquid Lift for the Shunle," Aerospace America, February 1989, pp. 22-25. 
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imbalance.2o NASA is currently conducting stud-
ies to understand the potential benefits and 
drawbacks from substituting LRBs for solid 
rocket motors. 
A Shuttle Improvement Program 
Making major Shuttle enhancements on an indi-
vidual project-by-project basis may not be the most 
efficient way to improve the Shuttle system. To 
choose one improvement may mean not pursuing 
another, worthwhile avenue. However, having a 
versatile, capable launch fleet that provides reliable 
human access to space will be essential if Congress 
wishes to maintain a policy of supporting the human 
presence in space. Hence, Congress may want to 
consider an integrated approach to strengthen-
ing the Nation's space transportation capability 
by funding a Shuttle Improvement Program 
(table 4-2) lasting, for example, 10 years. Such a 
program could include development of advanced 
solid rocket boosters, liquid rocket boosters, and the 
Shuttle-C, as well as additional, more modest, 
improvements summarized in box 4-B. T,Q support 
thi£ -SOrt of progr.am._whi~lU;;9yJd~Q~_L~ _!!111ch_Cl$ __ 
$~2Q ~m<>.np~J:-Yt!<l!: fQl"lQj'~a.r~ ~1?~~~_the cugellt 
projected cost of th~ __ ~hllttl~pr()grarIl, would require finding-extra S-pace program funding, scaling down 
the Space Station program, or deferring other 
programs. In addition to leveling out budgetary 
requests for the lO-year period of the program, an 
integrated improvement program could lead to the 
development of technologies and systems that 
would be needed for new crew-carrying systems 
should Congress decide to pursue a more ambitious 
space program in the future. 
SMALL LAUNCH SYSTEMS 
Most of the Government's attention has focused 
on medium- or heavy-lift launch vehicles.21 How-
ever, recent interest in lightweight spacecraft, de-
signed for a range of specialized activities, such as 
store-forward communications, single-purpose re-
mote sensing, and materials processing research, has 
generated a concomitant interest in small vehicles to 
Photo credit Orbital Sciences Corp. and Hfircu/es Corp. 
An artist's conception of the Pegasus air-launched vehicle 
ascending to orbit after being launched from an aircraft. 
launch them. Launchers of this class are particularly 
appropriate for private sector development, as the 
costs and risks are modest compared to higher 
capacity launch systems. If small payloads prove 
effective for a wide variety of military and civilian 
uses, the demand for small launchers could grow 
substantially.22 
• Scout. Originally developed in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, the Scout launcher is capable 
of carrying about 600 pounds to LEO. Scout is 
a four-stage vehicle, propelled by solid rocket 
motors, which is manufactured by the LTV 
corporation under contract to NASA. As soon 
as the remaining vehicles have been flown, 
NASA will retire it from service, unless LTV, 
lOSee u.s. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Round Trip to Orbit: HUTnIJn Spaceflight Alternatives, OTA-ISC-419 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, August 1989), pp_ 45-48 and app. A, for a detailed comparison of solid and liquid engines. 
21However, the relatively small Atlas-E (1,750 pounds to low-Earth Polar orbit) and Titan II (4,200 pounds \0 low-Earth Polar orbit) launchers. which 
originally served as intercontinental ballistic missiles. have been used to launch a variety of Government payloads. Neither of these vehicles are available 
for commercial use or for launching non-Government payloads. 
22Lawrence H. Stem et. aI., An Assessment of Potential Markets for Small Satellites (Herndon, VA: Center for Innovative Technology. November 
1989); "Lightweight Launches to Low Orbit: Will a Market Develop?" Space Markets. Summer 1987. pp. 54-58. 
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Table 4-2-A Possible Shuttle Improvement Program 
Options Cost Benefit 
Orbiter Improvements: 
Develop alternate turbopumps for Space Shuttle main engines ...... . 
Automate orbiter for unpiloted flight .............................. . 
$228 million" 
$200 millionb 
$120 million 
Safety and economy 
Safety 
Extend orbiter flight duration ..................................... . Utility 
Built-in test equipmentc ........................................• [?)C Safety and economy 
SOOtltfH'lmprovements: 
Increase thrust of redesigned solid rocket motor (AS AM) ........... . More payload 
Continue to develop advanced solid rocket motor (ASAM) ............ . 
$50 to $60 million 
$1.3 to $1.8 billion 
$3.5 billion 
Safety and more payload 
Safety and more payload Develop liquid rocket booster (LAB) .............................. . 
OIher .,.",.nts: 
Develop lightweight external tank .............................•.. [?] More payload 
Complementary Vehicles: 
Develop Shuttle-C ........................................... . 
Develop capsule or lifting body for Space Station escape ............. . 
$1.5 billion 
$0.7 to $2 billion 
For cargo 
Safety 
-Already funded by NASA. 
bQnly $3OM to 140M for each additional orbiter. 
CSee OTA-TM-ISC-28, Reducing Launch Operations Costs. 
NOTE: Most ofthese options would increase Shuttle payload capability, but by different amounts; their other benefits and their dates of availability would differ. 
Therefore, two or more options might be pursued, for example, ASRMs to Increase Shuttle payload capability and LRBs for increased safety and 
reduced environmental impact. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
or some other private finn, decides to offer it 
commercially.23 On a cost per pound basis, 
Scout offers a relatively expensive way to reach 
space ($12,000 per pound). 
• Pegasus. The Lightsat program, initiated by the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), has created a market for at least one 
new small launcher, the Pegasus, capable of 
launching between 600 and 900 pounds to 
LEO.24 Pegasus is a three-stage, solid-fuel, 
inertially guided winged rocket that is launched 
from a large aircraft. It is the fIrst all-new U.S. 
launch vehicle design since the 1970s, though 
it depends heavily on propulsion and systems 
originally developed for intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles; it uses engines designed for the 
Midgetman ICBM. 
Pegasus has been developed as a joint 
venture between Orbital Sciences Corp. (OSC) 
and Hercules Aerospace Co., and funded en-
tirely with private capital. DARPA negotiated 
a price of $6 million per launch for a possible 
six launches. The Air Force has assumed 
responsibility for the oversight of the launch of 
Pegasus for Government payloads. To date, 
two launches have been ordered; the fIrst one, 
which will carry two payloads, is scheduled for 
spring 1990. 
A mobile launch system such as Pegasus 
could provide a survivable means for 
launching small military satellites in war-
time to augment satellites launched in peace-
time or replace any satellite damaged by 
anti-satellite weapons. However, the Depart-
ment of Defense has not stated a need for a 
survivable launch capability. The fIrst flights of 
Pegasus will employ a B-52 as the carrier. OSC 
plans to acquire a large commercial aircraft, 
such as a Lockeed L1011, to serve as a launch 
platform for commercial flights.25 
• Industrial Launch Vehicle. The American 
Rocket Company (AMROC) is developing a 
family of suborbital and orbital rockets, called 
the Industrial Launch Vehicle, powered by a 
hybrid, solid-fuellliquid-oxygen engine. 
AMROC's hybrid design uses liquid oxygen to 
burn nonexplosive solid propellant similar to 
tire rubber. Such hybrids would have some 
safety advantages and might be allowed in 
areas where conventional solid- or liquid-fuel 
rockets are not. They could, for example, be 
used to launch small satellites from mobile 
23LTV and the Italian corporation SNIA BPD are discussing developing-an upgraded Scout II. capable of launching about 1,200 pounds to LEO at 
a cost of about $15 million per mission. 
24Joseph Alper. "Riding an Entrepreneurial Rocket to Financial Success." The Scienlist. July 25. 1988. pp. 7-8. 
250n a per-poWld basis. Pegasus currently costs $6.000 to $10.000 perpound of payload. which is much higher than competing. larger launch systems. 
However. for some customers. the ability to laWlch from many different locations and relatively quickly (once the concept bas been proven and 
operational procedures are streamlined) will outweigh the relatively high per poWld cost of the Pegasus. 
IT' 
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Box 4-B-Maintaining and Improving the Cu"ent Shuttle System 
Buying Additional Orbiters 
Three basic options are available: 
• Build a copy of OV-105 
The Challenger replacement (OV-105), already 
being built, includes several important improve-
ments: 
-addition of an escape hatch and pole; 
-improved heat shielding tiles, strengthened 
landing gear, wing structure, and engine pod; 
-more than 200 internal changes, including 
eiectrical rewiring and improvements in the 
braking and steering systems. 
• Implement additional improvements 
-safety /reliability; 
--cost reduction; and 
-performance. 
(Some of these upgrades may involve structural 
changes, and therefore could not be made in 
existing vehicles.) 
• Reduce airframe weight-Orbiter airframe 
weight reduction of 8,000 to 10,000 pounds could 
be achieved through the use of: 
--composite materials; 
-alloys; 
-intermetallic alloys; and 
-high-temperature metallics. 
Incremental Changes 
Some alterations to the Space Shuttle system have 
already been accomplished, or are already under way: 
• Redesigned Solid Rocket Motors (RSRMs) 
• Space Shuttle Main Engine Improvements-
Specific efforts directed at longer life and higher 
reliability include improved: 
-welds; 
-manufacturing techniques; 
-nondestructive testing; 
-heat exchangers; 
--controllers; 
~ngine health monitoring; and 
-turbopumps. 
• On-Board Computer Upgrades-Specific efforts 
include: 
-identical computer modules' 'mass-produced" 
for economy, 
--connection by optical fibers, and 
-a high degree of fault-tolerance. 
Other improvements NASA has considered or is 
now working on: 
• Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO)-NASA is 
building in the capacity to extend on-orbit stays 
from the current 7 days to 16-28 days. 
• Automatic Orbiter Kit-An existing Shuttle or-
biter could be given the capability to fly an entire 
mission automatically without a crew. 
• OperatimlS Improvements-Introducing a num-
ber of new technologies and management strate-
gies to make Shuttle launch operations more 
efficient and cheaper, e.g., improved Shuttle tile 
inspection and repair, and expert systems for 
control. 
MlYor Changes 
Some candidates include: 
• Advanced Solid Rocket Motors (ASRMs)-These 
would replace the existing RSRMs. Compared to 
the RSRMs, they offer: 
-up to 12,000 pounds additional lift capacity, 
-better manufacturing reproducibility, 
-reduced stress on the Space Shuttle Main 
Engines, 
--potentially higher reliability, and 
--potential for enhancing competition. 
• Improve Redesigned Solid Rocket Motors-The 
existing RSRMs could be improved further by 
redesigning them to increase their thrust. The 
Shuttle's payload capacity could be increased by 
6,000 to 8,000 pounds by substituting a more 
energetic solid propellant and by making other 
requisite changes to the motors. 
• Liquid Rocket Boosters (LRBs)-They would 
replace the solid boosters on the Shuttle. Com-
pared to RSRMs, LRBs offer: 
-safer abort modes; 
-up to 20,000 pounds additional lift capacity; 
-long history, potentially greater mission reli-
ability; 
--capabilitY of changing mission profiles more 
easily; 
-safer Shuttle processing flow; 
-potential application as an independent launch 
system; and 
-better environmental compatibility. 
• Materials Improvements-The emphasis on im-
proved materials has focused particularly on 
saving weight. For example, using aluminum-
lithium (Al-Li) for the external tank instead of the 
present aluminum alloy could provide a 20 to 30 
percent weight savings. Using composite 
materials in the orbiter wings and other parts 
could save an additional 10,000 pounds. 
• Crew Escape Module-This would allow for safe 
escape over a larger portion of the liftoff regime 
than now possible. It would replace the escape 
pole system presently in place, but would be 
heavier and much more costly. 
launchers. AMROC's first attempted launch of 
its hybrid system on October 5, 1989 was 
aborted when a liquid oxygen valve failed to 
provide enough oxygen to support adequate 
thrust. 26 Significantly, the rocket neither ex-
ploded nor released toxic fumes, demonstrating 
one of the safety features of using hybrid 
systems. Instead, it burned on the pad, doing 
relatively little damage to the pad (between 
$1,000 and $2,0(0) or to the two payloads it 
was to carry on a suborbital flight. AMROC has 
several customers interested in its launch vehi-
cle, but to date has no firm launch contracts. TI 
• Standard Small Launch Vehicle (SSLV). The 
SSLV is being developed by the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
DARPA recently awarded a contract for pur-
chase of SSLV launch services to Space Data 
Corp., a division of Orbital Sciences Corp. The 
first stage of Space Data's Taurus SSLV will be 
the first stage of an MX missile booster; the 
three upper staJes of this vehicle will be the 
same solid rocket engines that power the 
Pegasus. Taurus is designed to carry a 1,500 
pound satellite to a 400 nautical mile polar 
orbit, or a 3,000 pound spacecraft to LEO. It 
could even be used to launch an 830 pound 
satellite to geosynchronous transfer orbit.28 
Taurus will be fully transportable and capable 
of being launched quickly on a few months 
notice from a variety of launch sites. The first 
DARPA demonstration launch is scheduled for 
July 1991. DARPA holds options for four 
future flights on Taurus. 
• Conestoga. Space Services Inc. (SSI) is devel-
oping a family of launch vehicles called 
Conestoga, which will use Castor solid rocket 
motors strapped together in different configura-
tions to achieve payload lift capacities of 900 to 
2,000 pounds to polar orbit and 1,300 to 5,000 
pounds to LEO. Launch services to LEO will 
cost $10 million to $20 million, depending on 
payload size and vehicle configuration. To 
date, SSI has no firm orders for launch services 
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on Conestoga, although it has several pros-
pects. SSI successfully launched its Starfire I, 
the first U.S. commercial sounding rocket on 
March 29, 1989. However, on November 15, 
1989, the second sounding rocket flight failed. 
• EPAC "S" Series. E'Prlme Aerospace Corp. 
(EPAC) is developing a series of ELVs pro-
pelled by rocket motors developed for the MX. 
EPAC is offering seven different launch vehi-
cle configurations capable of placing payloads 
of up to 36,000 pounds in LEO. Prices charged 
commercial customers will range from $18 
million (for 5,781 pounds to LEO) to $84 
million (for 36,138 pounds to LEO). Govern-
ment prices would be 10wer.29 Jt plans to make 
its first orbital launch of the S-1 in 1991. 
Other companies, both large established firms and 
smaller, startup companies, have offered small 
launch vehicle designs in the launch services market. 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. has designed a 
launch vehicle that would use Poseidon Fleet 
ballistic missile components to carry 850 pounds to 
polar orbit or 1,200 pounds to LEO. Pacific Ameri-
can Launch Services, Inc., is working on the design 
of a single-stage, liquid oxygen-hydrogen launcher 
that would carry 2,200 pounds to LEO. 
In addition to these U.S. examples, several foreign 
firms are offering to sell launch services on small 
launchers. For example, a consortium in northern 
Europe is developing a small, solid rocket-powered 
launcher named LittleLeo. The Soviet Union has 
suggested converting some of its SS-20 mobile 
missiles for use as small commerciallaunchers.3o 
The market created by DARPA made possible the 
development of Pegasus and Taurus. At this time, it 
is unclear whether private sector demand for small 
spacecraft will be sufficient to support a truly 
commerical launch market for small launchers. 
However, several aerospace companies, including 
Orbital Sciences Corp., Hughes Aircraft Corp., and 
Ball Aerospace Co. are working on designs for small 
satellites for communications and remote sensing, 
which will test market potential over the next few 
Wfhe liquid oxygen valve failed to open sufficiently. probably as a result of heavy icing in the relatively humid climate of Vandenberg Air Force Base 
where the test laWich was attempted. Michael A. Dornheim. "Amroc Retains Key Personnel Despite Cutbacks After Pad Fire." Aviation Week and Space 
Technology. Oct. 30. 1989. p. 20. 
27James Bennett. AMROC. December 1989. 
28"Pegasus. MX Boosters Combined for N:w Defense Launch Vehicle." Aviation Week and Space Technology. Sept. 18. 1989. pp. 4748. 
29Bob Davis. EPAC. Mar. 12. 1990. 
30Marketed in the United States by Space Commerce Corporation. 
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years. The construction of non-Federal launch sites 
would assist the process of developing a market for 
small spacecraft and launchers.3! Groups in the 
States of Florida, Hawaii, and Virginia have shown 
considerable interest in constructing launch sites for 
the private market. 
Military demand for small launchers may be 
substantial, as some elements in the services are 
interested in developing small spacecraft for tactical 
surveillance and communciations. SDIO may have 
a near-term requirement for launching small space-
craft to support ballistic missile defense. Although 
the cost per pound of payload carried on small 
launchers is currently high, a large market for small 
launchers may help to bring costs down over time. 
However, private companies will have to amortize 
their development costs, which will tend to keep 
launch costs per pound of payload relatively high 
compared to larger systems for which the develop-
ment costs were borne by the government years ago. 
31However. additional launch sites might reduce the market for Pegasus by increasing availability of alternate launch sites. 
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Photo credit: National At/OfIautJcs and Space Administration 
An artist's conception of Space Station Freedom, which is scheduled for completion by theend of the century. 
Chapter 5 
Space Transportation and the Space Station 
The planned international Space Station will 
make long-term demands on space transportation for 
construction, servicing, supply, and possibly emer-
gency crew return. Current NASA plans call for 
making at least 29 Shuttle flights (including several 
logistics flights) between 1995 and 1999 to build the 
station, and about 5.5 flights per year thereafter to 
operate it. Some flights will be required to rotate 
station crew, some for delivering or returning cargo. 
SPACE SHUTTLE 
Uncertainty about the adequacy of the current 
Shuttle fleet for constructing and servicing the Space 
Station makes station planning uncertain and risky. 
Deployment, servicing, and resupply of the Space 
Station face the dual risks of delayed launch 
schedules and loss of one or more orbiters. In 
addition, losing a critical element of the Space 
Station in transit to orbit as a result of a Shuttle 
failure could lead to long delays in Space Station 
construction. 1 
Chapter 4 outlined options for reducing the risk of 
using the Shuttle for Space Station construction and 
operation. However, most of these options would 
require additional funding beyond NASA's pro-
jected budget for Space Station or for space transpor-
tation. Congress may wish to postpone Space 
Station construction and operation and focus on 
improving the Nation's ability to place crews in 
orbit safely and reliably. Alternatively, Congress 
could direct NASA to fly fewer non-Space Sta-
tion-related Shuttle missions in order to reduce 
the risk that a Shuttle would be lost before Space 
Station construction is completed. 
NASA might, for example, plan to use Titan IVs 
to carry some Space Station elements into orbit 
rather than risking the Shuttle to do so. However, the 
availability of Titan IV is highly uncertain, as the Air 
Force appears to need all the Titan IVs it has 
purchased for the period of station construction. 
NASA might also develop the Shuttle-C for Space 
Station construction. Furthennore, as noted earlier, 
science payloads now tentatively manifested for the 
Shuttle, if properly designed, could be flown on 
ELVs purchased competitively from the private 
sector. 
RESCUE OR ESCAPE VEHICLES 
Crews living and working in the planned Space 
Station could be exposed to substantial risk from 
major failures of the Station or the Space Shuttle that 
transports the crew. For example, orbital debris from 
previous space activities could puncture one of the 
crew modules, causing a need to evacuate the crew 
and return them to Earth.2 NASA is attempting to 
reduce such risk by building safety features into the 
Space Station and improving the Shuttle's design. 
Nevertheless, many analysts in NASA and the 
broader U.S. space community believe that the 
United States should develop some means independ-
ent of the Shuttle to rescue crews from the Space 
Station. 
NASA is studying the possibility of building a 
specialized vehicle that could be launched into space 
atop an expendable launch vehicle as well as return 
from the Space Station (box 5-A). Such a vehicle, 
which NASA calls the Assured Crew Return Vehicle 
(ACRV),3 could be used to provide: 
1. crew emergency rescue, 
2. access to space by crews, 
3. small logistics transport, and 
4. on-orbit maneuver. 
Emergency rescue vehicles could be developed 
and launched on a Titan III or Titan IV by 1995 or 
1996. Alternatively, a Shuttle could carry two at a 
time, to be docked at the Space Station. 
To decide whether a risk-reducing effort is 
worth the investment required, Congress lOust be 
advised about how much the investment would 
reduce the risk. Even if an alternate crew return 
capability were provided and worked as planned, 
it would not eliminate all risks to station crew-
members. To gain perspective on the decision, 
Congress may wish to weigh the risks with and 
tIf a Space Station element for which there was no spare were lost. replacing that element would take many mooths. 
2In 1983. a paint chip from a space object severely damaged a windshield 00 the Shuttle orbiter ChaUenger. Nicholas L. Johnson and Darren S. 
McKnight, Artificial Space Debris (Malabar. Florida: Orbit Book Company. 1987). pp. 4-5. 
3Note. however. that although the ACRV may provide a high probability of return from space. it does not necessarily provide assured safe return. 
as there will still be a non-negligible degree of risk connected with the vehicle and the procedures required to operate it ~Iy. 
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Photo credit: National Aeronaulics and Space Administration 
Artist's conception of an Apollo-type emergency rescue vehicle entering the Earth's atmosphere after leaving the Space Station. 
without a rescue vehicle against the risks of other 
hazardous duty in the national interest.4 
A risk assessment of the Space Station should take 
into account all phases of the crews' experience in 
space, For example, if the greatest risk to Space 
Station crew members were experienced during 
flight to orbit, it may prove more cost-effective to 
improve the safety of the Shuttle or any later 
crew-carrying space transportation systems than to 
build a crew escape craft. The use of a rescue 
system would itself expose Space Station crew-
members to a certain element of risk, which must 
also be assessed before making any decision 
about whether or not to build such a system. 
Finally, it would be well to remember that the Space 
Station crew will be volunteers, who would will-
4por example, working on off-shore oil platforms, or piloting experimental aircraft. 
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Box 5-A-Escape Vehicles 
Several contingencies could require emergency escape of personnel in space. These include medical 
emergencies of Space Station crewmembers, major equipment failures, damage from orbital debris, etc. Escape 
could also be necessary if the Shuttle failed to meet its scheduled launch date by so long a time that the Station risked 
running out of critical supplies. 
Crew Emergency Return Vehicles (CERV) 
NASA is considering two types of vehicles for emergency return from space to Earth: 
• Capsule-This simple vehicle would have an ablative heat shield reminiscent of reentry capsules from the 
early days of spaceflight, and still used routinely by the Soviet Union. A capsule, which could closely 
resemble the Apollo capsule, would descend by parachute and land in the ocean. Its advantages include 
simplicity, relatively low cost, and proven technology. In addition, capsules need little or no piloting, which 
could be a major consideration if pilots are unavailable or unable to function as a result of injury or a long 
stay in orbit. Depending on its capability, a capsule could cost $0.75 billion to $1.0 billion to develop. 
• Small Glider-A small, aerodynamically stable vehicle whose shape would provide lift, and could land by 
parachute or at low speed on a runway. A glider could reach a wider range of landing sites and have more 
opportunities for reentry and recovery (particularly for a version with landing gear), and a softer ride than 
capsules (important if an injured crew member is returning). However, a glider would cost 20 to 50 percent 
more than the simplest parachute version of a capsule. 
ingly, even eagerly, accept such duty despite the 
inherent risks of spaceflight. Although they should 
not expect to be exposed to unnecessary risks, their 
duty will never be risk free. 
A rescue system, if built, would be needed for the 
life of the Space Station. Therefore, its total operat-
ing costs can be expected to exceed its development 
costs. Before committing to a specific rescue 
strategy, system designers will have to address 
the costs of developing the necessary support 
infrastructure, which might include ground op-
erations hardware and personnel at the mission 
control site, landing site crews, and the necessary 
subsystems and logistics support to resupply, 
replenish, and repair a rescue vehicle on orbit. 
The NASP program is also evaluating the poten-
tial for using an operational aerospace plane for 
Space Station crew rotation and rescue. Using an 
aerospace plane for rescue would provide two 
primary advantages: 1) there would be no need to 
build and support a dedicated vehicle and its 
associated infrastructure and personnel; and 2) it 
could be based on Earth, rather than in space, making 
it easier and cheaper to maintain. However, NASA 
expects to complete Phase I of the Space Station 
before 2000, and an operational aerospace plane 
could not be ready before it does so. Hence, an 
aerospace plane could not serve to replace or rescue 
crew from the Space Station until 2005 or later, if at 
all. 
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Photo etrIdIt General Dynamics Corp. 
Artisfs conception of an Advanced Launch System launch vehicle. 
Reducing the cost of exploring and using the 
space environment is crucial to the continued 
development and exploitation of outer space. Amer-
ica's wish list for projects in outer space far exceeds 
its ability to pay, given the many pressures on the 
Federal budget. Launch costs currently range from 
$3,000 to $12,000 per pound to reach low Earth orbit 
(LEO), depending on payload weight and the launch 
system employed. Launching communications sat-
ellites into geosynchronous transfer orbit costs 
between $11,000 and $20,000 per pound. If these 
costs could be reduced significantly, outer space 
would be more attractive to potential users, both 
within Government and in the private sector. How-
ever, for many spacecraft, space transportation costs 
are relatively small compared to the costs of 
designing and building the spacecraft. Hence, reduc-
ing spacecraft costs plays an essential part in 
bringing down overall space program costs. 
SPACE TRANSPORTATION 
New technologies promise to make the process of 
manufacture, assembly, and processing of launch 
vehicles less expensive (table 6-1). The Advanced 
Launch System (ALS) program, for example, is 
exploring a wide variety of technologies that could 
be employed to reduce space transportation costs. 1 
However, for these technologies to be effective, 
new management practices must be introduced 
(table 6-2). Launch operations, for example, tend 
to be highly labor-intensive, and comprise a 
significant percentage of the cost of a launch. As 
the example of the Delta 180 experiment for the 
Strategic Defense Initiative Office demonstrated, 
sharply reducing the burden of oversight and review 
in a project, and delegating authority to those closest 
to the technical problems, can result in meeting a 
tight launch schedule and reducing overall costs.2 In 
addition, launch system designs that reduce the 
number and complexity of tasks requiring human 
involvement would also contribute to reducing costs 
(table 6-3). The ALS program is also assessing 
various management and organizational techniques 
that would speed launch processing and reduce its 
complexity. It has incorporated some of the features 
of the so-called Big Dumb Booster concept (box 
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Table &-1-Cost-S8vlng 1Khnologles for 
Launch Systems 
• Automated manufacturing processes 
• Advanced, lightweight materials 
• Automated data management system 
• Automated test and inspection 
• Automated launch vehicle and payload handling 
• Modular subsystems 
• Database management systems 
• Computer-aided software development 
• Expert systems 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
Table &-2-COSt-Rec:luclng Strategies 
• Reduce documentation and oversight 
• Create better incentives for lowering costs 
• Provide adequate spares to reduce cannibalization of parts 
• Develop and use computerized management information 
systems 
• Use an improved integrateltransferllaunch philosophY-
lIThe integrate/transferllaunch (lTl) philosophy refers to the practice of 
separating categories of launch operations procedures to make each more 
efficient. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
Table 6-3-Launch System Design Strategies 
• Engage all major segments of launch team in launch system 
design process 
• Design for simplicity of operation as well as performance 
• Design for accessibility and modularity 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
6-A) in its planning, viz., the concept of designing a 
launch system to achieve minimum cost, rather than 
maximum performance. 
Purchasing launch services competitively from 
private firms, rather than managing launches from 
within NASA or the armed services might well save 
money. The intent of purchasing launch services is 
to remove the Government as much as possible from 
setting detailed engineering specifications for the 
launch system and to reduce the burden of excessive 
oversight by Government managers. Several en-
trepreneurial launch vehicle firms are developing 
new launch systems for small or medium-size 
payloads (see Small Launch Systems in ch. 4). These 
projects present opportunities to incorporate low-
IU.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-JSC-28 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988) for a detailed discussion of these points. 
2Department of Defense Strategic Defense Initiative Office/Kinetic Energy Office, "Delta ISO Final Repon," vol. 5, March 1987. 
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cost approaches at little direct3 cost to the Govern-
ment. However, launch fIrms complain that the cost 
of continued excessive government oversight and 
complicated procurement regulations4 unnecessar-
ily raises the costs of launch services. They argue 
that the cost of government oversight far exceeds the 
actual cost risk of a failed mission. Launch fIrms 
suggest that the government role, which may be vital 
during the development and demonstration phases 
of a new, complicated technology, becomes counter-
productive when the basic technology has been 
successfully acquired and is needed for ongoing 
operations. Then, matters of cost and reliability 
become paramount. However, Government users 
3Private development will result in some indirect costs to the Goverrunent. However, if these finns are operating within a competitive market, the 
eventual cost to the Government should be lower than if the Goverrunent paid for the improvements directly. 
4For a detailed discussion of the DoD acquisition system, especially rules and oversight, see U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Holding the Edge: Maintaining the Defense Technology Base, OTA-ISC-420 (Washington, DC: U.S. Goverrunent Printing Office, April 1989), 
especially ch. 8. 
may fear that boosters not built to government 
specifications might be too unreliable, especially for 
one-of-a-kind spacecraft. 
Current space policy provides for the civilian 
agencies to "encourage, to the maximum extent 
feasible, a domestic commercial launch industry by 
contracting for necessary ELV launch services 
directly from the private sector or with DoD."5 
Extending this policy to all Government 
launches, both civilian and military, except those 
on the Space Shuttle, could also save the Govern-
ment money, but only if Government oversight 
and paperwork were reduced. 
The Federal Government might encourage the 
private sector launch industry by issuing space 
transportation vouchers to space scientists whose 
experiments are being supported by the govern-
ment. 6 These vouchers could be redeemed for 
transportation on any appropriate U.S. launch vehi-
cle, and would free scientists to choose the vehicle 
they thought most suitable to the needs of the 
spacecraft. This policy would free space scientists 
from dependence on the Shuttle and its schedule. It 
might also increase opportunities for researchers to 
reach space. By reducing scientist's dependence on 
the Shuttle, such a policy should help in raising the 
demand for ELVs and in bringing down the cost of 
space transportation. 
PAYLOADS 
Dramatic reductions in launch costs will not, 
by themselves, lower spacecraft program costs 
substantially, because it may cost from $40,000 to 
$650,000 per pound to design and build many 
payloads,7 while it costs only about $3,000 per 
pound to launch one to LEO. Reducing launch 
costs to $300 per pound, a goal of the ALS program,8 
may reduce the total cost of procuring and launching 
an expensive spacecraft by less than 2 percent. 
Commercial communications satellites, however, 
often cost on the order of $10,000 per pound. 
Because they need to be placed in geosynchronous 
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orbit, which is more expensive to achieve than LEO, 
the cost of a launch is comparable to the cost of the 
payload. Therefore, commercial operators are ex-
tremely interested in cost reductions in both areas. 
To reduce payload costs, and for other reasons, 
novel approaches to payload design and fabrication 
have been proposed: 
• Provide for Weight Margin: Designing pay-
loads to fit launch vehicles while reserving 
ample size and weight margins can reduce the 
risk of incurring delay and expense after 
assembly has begun. 
Satellites often grow substantially heavier 
than expected as they proceed from design to 
construction. If a payload grows so heavy that 
its weight equals or exceeds the maximum 
allowable gross lift-off weight, the payload 
must be redesigned, which causes delay and 
increases cost. To reduce the risk of exceeding 
vehicle payload capacity, program managers 
could require designers to allow extra weight 
margin for such contingencies. However, this 
design philosophy would lead to more stringent 
size and weight constraints than would other-
wise be imposed. In many cases, sufficient 
margin could be provided by clever design, 
e.g., by designing several smaller single-
mission payloads, to be launched separately, 
instead of a single multimission payload.9 
• Fatsats: If payloads were allowed to be heavier 
for the same capability, some could cost 
substantially less. For example, OTA estimates 
that Titan-class payloads that cost several 
hundred million dollars might cost about $130 
million less if allowed to be five times as heavy. 
If payloads were allowed to be much heavier, a 
manufacturer could forego expensive processes 
for removing inessential structural material, as 
well as expensive analyses and tests. Standard-
ized subsystems, which could be produced 
economically in quantity, could be used instead 
of customized subsystems. Designers could 
also add redundant subsystems to increase 
SWhite House. Office of the Press Secretary, "National Space Policy," Nov. 2, 1989, p. 11. 
6Molly Macauley, "Launch Vouchers for Space Science Research," Space Policy, vol. 5, No.4, pp. 311-320. 
7The low end of Ibis range is for payloads consisting mostly of fuel; the high end would be for some satellites carrying little or no fuel. U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, Affordable Spacecraft: Design and Launch Alternatives--Background Paper, OTA-BP-ISC-60 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1990). 
8101 Stat. 1067. 
9Tbe number of new program starts allowed in a year tends to force program managers to add additional capabilities to the spacecraft. In addition, 
in some cases, a larger spacecraft bus can accommodate more functions at a reduced cost per function compared to multiple smaller buses. 
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reliability. An accurate estimate of potential 
savings requires a detailed trade-off analysis 
for each payload. Achieving these savings will 
probably require giving spacecraft program 
managers, and those who establish mission and 
spacecraft requirements, incentives crafted spe-
cifically for the purpose, and may require 
developing new launch vehicles. 
• Lightsats: If allowed to be less capable, relia-
ble, or long-lived, payloads could be both 
lighter and less expensive. Useful functions 
such as communications and weather surveil-
lance could be performed by payloads small 
enough to be launched on small rockets from 
airborne or mobile launchers. 
Small, simple, and relatively inexpensive 
civil and military satellites have been, and still 
are, launched at relatively low cost on small 
launch vehicles or at even lower cost, some-
times for free, as "piggyback" payloads on 
larger launch vehicles. DoD is considering 
whether the increased survivability and respon-
siveness such spacecraft could provide would 
compensate for possible decreased capability. 
A swarm of several small satellites might 
accomplish a given mission as well as a single 
large one, and, in many cases, would also be 
cheaper because smaller satellites typically 
cost much less per pound than do large ones. 
Even if the satellites are launched individually, 
which would increase total launch cost, overall 
mission cost could be lower. 
• Microspacecraft: Spacecraft weighing only a 
few pounds could perform useful space science 
missions and might be uniquely economical for 
experiments requiring simultaneous measure-
ments (e.g., of solar wind) at many widely 
separated points about the Earth, another 
planet, or the Sun. 
Each type of spacecraft-fats at, lights at, or mi-
crospacecraft-would impose unique launch de-
mands. New, large, heavy-lift launch vehicles would 
be needed to launch the heaviest satellites. Lightsats 
could be launched on existing launch vehicles, but 
new, smaller launch vehicles might launch them 
more economically. In wartime, small launch vehi-
cles could be transported or launched by trucks or 
aircraft to provide a survivable means of space 
launch. Microspacecraftcould be launched on exist-
ing launch vehicles, but they might eventually be 
launched by more exotic means such as a ram 
accelerator, railgun, coilgun, or laser-powered 
rocket (see ch. 7). Within the next decade, experi-
ments now being planned may establish the feasibil-
ity of some of these launch systems. Their costs 
cannot be estimated confidently until feasibility is 
proven. However, they may prove more economical 
than conventional rockets for launching microspace-
craft at high rates. 
If Congress wishes to promote spacecraft cost 
reduction and, thereby, reduce the cost of space 
programs: 
1. Congress could order a comprehensive study of 
how much the Nation could save on space programs 
by: 
• designing payloads to reserve more weight and 
volume margin on a launch vehicle; 
• allowing payloads to be heavier, less capable, 
shorter-lived, or less reliable; 
• designing standard subsystems and buses for 
use in a variety of spacecraft; 
• designing spacecraft to perform single rather 
than multiple missions; and 
• using several inexpensive satellites instead of a 
single expensive one. 
Lockheed completed such a study in 1972; 10 a 
new one should consider current mission needs and 
technology. It would complement the Space Trans-
portation Architecture Study (STAS) and more 
recent and ongoing studies 11 that compare space 
transportation options but not payload design op-
tions. 
As noted above, to estimate potential savings 
accurately, a detailed trade-off analysis must be 
done for each payload, or more generally, for each 
mission. So, for greater credibility, 
2. Congress could require selected spacecraft 
programs-for example, those that might require a 
new launch vehicle to be developed-to award two 
design contracts, one to a contractor who would 
1000000ckheed Missiles & Space Co., Impact of Low Cost Rejurbishable and Standard Spacecraft Upon Future NASA Space Programs, N72-27913 
(Springfield, VA: National Technical Information Service, Apr. 30, 1972). 
IIE.g., the Air Force's Air Force-Focused STAS, NASA's Next Manned Space Transportation System study, the Defense Science Board's National 
Space Launch Strategy study, and the Space Transportation Comparison study for the National Aero-Space Plane Program. 
consider the unconventional approaches mentioned 
above. 
3. Congress could require both the Department of 
Defense and NASA to refrain from developing a 
spacecraft if the expected weight or size of the 
spacecraft, together with its propellants, upper stage, 
and support equipment, would exceed some fraction 
of the maximum weight or size that its intended 
launch vehicle can accommodate. Public Law 100-
456 requires the Department of Defense to require at 
least 15 percent weight margin in fiscal year 1989,I2 
New legislation could extend this restriction to 
NASA and could require size margins in future 
years. 
In addition, Congress could promote the develop-
ment of launch systems capable of launching small, 
inexpensive spacecraft at low cost or heavy space-
craft with generous weight margins. 
INNOVATION AND THE 
U.S. TECHNOLOGY BASE 
Building a new system, or even making substan-
tial modifications to existing launchers, requires a 
vigorous private sector, well-supported research 
programs, a cadre of well-trained engineers, and an 
institutional structure capable of putting a vast 
variety of technologies to use in innovative ways. 
According to several recent reports, our existing 
space technology base has become inadequate in 
recent years}3 Yet a strong technology base is an 
investment in the future; it provides insurance that 
the United States will be able to meet future 
technological challenges. 
Government Programs 
Several studies have recommended greater atten-
tion to improving the Nation's technology base for 
space transportation. 14 Though specific proposals 
differ in detail, these studies have cited propulsion, 
space power, materials, structures, and information 
systems as areas in need of special attention. 
In response to these and other expressed concerns, 
NASA and the Air Force have initiated four pro-
grams to improve the Nation's launch system 
12See S.Rept. 100-326, p. 36, and H. Rept. 100-989, p. 282. 
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technology base (box 6-B). As currently organized, 
these programs are directed primarily toward devel-
oping new, advanced capabilities. In the existing 
budgetary climate, it may be more realistic to 
redirect funding toward technologies that could 
be used to improve existing launch systems and 
make them more cost-effective to operate. Each of 
the three ALS prime contractors are exploring ways 
to insert technology conceived in the ALS program 
into existing launch systems. 
Although launch operations and logistics are 
labor-intensive and therefore expensive compared to 
manufacturing or materials,launch system designers 
have focused little attention on technologies that 
would reduce these costs. NASA's technology 
programs are addressing issues in automation and 
robotics, technology areas that could Significantly 
reduce launch operations costs. However, to date 
NASA has spent relatively little on applying these 
technologies more effectively to Shuttle launch 
operations. In the yearly budget process, when 
budgets are cut, technology programs tend to be cut 
more sharply than operational programs because 
they focus on future efforts, rather than near-term 
results. Launch operations is the direct focus of 
about 30 percent of the ALS program. Outside of this 
effort, however, no well-organized or well-funded 
plan exists to apply the technologies developed in 
these programs to launch operations procedures, or 
to coordinate research being carried out through the 
existing technology R&D programs. 
It may be appropriate to institute a long-term 
National Strategic Launch Technology Plan that 
would set the agenda for developing and incorpo-
rating new technologies into existing and future 
launch systems. It should include work in all 
development phases: 
• broad technology exploration (basic research); 
• focused research leading to a demonstration; 
and 
• implementation to support specific applica-
tions. 
Even if specific applications have not been identi-
fied, the United States needs to fund basic and 
13National Research Council, Ae~nautics and Space Engineering Board, Space Technology to Meet Future Needs (Washington, DC: National 
~::~my Press, December 1987); Jomt DoD/NASA Steering Group, National Space Transportation and Support Study, Swnmary Report, May 14, 
14Ibid. 
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focused research in order to build an adequate base 
for future applications. 
The Private Sector's Role 
In space transportation, the private sector now 
serves primarily as contractor for Government-
defined needs. It is just beginning to act as a 
commercial service provider. IS Two firms launched 
their first commercial payloads in 1989.16 
Private firms are unlikely to develop major new 
launch systems until well into the next century 
unless Congress and the Administration set a high 
priority on involving them more directly in setting 
the terms of space transportation development. 17 
The Government controls access to spacelS and most 
lS'fhe Department of Transponation regulates the private launch industry. 
16McDonnell Douglas (Delta) and Martin Marietta (Titan) 
of the technology. It will continue to determine 
launch specifications and provide most of the 
funding. Government control of systems involving 
crews in space will continue, in large part because 
such systems are costly and represent a major 
national commitment. 
Harnessing industry's innovative power in a 
more competitive environment could lead to 
reduced launch -costs and more etTective use of 
U.S. resources for outer space. By promoting 
private sector innovation toward improving the 
design, manufacture, and operations of launch sys-
tems, the Government could reduce the cost of 
Government launches, yet relatively few incentives 
to involve private firms exist today. As a result, 
firms have spent little of their own money on R&D 
17The NASP program. for example. has sent a high priority on directly involving private finns and the universities in materials and other advanced 
research on the X·30. 
18According to the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space. which the United States signed. and to which it adheres. "States parties to the Treaty shall bear 
international responsibility for national activities in outer space ... whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by 
non-governmental entities ... " The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984. which sets out the basic provisions regulating the commercial launch 
industry. recognizes this responsibility by stating. " ... the United States should regulate such launches and services in order to ensure compliance with 
international obligations of the United States ... " 
to improve the capability of launch systems or 
reduce their costs. 
If outer space becomes a more important arena for 
private investment, competitive pressures will pro-
vide the incentives for launch system innovation. 
For the near term, however, incentives must come 
from the Government because projected future 
demand for commercial launch services is extremely 
small compared to Government demand. 19 
Incentives could include: 
• direct grants to develop new technology for 
launch systems specifically directed toward 
saving costs rather than increasing perform-
ance; 
• cash incentives to firms for reducing the 
manufacturing costs of specific items procured 
by the Government;20 
• encouragement of industrial teaming arrange-
ments in focused technology areas such as the 
National Aerospace Plane Materials Consor-
tium (see ch. 7). 
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In addition, the U.S. Government could stimulate 
the private sector's innovative creativity by issuing 
a request for proposal for launch systems or services 
similar to the Advanced Launch System, and have 
industry bid for them. Such an approach assumes 
minimum Government oversight over the design 
and manufacturing processes. It would also require 
the aerospace community to assume much greater 
financial risk than it has taken on in the past. In order 
to offset that risk, the Government might have to 
agree to a minimum purchase that would allow the 
companies involved to earn a profit on their invest-
ment. 
Finally, America's ability to foster the innovative 
process depends directly on having an adequate 
supply of scientists and engineers. In order to assure 
that the United States has sufficient trained person-
nel to contribute to the development of new launch 
systems and other space activities, the Government 
could strengthen its support for science, mathemat-
ics, and engineering education from grade school 
through graduate school. 21 
l'!Richard Brackeen, Space Challenge' 88: Fourth Annual Space Symposium Proceedings Report (Colorado Springs, CO: U.S. Space Foundation 
1988), pp. 76-79. 
2Opor example, Rockwell International earns 20% of every dollar it saves NASA on building orbiter OV -105. 
2IU.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Educating Scientists and Engineers: Grade School to Graduate School, OTA-SET-377 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1988). 
Chapter 7 
Potential Future Launch Systems 
Photo credit: McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
Artist's conception of an X-30 aerospace plane 
Chapter 7 
Potential Future Launch Systems 
The Space Transportation Architecture Study 
:.\S)1 and later ~tudies ~onducted by NASA ~d rAir Force identIfied a wIde range of technologIes ~ management practices that could reduce the :Sts of space transportation and also increase 
reliability and operabi~ty. This chapter describes 
several options for meeting future space transporta-
tion demand. 
CARGO ONLY 
The Nation's existing fleet of expendable launch 
vehicles (ELVs) can carry payloads weighing up to 
39 000 pounds (figure 1-1) to low Earth orbit (LEO). 
Ev~ntually, as cargoes gradually increase in size and 
weight, and as the Nation seeks to do more in space 
than it currently plans, new launch systems offering 
higher lift capacity will become attractive, if they 
can reduce costs while improving reliability and 
operability. 
Some have argued that the Nation needs a 
heavy-lift launch vehicle (HLLV), similar in capac-
ity to the Soviet Energia,2 which can lift about 
220,000 pounds to LEO. Indeed, for tasks requiring 
the launch of many pounds of cargo to space at one 
time in a single package, an HLLV would be 
necessary. If available, an HLLV would be useful for 
building large space structures, such as the Space 
Station, because 13;unching pre-assembled structures 
would obviate much risky and expensive on-orbit 
assembly. 
Some also argue that if the United States had an 
HLLV, the Government and the private sector would 
find a way to use it, for example, in bringing down 
launch and payload costs. OTA's analysis of future 
space transportation costs indicates that average cost 
per pound can be reduced substantially only if there 
is a marked increase in demand-that is, the number 
of pounds launched per year. Unless the Nation 
plans to increase investment in space activities 
Significantly over current levels, development of an 
HLLV in order to reduce launch costs appears 
unwarranted. 
As noted earlier, if the Nation were to pursue the 
goals of building a permanent settlement on the 
Moon and/or sending explorers to Mars, one or more 
HLLVs would be required to carry the requisite fuel 
and other support infrastructure to LEO (box 7-AV 
Shuttle-C 
NASA has investigated the potential for building 
a cargo-only HLLV, which would use Shuttle 
elements and technology. As envisioned by NASA, 
Shuttle-C could launch between 94,000 and 155,000 
pounds to low Earth orbit (figure 7-1).4 Such a 
system could lift large, heavy payloads if the risk or 
cost of using the Shuttle would be high as a result of 
S IU.S. Depanment of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Space Transponation and Support Study /995-2010, 
ummary Report of the Joint Steering Group, May 1986. 
2'fhe Energia can carry either cargo or the Soviet Shuttle into space. Energia may be used to lift elements of a new Soviet space station. 
11 ~chard Truly, "Testimony before the Subcommittee on Space Sciences and Applications of the House Committee on Science, Space, and 
~ __ Ology, Sept. 26, 1989; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Repon o/the 90-Day Study on Human Exploration oj the Moon & Mars, 
• "'vcmber 1990. 
4Shuttle is currently capable of lifting 52,000 pounds to 110 nautical miles above Kennedy Space Center. 
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Agure 7-1-Potentlal Shuttle-C Performance 
Shuttle-C Ascent Performance Capability (Ib) 
ETR 
220 nmi 110 nmi 110 nmi 
28.5 deg. 28.5 deg. 98.7 deg. 
BASELINE DESIGN 2 SSME@ 100% 82,750 93,700 n/a 
@104% 88,180 99,100 n/a 
3 SSME@ 100% 141,300 151,100 53,200 
@104% 145,200 155,000 57,200 
BASELINE + ASRM 2 SSME @ 104% 99,620 110,540 13,900 
3SSME @ 104% 156,600 166,500 68,600 
KEY: ETR = Eastern Test Range (Cape Canaveral) ; WTR = \Nestern Test Range (Vandenberg Air Force Base) 
SOURCE: National Aeronantics & Space Administration , 1989. 
3Ox2OOnmi 
28.5 deg. 
105,900 
112,40 
162,900 
167,400 
124,400 
179,400 
WTR 
110 nmi 
98.7 deg. 
57,460 
62,800 
111,000 
115,100 
74,300 
126,400 
"orbital assembly or multiple Shuttle launches.'>5 
For example, it could enable the launch of large 
elements of the planned Space Station, already 
outfitted, reducing the risks that are associated with 
extensive on-orbit assembly using the Shuttle, or the 
Shuttle plus smaller ELVs (box 7-A). 
Because the Shuttle-C would use most of the 
subsystems already proven on the Shuttle, NASA 
asserts that the Shuttle-C would cost about $1.8 
billion to develop and could be ready for the first 
flight about 4 years after development begins. 
NASA planners suggest that it would serve to 
"bridge the gap" in launch services for large 
payloads between the mid-1990s and the beginning 
of the 21st century when an Advanced Launch 
System (ALS) could be available.6 
Shuttle-C would avoid some costs by using 
Shuttle facilities and subsystems. For example, each 
Shuttle-C would use and expend two or three Space 
Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs), but it could use 
SSMEs that had been used on the Shuttle until 
permitted only one more use by safety rules; these 
would be almost completely depreciated. However, 
Shuttle-C planners now propose to use SSMEs that 
have been used on the Shuttle only once; they would 
cost the Shuttlt(-C program $20 million each if they 
can be procured for $25 million each (versus $38 
million currently) and refurbished for $15 million 
(fiscal year 1991 dollars), and if half the cost of two 
flights is allocated to Shuttle-C. In this case, the 
incremental cost per launch would be about 480 
million fiscal year 1991 dollars7 for a 3-engine 
Shuttle-C.8 
Advanced Launch System (ALS) 
In 1987 the Air Force and NASA began prelimi-
nary work on the (ALS), with the goals of dramati-
cally reducing launch costs and improving vehicle 
reliability and operability. ALS program officials 
expect the ALS efforts to result in a modular family 
of cargo vehicles that would provide a broad range 
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of payload capacity (figure 7-2). The ALS program 
estimates that development would cost about $7.3 
billion (1989 dollars), and facilities would cost 
about $4 billion. 
The ALS approach is to trade launch vehicle 
performance efficiency for low cost and high relia-
bility by incorporating design and operating mar-
gins, and using redundant subsystems that are highly 
fault-tolerant. In addition, ALS designs would 
simplify and standardize interfaces, manufacturing 
processes, and operations procedures. New technol-
ogies would be developed and used only if they 
would further the goals of low cost and high 
reliability. ALS managers expect these approaches 
to improve the operability of the ALS compared to 
existing launch systems, by providing: 
• high availability and reliability; 
• high throughput and on-time performance; and 
• standard vehicle-cargo operations9 
The ALS Program Office has defmed a reference 
vehicle using liquid propulsion and capable oflifting 
between 80,000 and 120,000 pounds to LEO. It 
would use low-cost, 580,OOO-pound thrust engines 
that would be developed specifically for the ALS. 
The ALS program is also exploring the possible use 
of solid rockets for strap-on boosters. 
Recently, the Department of Defense decided not 
to proceed with procurement of an ALS at this time, 
but to continue the program as a technology 
development effort. The primary thrust of the 
restructured ALS program would be to develop a 
new engine and other critical technolgies for an ALS 
family of vehicles that could be started later in the 
decade if the need for such vehicles arises. The 
technology and subsystems developed for the ALS 
technology development program could provide the 
basis for building an HLLV system, if needed, in the 
early part of the 21 st century. In the meantime, the 
program could provide important improvements for 
existing ELVs (table 7-1). 
5NASA Marshall Space Center, "Shuttle-C Users Conference. Executive Smnmary," May 1989. 
6Ibid. 
7 About 424 million fiscal year 1989 dollars. 
sTIle other half oCthe cost should be allocated to Shuttle operations. OTA's cost estimates for Shuttle assume 10 or more uses per SSME. See U.S. 
Congress. OffICe of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for tM Future: A Buyer's Guide. OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, July 1988). p. 68. footnote 5. 
9ALS Program OffICe briefing to OTA. September 1989. 
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Figure 7-2-Advanced Launch System: The ALS Family 
Height in feet 
400,-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Reference vehicle 
300~--------------------------------------------------------------~ 
200 -+---1 
100~---F~--------~~----~ 
Payload 
(thousands of Ibs) 
Booster: 
Type 
Propellant 
Number 
40 to 80 
Stage & half 
L02/LH 2 
N/A 
40 to 80 80 to 110 
ALS-SRM SRMU 
Clean solid Clean solid 
3 to 8 2 to 4 
100 to 251 
STS LRB 
L02/LH 2 
2 to 6 
80 to 120 120 to 300 
ALS LRB 
L02/LH 2 
2 to 4 
KEY: ALS = Advanced Launch System; LRB = liquid Rocket Booster; SRM = Solid Rocket Motor; SRMU = Solid Rocket Motor Unit; STS = Space 
Transportation System. 
SOURCE: Advanced Launch System Program Office. 
Unconventional Launch Systems 
A number of launch systems have been proposed 
that would use "exotic" technologies to propel 
payloads into space. For example, a payload might 
ride to orbit on a plastic cylinder, the bottom of 
which is heated from below by the beam from a 
powerful ground-based laser. As the plastic on the 
bottom decomposes into vapor and expands, it will 
exert pressure on the cylinder, producing thrust. The 
SDIO estimates development and construction of a 
laser for launching 44-pound payloads would re-
quire about $550 million over 5 or 6 years. It 
estimates that a laser system could launch up to 100 
payloads per day-more than 20 Shuttle loads per 
year-for about $200 per pound, assuming propul-
sive efficiencies 300 percent greater than those 
achieved in lab tests. The cost would be closer to 
$500 per pound if efficiency is not improved. 
Railgun proponents predict a prototype railgun 
capable of launching 1,lOO-pound projectiles carry-
ing 550 pounds of payload could be developed in 
about 9 years for between $900 million and $6 
billion, including $500 million to $5 billion for 
development of projectiles and tracking technology. 
If produced and launched at a rate of 10,000 per year, 
the projectiles (less payload) might cost between 
$500 and $30,000 per pound (estimates differ). The 
cost of launching them might be as low as $20 per 
pound-Le., $40 per pound of payload. 10 
Several other gun-like launchers have been pro-
posed. One is the ram cannon (or ram accelerator), 
the barrel of which would be filled with gaseous fuel 
and oxidizer. The projectile would fly through this 
mixture, which would be ignited by the shock wave 
of the passing projectile and would exert pressure on 
it, accelerating it. A ram cannon designed for space 
launch would be about 2 miles long. 
Many uses have been proposed for such launch 
systems, but to date only the Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization has identified a plausible 
IGNote, however, that such rates are more than 100 times the current launch rate. 
Table 7-1-Potentlal ALS Technology 
Improvements to Existing Systems 
PrOpulsion 
• Simplified engine designs 
• Low cost manufacturing processes 
• Low cost, clean solid propellants 
• Automated nondestructive testing for solid rocket motors 
• Enhanced liquid propulsion performance 
Avionics and software 
• Highly reliable avionics 
• Weather and mission adaptive guidance, navigation, and 
control 
• Expert systems for vehicle/mission management 
• Automated software production 
• Electromechanical actuators 
Aerothermodynsmlcs 
• Engine and avionics reuse 
- recovery 
- landing 
- maintenance 
- reentry systems 
Structures, materials, and manufacturing 
• Low weight materials for propellants 
• Composite structures for shroud and innertank 
• Low cost manufacturing 
- automation: welding 
- processes: spinning, casting, extruSion, forging 
Operations 
• Automated checkout and launch operations 
• Paperless management 
• Expert system monitoring and control 
• Engine and avionics health monitoring 
• Operational subsystems 
- pyrotechnic alternatives 
- hazardous gas detection 
- remote cable transducer 
SOURCE: Advanced Launch System Program Office. 
demand for high-rate launches of microspacecraft, 
which could use such systems economically. How-
ever, demand for launches of scientific, commercial, 
and other microspacecraft could increase, perhaps 
dramatically, if launch costs could be reduced to a 
few hundred dollars per pound. 
Most of these exotic launch technologies are still 
in the exploratory stage and therefore much less 
mature than rocket technology. Because of this, the 
costs cited must be regarded as highly speculative. 
Nevertheless, Congress may wish to fund continued 
research in order not to foreclose the opportunity 
exotics may pose for reducing future launch costs, 
especially for extremely small payloads such as the 
microspacecraft discussed in chapter 6--Reducing 
Space Space System Costs. 
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CREW-CARRYING LAUNCH 
SYSTEMS 
Even if the Shuttle is made more reliable, the 
Shuttle's high operational costs will eventually 
lead to a decision to replace it with a successor 
capable of more effectively fitting the needs of the 
Government's activities for people in space and 
reducing the recurring cost of launching piloted 
vehicles. The most important goal of each Shuttle 
mission is to return the reusable orbiter and crew 
safely to Earth. II This goal, an essential aspect of 
flying human crews and an expensive reusable 
vehicle, nevertheless adds to mission costs by 
requiring additional attention to payload integration, 
extra payload safety systems, and additional pre-
flight payload handling. In addition, humans require 
special environments not needed by many payloads. 
For the 1990s, the primary need for transporting 
people to and from outer space will be to operate the 
Shuttle orbiters and experiments aboard them, and to 
assemble and operate the Space Station. NASA now 
estimates that Phase I Space Station construction 
wiil require 29 Shuttle flights (including some 
logistics flights) and about 5.5 flights per year 
thereafter to service Space Station. If the Nation 
decides to build a lunar base or to send a crew-
carrying mission to Mars, NASA estimates that 
additional crew-carrying capacity would be needed 
to supplement or replace the Shuttle. 
NASA is studying several launch concepts that 
could supplement or replace the current Shuttle. 
Most could not be available before the turn of the 
century. NASA and the Air Force are collaborating 
on the development of an aerospace plane using 
advanced, airbreathing engines that could revolu-
tionize spaceflight. However, even if development 
were pushed, an aerospace plane based on air-
breathing technology is unlikely to be available for 
operational before 2005. 
PERSONNEL CARRIER 
LAUNCHED ON UNPILOTED 
LAUNCH VEHICLES 
NASA is exploring the possibility of developing 
a personnel launch system (PLS) that would use a 
llReturning the orbiter and crew safely is not necessarily equivalent to completing the mission, although it is often confused with the same. NASA 
will abort the mission rather than knowingly risk crew safety, if problems appear. Launching payloads on unpiloted vehicles avoids the added complexity 
and cost provided by the human factor. 
74 • Access to Space: The Future of u.s. Space Transportation Systems 
small reusable glider, capsule, or lifting body 
launched atop an expendable launch vehicle rated to 
carry crews. 12 This option would separate human 
transport from cargo delivery, and could, in princi-
ple, be made safer than the Shuttle. The Soviet 
Union,13 The European Space Agency, 14 and 
Japan1S have all adopted this approach to placing 
people in orbit. Candidate launchers could include a 
Titan III, a Titan IV, a Shuttle-C, or perhaps anew, 
as-yet undeveloped launcher such as the ALS. 
The ALS Joint Program Office has recognized the 
potential benefit of having a flexible launch vehicle 
rated for launching crews. It has therefore required 
that contractor proposals for an ALS provide for a 
launch vehicle capable of meeting both the design 
and quality assurance criteria for carrying crews. 
Designing an ALS launch vehicle at the outset to 
provide additional structural strength would be 
much less expensive than redesigning, rebuilding, 
and retesting it after it is developed. 16 As currently 
envisioned, ALS would also provide previously 
unobtainable levels of safety by incorporating fault-
tolerant subsystems and engine-out capability. 
Having a crew-rated automated launcher in addi-
tion to a Shuttle has three strong advantages: 1) the 
crew-rated vehicle could launch new orbiters de-
signed for launch with other boosters; 2) it could 
enhance crew safety (intact abort is a design 
requirement for the PLS); and 3) there may be cases 
where it will be necessary only to deliver personnel 
to the Space Station. In that case, there is no need to 
risk a Shuttle orbiter. Separation of crew- and 
cargo-carrying capabilities is especially important, 
as carrying both on the same vehicle adds to the 
payload costs and may reduce crew safety. In view 
of the concerns over Shuttle fleet attrition, it may 
be important for NASA to investigate the poten-
tial for using a crew-rated ALS or other launcher 
to reduce the risk of losing crew-carrying capac-
ity early in the next century. 
Advanced Manned Launch System (AMLS) 
NASA's program investigating the set of con-
cepts for an AMLS, previously called the Shuttle II, 
is studying new designs with the goal of replacing 
the Space Shuttle early in the next century. A vehicle 
significantly different from the existing Shuttle 
would result (box 7-B). If activities involving crews 
in space increase markedly in the next century, an 
AMLS using advanced technology might be needed. 
It could offer significant improvements in opera-
tional flexibility and reduced operations costs over 
the existing Shuttle. However, development, testing, 
and procurement of an AMLS fleet could cost $20 
billion or more (1989 dollars). 
The timing of the development phase for an 
AMLS should depend on NASA's need to replace 
the Shuttle fleet. It would also depend in part on 
progress reached with technologies being ex-
plored in the Advanced Launch System and 
National Aero-Space Plane (NASP) programs. In 
any event, a decision on AMLS will not have to be 
made for several more years. For example, if 
Congress decided that an operational AMLS was 
needed by 2010, the decision to start the early phases 
of development would have to be made by about 
1995. By that time, Congress should have had 
adequate opportunity to assess the progress made in 
the NASP program (see below), which could be 
competitive with an AMLS. 
An Aerospace Plane 
Developing a reusable vehicle that could be 
operated like an airplane from conventional 
runways, but fly to Earth orbit powered by a 
single propulsion stage would provide a radically 
different approach to space launch and a major 
step in U.S. launch capability. However, building 
such a vehicle poses a much larger technical 
challenge than building a two-stage, rocket-
propelled vehicle such as the AMLS. A successful 
aerospace plane might also provide greater benefits 
to industry and to U.S. technological competitive-
12A NASA or Air Force launch vehicle is said to be crew, or "man-rated," if it has been certified as meeting certain safety criteria. These include design 
criteria as well as quality assurance criteria. 
13Although the Soviet Union has also developed a shuttle orbiter similar to the U.S. Space Shuttle, it will continue to rely on its Soyuz vehicle for 
transporting people to the Mir space station atop the Proton launcher, and on its Progress transport for launching cargo. 
14The reusable, piloted Hermes spaceplane will be launched atop an Ariane V launcher sometime in the late 1990s. Ariane V is currently also under 
development. 
ISJapan plans to develop a small, unpiloted spaceplane, HOPE, that would be launched atop its H II launch vehicle, now under development. HOPE 
may experience its first flight in the early years of the next century. 
16ft would, however, add a small amount to the cost of each flight in which cargo only were carried. 
ness than an AMLS, as a result of the development 
of new materials and propulsion methods. The 
Department of Defense and NASA are jointly 
funding the NASP program to build the X-30 (box 
7-C),17 a research vehicle intended to demonstrate 
both single-stage access to space and endoat-
mospheric hypersonic cruise capabilities. 
NASP is a high-risk technology development 
program. BuDding the X-30 to achieve orbit with 
a single stage would require major technological 
advances in materials and structures, propulsion 
systems, and computer simulation of aerody-
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namic and aerothermal etTects from Mach 1 to 
Mach 25.18 The uncertainties in meeting design 
goals are compounded because a successful X-30 
would require many of the key enabling technolo-
gies to work in concert with one another. Because 
ground test facilities cannot replicate all of the 
conditions that would be encountered in ascent to 
orbit, it is impossible to predict precisely how the 
X-30 would perform when pilots make the first 
attempts to push it far into the hypersonic realm. 
If funded, the X-30 would be a research vehicle, 
not a prototype of an operational vehicle. To develop 
an operational vehicle would require an additional 
program beyond NASP. A development cycle that 
took full advantage of lessons learned in the X-30's 
planned test program could not commence until the 
late 1990s at the earliest. An operational vehicle 
derived from the proposed X-30 would therefore be 
unlikely until approximately 2005 or later unless it 
were closely modeled on the X-30. However, if the 
X-30 were designed to provide the maximum data 
17Debates over NASP fWiding within the Administration and within Congress have left the long-tenn status of the program in doubt. In Spring 1989 
DoD decided to cut its contribution to NASP by two-thirds for fiscal year 1990 and to tenninate funding for it in subsequent years. A reexamination 
of the program by the National Space CoWicilled to the replacement of program fWlds, but delayed the decision concerning whether or not to proceed 
with construction of the X-30 for 2 years, to 1993. Congress decided to appropriate $254 million for NASP research in 1990 ($194 from DoD; $60 million 
from NASA). 
18Mach 1 is the speed of soWid. Hypersonic usually refers to flight at speeds of at least Mach 5-five times the speed of soWld, or about 4,000 miles 
per hour. Mach 25 (25 times Mach 1), is the speed necessary to reach Earth orbit. 
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about the feasibility of an operational aerospace 
plane, it would be unlikely to serve as an appropriate 
prototype of an operational vehicle. Although the 
X-30 would be piloted, aerospace planes based on 
the X-30 could be designed to carry cargo autono-
mously.19 
If the X -30 proves successful, the fIrst operational 
vehicles that employ NASP technologies are likely 
to be built for military use, possibly followed by 
civilian space vehicles. Commercial hypersonic 
transports (the "Orient Express") are a more distant 
possibility. Recent studies have shown that from an 
economic standpoint, commercial hypersonic trans-
ports would compare unfavorably with proposed 
slower, Mach 3 supersonic transports based on less 
exotic technology and conventional fuels. There-
fore, the most economic route to commercial 
high-speed air transport is unlikely to be through 
the X-30 development program. However, the 
X-30 program could provide technical spin-offs 
to aerospace and other high-technology indus-
tries through its development of advanced mate-
rials and structures and through advances in 
computation and numerical simulation tech-
niques. It is too early to judge the economic 
importance of such spinoffs. 
Even assuming a rapid resolution of the myr-
iad of technical issues facing the creation of an 
X-30 capable of reaching orbit with a single 
propulsion stage based on airbreathing technol-
ogy, translating this technology into an opera-
tional spaceplane might come late in the period 
when an AMLS could be ready, and perhaps 
after the time when replacements for the Shuttle 
would be necessary. With their less exotic technol-
ogies, rocket propelled AMLS vehicles could proba-
bly be funded in the mid to late 1990s and still be 
developed in time to replace aging Shuttles. An 
AMLS program begun in this period would also 
benefit from the technical base being developed in 
the NASP program, which is exploring concepts 
based solely on rocket propulsion as well (see 
below). However, the technical and economic 
uncertainties of both programs suggest that 
Congress would benefit from monitoring their 
progress and comparing the probability of suc-
cess of each before committing development 
funds for operational vehicles in the mid-1990s. 
The development costs of each program, as well 
as other competing budget priorities, will play a 
major role in such a decision. 
Additional Reusable Launch Concepts 
Routine flight to space with reusable vehicles 
offers tremendous economies if the United States 
can master the underlying technologies-materials, 
structures, propulsion, and avionics to produce· a 
highly reliable and maintainable reusable vehicle.20 
The technologies needed for fully reusable space 
launch systems are being developed primarily by the 
NASP program, although the ALS and AMLS 
programs are also investing in reusable concepts. 
Future operational cargo systems may combine the 
best technologies developed by each program. 
Ranging from rocket -powered vehicles that might be 
available by the beginning of next century, to 
airbreathing propulsion systems that would be 
available later, such vehicles could support interme-
diate to near Shuttle-size payloads. Operated as fully 
reusable vehicles able to fly to orbit without an 
expendable stage, such vehicles offer some of the 
economies associated with aircraft. 
19'fhe Soviet shuttle Buran has demonstrated the feasibility of launching and landing a reusable space plane without a human crew. 
ZOSee app. A for a discussion of the effect of reliability on life-cycle cost estimates of future launch systems. 
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Soviet Shuttle Buran on the launch pad at the Soviet launch complex. 
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COMPETITION 
This decade has seen the rise of intergovernmental 
competition in space transportation. The develop-
ment of space transportation systems is a national 
achievement that signals a nation's status as a space 
power, able to develop and use advanced technol-
ogy. The Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, and China 
now operate launch systems capable of reaching 
space with sizable payloads. Although only the 
United States and the Soviet Union are currently 
able to send humans to and from space, ESA, France, 
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom are all in 
various stages of developing their own reusable 
launch systems, which, if successful, would be 
capable of transporting human crews. 
Recently, commercial competition subsidized by 
governments has become an important part of space 
transportation competition. Europe, the Soviet 
Union, and China now compete with U.S. private 
firms for the international space launch market. Each 
government has developed its own mechanisms for 
assisting its launch firms. For example, Glavcosmos 
(U.S.S.R.) and the Great Wall Corp. (China) are 
government corporations, for which sales of launch 
services are an integral part of international policy. 
Arianespace, S.A. (France) is a private corporation 
owned in part by the French Government. 1 Although 
it operates as a private firm, Arianespace receives 
considerable indirect support from the European 
Space Agency, which has developed the various 
Ariane launchers, built the launch complexes, and 
purchases launch services. The United States Gov-
ernment has assisted U.S. private firms by develop-
ing the expendable launch vehicles and launch 
facilities (which are leased to the ftrms), by purchas-
ing launchers and launch services from them, and in 
numerous other ways.2 
A number of experts have raised doubts about the 
capability of the U.S. private sector to compete for 
providing launch services in the world market, 
especially in the face of a relatively small market for 
commercial launch services. Projected launch serv-
ices supply far exceeds expected demand. Launch 
firms in the United States, France, the Soviet Union, 
and China expect to be able to supply about 35 to 40 
vehicles per year to launch only 15 to 20 commercial 
payloads per year over the next decade. 
A launch industry capable of competing on the 
basis of price as well as capability in the world 
market could contribute several hundred million 
dollars per year toward improving the current strong 
negative balance of payments with foreign coun-
tries, directly by making sales to foreign customers, 
and indirectly by keeping U.S. payload owners from 
going off-shore to purchase launch services. Con-
gress could assist the U.S. private sector by helping 
the Executive work to develop and maintain a' 'level 
playing fteld" in the marketplace, in which prices 
are arrived at by rules based on justiftable economic 
rationales and agreed on by the launch providers.3 
The recent negotiations with China in which that 
country agreed to price its launch services to reflect 
actual manufacturing and launch cost have been a 
step in the right direction, but similar arrangements 
need to be negotiated with all launching nations who 
are offering their launch vehicles in the commercial 
market. 
COOPERATION 
The United States has always maintained a 
vigorous program of international cooperation in 
space in order to support U.S. political and economic 
goals. However, it has cooperated very little with 
other countries in space transportation, in large part 
because most launch technology has direct military 
applications and much of the technology has been 
classified or sensitive. 
Today, because other countries have developed 
their own indigenous launch capabilities, reducing 
much of the competitive edge the United States once 
held, and because progress in space will continue to 
be expensive, cooperating on space transportation 
and sharing costs could be beneftcial. Several 
cooperative ventures have been suggested: 
• Space Station resupply. The United States 
could share responsibility for resupply of the 
international Space Station with its Space 
Station partners. In order for other countries to 
IArianespace is owned by 35 companies, 13 banks, and CNES, the French Space Agency. 
2The commercial market alone is insufficient to support more than one U.S. commercial medium-capacity launch system. No large launch system 
has yet been privately developed, and at least for the next decade or two commercial traffic levels will probably not justify future private development. 
JSee Public Law 100-657 (102 Stat. 3900), ''The Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988." 
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Photo credit: British Aerospace 
Artist's conception of British Aerospace's Hotol aerospace plane taking off. If successful, this space plane 
would reach Earth orbit with a single propulsion stage. 
use their launch systems to supply the Space 
Station, or to dock with it, the countries will 
have to reach agreement with the United States 
on appropriate standards for packaging, dock-
ing, and safety. ESA and NASA have now 
established a working committee to discuss 
these matters. If successful, such cooperation 
could be extended to include cooperation on 
more sensitive aspects of space transportation. 
In particular, because Europe and Japan have 
now developed and operated their own launch 
systems, they may have specific technologies 
or methods to share with the United States in 
return for access to some U.S. technology. 
• Emergency rescue from Space Station. As 
noted in an earlier section, NASA is planning 
to provide some sort of emergency crew return 
capability for the Space Station. NASA esti-
mates that developing such a capability would 
cost between $1 billion and $2 billion, depend-
ing on its level of sophistication. If properly 
outfitted, the European Hermes or the Japa-
nese HOPE might be used as an emergency 
return vehicle. In addition, Hermes could 
even back up the Shuttle for limited space 
station crew replacement. However, such 
international cooperation would also require a 
degree of international coordination and tech-
nology sharing for which the United States has 
little precedent. 
• Cooperative space rescue efforts. At present, 
the Soviet Union is the only country beyond the 
United States with the capability to launch 
people into space. As Europe and Japan de-
velop their crew-carrying systems, the potential 
for emergencies requiring rescue from a variety 
of space vehicles will increase. Broad agree-
ments on docking standards, and procedures for 
space rescue,4 could increase astronaut safety 
for all nations and lead to more extensive 
cooperative activities in the future. Initial 
meetings have been scheduled this spring to 
discuss the nature and extent of such coopera-
tion. Both this cooperative project and the use 
of foreign vehicles to supply Space Station 
have the advantage that they risk transferring 
very little U.S. technology to other partici-
pants.s 
4The United States, the U .S.S.R., the European countries and Japan have signed the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts 
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space-UST 7570; TIAS 6599. 
5The Apollo-Soyuz Test Program, for example, was designed to minimize the potential for technology transfer. 
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• Aerospace plane research and development. 
With strong encouragement from their private 
sectors, Gennany, Japan, and the United King-
dom are working independently toward devel-
opment of ~e~osp.ace . planes .. The level of 
foreign SOphlsucauon m certam areas of ad-
vanced materials, advanced propulsion, and 
aerodynamic computation is on a par with U.S. 
work. A joint development program with one or 
more of these partners might allow the United 
States to develop an aerospace plane faster and 
with lower cost to the United States than the 
United States could on its own. Although a 
joint project would risk some technology trans-
fer, if properly structured, such a joint project 
could be to the mutual benefit of all countries 
involved . 
• U.S. use of the Soviet Energia heavy-lift 
launcher. The U.S.S.R. has offered infonnally 
to make its Energia heavy-lift launch vehicle 
available to the United States for launching 
large payloads. As noted throughout this report, 
the United States has no existing heavy lift 
capability. Thus, the Soviet offer could assist in 
developing U.S. plans to launch large, heavy 
payloads, such as Space Station components. 
However, concerns about the transfer of mili-
tmly useful technology to the Soviet Union 
would inhibit U.S. use of Energia for such 
high-technology payloads. As well, NASA 
would be understandably reluctant to make use 
of a Soviet launcher because such use might be 
seen as sufficient reason for the United States 
to defer development of its own heavy-lift 
vehicle. 
Although cooperation in space transportation can 
be expected to be more difficult than cooperation in 
other areas of space endeavor, it could assist the 
United States to achieve much more in space than 
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Photo credit: Arianespace 
Night launch of Ariane 3 launcher from the European 
Space Agency launch pad in Kourou. French Guiana. 
this country can afford to attempt on its own. 
However, it will require that NASA and the U.S. 
aerospace industry make a greater effort to tap the 
expertise and' technology now available in other 
industrialized countries. 
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The proposed experimental National Aero-Space Plane 
(NASP), the X-30,is being designed with a goal of 99.999 
percent reliability-i.e., to have only 1 chance in 100,000 
of failing catastrophically during a flight, assuming no 
human error. NASP program officials have said that later 
first-generation aerospace planes, which they term 
NASP-Derived Vehicles (NOVs), would probably be 
designed to have a similar reliability. Recognizing that the 
design reliability does not account for possible human 
error in maintaining and flying the vehicle, NASP 
program officials assume the actual reliability of a 
first-generation NOV would be lower-nominally 99.8 
percent, but 99.9 percent in the "best case," and 99.5 
percent in the "worst case."l 
NASP program officials assume there is little risk that 
an NOV of lower reliability would be flown on opera-
tional missions, because they expect NOV development 
would be halted if the proposed X -30, or a later prototype 
NOV, fails to demonstrate acceptable reliability (99.5 
percent) in its flight test program. Thus, in their view, the 
cost at risk would be not billions of dollars of greater than 
expected failure costs but only those funds spent to 
develop and build X-30s.2 
This argument hinges on a critical assumption: that if 
the test vehicles tum out to be unacceptably unreliable, the 
test program will detect that fact with high confidence. 
The validity of this assumption cannot yet be decided, 
because the NASP program office has not yet specified 
what kind of confidence (statistical or subjective) they 
require, nor how much is enough, nor how it will be 
calculated from test results. These details are important, 
because a test program cannot determine the reliability 
precisely. The test flights might be a lucky streak, or an 
unlucky streak; the actual reliability could differ signifi-
cantly from the successful percentage of test flights. 
However, a properly designed test program can determine 
the confidence level with which the required reliability 
has been demonstrated. 
In choosing a required confidence level, NASP pro-
gram officials face a dilemma-as would any manager of 
a launch vehicle development program: Requiring too 
little confidence could allow acceptance of a vehicle that 
is actually unacceptably unreliable; operational vehicles 
of similar design and reliability would probably fail often 
enough to incur staggering failure costs. If, on the other 
hand, too much confidence is required, a vehicle that is 
actually highly reliable might be rejected, and the savings 
potentially realizable by using operational vehicles of 
similar design and reliability would be forfeit.3 
NASP program officials must also choose the type 0/ 
confidence to require. They could require statistical 
confidence to be demonstrated, or they could calculate the 
confidence level by Bayesian inference, which would use 
the results of the flight tests to update a subjective prior 
probability distribution over possible values of reliability 
(see box A-A).4 The former choice would require a very 
large number of flights to demonstrate the required 
reliability with high statistical confidence.s A problem 
with the latter choice is that there would be risks of 
optimism and pessimism. If the prior distribution is 
optimistic, the reliability might be low but the vehicle 
would be accepted and later losses incurred. If pessimis-
tic, reliability might be high but the vehicle would be 
rejected and potential savings unrealized. 
Because the type and level of confidence with which 
99.5 percent reliability must be demonstrated has not been 
specified, and because the actual reliability will never be 
known precisely, this appendix shows how the life-cycle 
costs of acquiring and operating a mixed fleet of launch 
vehicles-including NOVs, if accepted-would depend 
on the type and level of confidence required in testing and 
on the actual reliability. 
Cost Estimates, 
If Statistical Confidence Is Required 
The type and level of confidence required and the actual 
reliability determine the probability that the test program 
will be successful; if it is, NOVs will be acquired and 
operated, and their actual reliability will affect the failure 
costs incurred. 
Figure A-I shows estimates of the probabilities with 
which test vehicles of various reliabilities would demon-
strate 99.5 percent reliability with various levels of 
statistical confidence in 100 test flights. If 40 percent 
iNASP Joint Program Office staff. personal communication. Jan. 18. 1990. 
2Funhermore. they expect that the value of NOV technology "spun off' to other applications such as aircraft and launch vehicles would compensate 
for some of the cost at risk. 
31( more test flights were conducted. a reliable vehicle could demonstrate acceptable reliability with acceptable confidence and allow these potential 
savings to be realized. but against this must be weighed the expense and delay of the extra tests. 
4National Research Council. Post-Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management (Washington. DC: National Academy 
Press, January. 1988). app. D. 
sOne hundred test flights. if all successful. would provide only 39.4 percent statistical confidence in a 99.5 percent lower confidence bound on 
reliability. 
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Box A-A-Estimation of Reliability by Bayesian Inference 
In classical probability theory, a system is assumed to have a definite reliability, even though the 
reliability is not known precisely. The percentage of tests (or uses) that are successful is an estimate of 
the reliability, and statistical confidence bounds indicate the uncertainty of estimates. If no tests have 
been done, reliability cannot be estimated by statistical methods. 
In contrast, the Bayesian view is that the 
reliability of a system may be 10 percent, or 
90 percent, or any other possible value. A 
person's beliefs and uncertainty about the 
reliability, even before tests have been con-
ducted, may be expressed by a set of 
probabilities: the probability that the reliabil-
ity is less than 10 percent, the probability that 
it is less than 20 percent, and so forth. 
Collectively, such probabilities specify what 
is called a cumulative probability distribution 
over reliability. Because it represents one 
person's beliefs about the reliability, the 
distribution is called a subjective probability 
distribution (SPO). Another person may have 
different beliefs about the reliability of the 
same system; that person's beliefs would be 
represented by a different SPO. The Bayesian 
interpretation of probability does not require 
the SPOs of different subjects to agree, but it 
does require each subject's SPO to be self-
consistent. For example, an SPO cannot 
specify that a subject believes the reliability 
to be less than 10 percent with 50 percent 
probability and less than 20 percent with 30 
percent probability! 
SPDs which are not based on actual tests 
of the system are called prior SPOs: they are 
SPOs estimated prior to testing. Prior SPDs 
may be based on expert judgement, consider-
ing tests of subsystems or analogous systems. 
They may also reflect guesses, hunches, 
mysticism, or complete ignorance. When test 
data become available, SPOs may be up-
dated; however-and herein lies the value of 
Bayesian inference-4!ach SPO must be up-
dated in a logically consistent manner, using 
Bayes's theorem, which is stated and proved 
in many textbooks on probability. SPOs 
Updated in this manner are calleo posterior 
SPOs: they are SPDs estimated a posteriori 
(after testing). 
Differing prior SPDs become more simi-
80-. 
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Four Subjects' Subjective Probability 
Distributions Over Reliability 
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lar after Bayesian updating, as the figures below illustrate. The figure on the left shows portions of the 
prior SPOs of four subjects, who are identified as "Confident Pessimists," "Uncertain Pessimist," 
"Uncertain Optimist," ;md "Confident Optimist." The prior SPO of the Confident Pessimist indicates 
that the Confident Pessimist is about 55 percent confident that the reliability is less than 98 percent and 
almost 100 percent confident that the reliability is less than 98.25 percent The Uncertain Pessimist is 
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Figure A-1-Probablllty That Test Vehicles Will Demonstrate Acceptable Reliability If 
Statistical Confidence Is Required 
Probability of Accepting Vehicle 
100 % 
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"JD 98.5% 
97.5% 
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20 % 95.5% / 40 0l~18'99.594.5% 
93.5% Actual 
o % 92.5% Reliability 
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Required Confidence in 99.5% Reliability 
Based on 100 Monte Carlo samples. 
SOURCE: Offioe of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
statistical confidence, or more, is required, a vehicle 
would be rejected even if all flights were successful. If, 
however, only 30 percent statistical confidence is re-
quired, a 99.5-percent reliable vehicle would be accepted 
with a probability of about 80 percent 
Figure A-2 shows how the expected present value of 
the life-cycle costs of flying the missions in OTA's 
Low-Growth mission model6 through the year 2020 
would depend on actual reliability and required confi-
dence, if statistical confidence is required. The greater the 
6U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the Futur~ Buyer's Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 1988). 
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Figure A-2-Expected Present Value of Mixed-Fleet Life-Cycle Cost If Statistical Confidence Is 
Required and NOV Costs Are As Estimated by NASP JPO 
Present Value of Life-Cycle Cost (FY89$) 
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Based on 100 Monte Carlo samples. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment and National Aero-Space Plane Joint Program Office. 
X-30's reliability turns out to be, the greater the savings 
can be.? If managers require at least 10 percent statistical 
confidence, they risk little or nothing compared to the 
costs if NDVs were not attempted (figure 1-2) if the 
X-30's reliability turns out to be low, because there is little 
chance that an unreliable vehicle would be accepted, and 
no NOV development costs are assumed to be incurred 
before the decision on whether to proceed with NOV 
development. 8 
Methodology 
OTA calculated these estimates assuming that NDV-
related costs are uniformly distributed over ranges 
estimated by the NASP Joint Program Office (JPO), 
which are shown in table A-I. OTA also assumed: 
1. X-30 development costs are sunk costs. 
2. The test program will consist of 100 test flights to orbit 
and back; other (e.g., suborbital) test flights may be 
conducted but will not be used to estimate reliability 
on orbital flights.9 
3. During the test program, the X-30s will not be 
modified in any way, or operated in different ways, 
that would make reliability differ from flight to 
flight. 10 
4. The government will decide in 2000 whether to 
proceed with NOV development,ll based on whether 
1The actual reliability of operational NDVs is assumed to be the same as that of the X-30s or prototype NDVs used to demonstrate reliability in the 
flight test program. 
8These estimates exclude the costs of developing the X-30 (or other prototype); if Congress decided now to forego development of an NDV, it could 
save a few billion dollars by halting the NASP program. See U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue 
Options (Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1990). pp. 68-70. 
'lThe JPO actually plans only about 75 to 100 test flights. most of them suborbital. Data from suborbital test flights and ground tests of vehicle systems 
and components could be used to estimate reliability on orbital flights. but this would require developing a component -level reliability model that 
describes how component failures could cause vehicle loss and how component failure probabilities depend on details of vehicle assembly. maintenance. 
and operation (e.g .• on the speeds and altitudes at which the vehicle has flown). 
lO'fhis assumption simplifies analysis. In fact, the X-30s could be modified-e.g., after a failure-in an attempt to increase reliability, but "wiping 
the slate cJean"late in the test program might reduce confidence that the required reliability has been demonstrated. 
IISome have suggested that ifthe X-30 is successful, NDVs might be developed privately to service the market for space tourism. For estimates of 
the demand for round trips to orbit as a function of ticket price. see DoD & NASA. National Space Transportation and Support Study 1995-2010. Annex 
B: Civil Needs DataBase. Version 1.1. vol. I-Summary Report. Mar. 16, 1986. pp. 3-31-3-32. and Gordon R. Woodcock. "Economics on the Space 
Frontier: Can We Afford It?," SSI Update (Princeton, NJ: Space Studies Institute. May/June 1987). 
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Table A-1-Ranges of Costs Estimated by NASP Joint Program Office (inde. year not specified) 
-
- t oevelopmen ................................. . Facilities (per NOV) ............................ . 
production (first NOV) ......................... . 
(% learning8) ....................... . 
operations (per NOV-year) ..................... . 
(per flight) .......................... . 
Failures (per failure) ........................... . 
Best Case 
$3,000 MB 
$25 M 
$700M 
85 % 
$10 M 
$0.8 M 
$1,500 M 
Nominal 
$4,000 M 
$50 M 
$800M 
90% 
$15 M 
$1.2 M 
$2,000 M 
\IIIorst Case 
$6,000 M 
$75 M 
$1,100 M 
95 % 
$3OM 
$2.2 M 
$2,500 M 
~.d~ . 
b I.e., the incremental unit cost of the nth NOV will be (%/1 00)lag(n)l1og(2) times the incremental unit cost of the first NOV, where % is the percentage learning. 
SOURCE: NASP Interagency Office, 1990. 
the required reliability (assumed to be 99.5 percent) is 
demonstrated with a specified statistical confidence. 
S. If the government decides not to proceed with NOV 
development, the missions in the mission model will 
be flown by Shuttles, Titan IV s, and Medium Launch 
Vehicles. Construction of facilities required for 
launching Titan IVs at the rates required (which began 
earlier as a hedge) will continue. 
6. If instead the government proceeds with NOV devel-
opment, 
(a) Construction of only those Titan IV facilities 
required for launching at the rates required to 
complement the NOV will continue, possibly 
after a delay. 12 
(b) The actual reliability of operational NOV s will be 
the same as that of the X-30s or prototype NOVs 
used to demonstrate reliability in the flight test 
program. 13 
(c) Enough NOVs will be procured to make the 
probability of losing them all to attrition no 
greater than one percent, assuming a reliability of 
99.5 percent 14 
(d) NOVs will fly all the manned missions in OTA's 
"Low-Growth" mission model on a 1:1 basis 
(i.e., one NOV flight substituting for one Shuttle 
flight) and half of Titan missions 1: 1, beginning 
the year of initial operational capability, which 
OTA assumes will be 2005. 
(e) If and when all NOVs are lost to attrition, another 
NOV will be procured at the same incremental 
unit cost as the first NOV. IS 
The probability that X-30s or prototype NOVs would 
demonstrate the required reliability (99.5 percent) with 
the required confidence during the flight test program was 
calculated for each combination of actual reliability and 
required confidence considered. This probability-tbe 
"acceptance probability"-was used in calculating the 
life-cycle cost of the mixed fleet. Titan and Shuttle costs 
depend on the number of missions Titans and Shuttles are 
required to fly, which depends on whether NOVs are 
accepted and used to complement Titans and supersede 
Shuttles. 
For the case in which they are, the costs of NOV 
development, facilities, production, operation, and fail-
ures are estimated by Monte-Carlo techniques-i.e., 
random-event simulation. For each of 100 scenarios, 
values for each of the uncertain costs in table A-I were 
generated pseudorandomly16 and used to calculate the 
life-cycle costs of the NOV fleet. The number of 
operational failures in each year was also generated 
pseudo-randomly, based on the actual reliability assumed, 
and used to calculate NOV failure costs. For each value 
of actual reliability considered, the difference between the 
70th percentile of NOV costs and the median value of 
NOV costs was used as the "STAS cost risk"-i.e., the 
cost risk as defmed in the Space Transportation Architec-
ture Study17 -for the NOV fleet. 
Sensitivity to 
Greater-than-Expected NDV Costs 
To gauge the sensitivity of the estimates in figure A-2 
to greater-than-expected NOV costs, OTA estimated 
costs by the same procedure but assumed NOV-related 
costs are uniformly distributed over the ranges in table 
A-2. The lower bounds of these ranges are as estimated by 
12Because they may not be needed as soon, and delaying expenditures for facilities allows them to be more heavily discounted. 
130perational NOVs could be designed to differ from the X-30s or prototype NOVs-e.g., to have more engines-with the intent of making them 
more reliable. If so designed, detailed reliability models (footnote 9) of both X-30s and operational NDVs would be needed to estimate operational NOV 
reliability on the basis of X-30 flight tests. If operational NOVs differ significantly from X-30s, X-30 flight tests may provide little information about 
NOV reliability; in any case, the updating procedure would be much more complicated than updating based solely on test flights of similar vehicles under 
similar conditions. 
14According to this criterion, the fleetsize should be eight for the Low-Growth mission model (534 NOV flights). 
15'fb.is is optimistic; it neglects procurement delay and the remote possibility that one NOV may be required to fly more flights than the NASP JPO 
assumes it will be able to: 250 to 500, but nominally 400. 
16'Jbe costs were assumed to be distributed uniformly between the worst-case and best-case values in table A-I. 
17U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, op. cit., footnote 6. 
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the NASP JPO (table A-I); the upper bounds of these 
ranges are twice the upper bounds of the ranges estimated 
by the NASP JPO (in the case of percentage learning, the 
upper bound is twice as close to 100 percent). Figure A-3 
shows the resulting cost estimates. 
Cost Estimates, 
If Subjective Confidence Is Allowed 
OTA has also estimated savings and losses for cases in 
which the government decides whether to proceed with 
NDV development based on the subjective (rather than 
statistical) confidence with which the required reliability 
(assumed to be 99.5 percent) is demonstrated. The 
confidence level is calculated by Bayesian inference. For 
illustration, the estimates were calculated assuming the 
prior distribution of the "Confident Optimist" of box 
A-A, which implies an expected reliability of 99.8 
percent-the same nominal reliability estimated by the 
NASP JPO. Figure A-4 shows the proto-NDV acceptance 
probabilities, and figure A-5 the life-cycle costs, esti-
mated under these assumptions, assuming OTA's Low-
Growth mission model and NDV -related costs unifonnly 
distributed over ranges estimated by the NASP JPO (table 
A-I). 
To gauge the sensitivity of the estimates in figure A-5 
to greater-than-expected NOV costs, OTA estimated 
costs by the same procedure but assumed that NOV-
related costs are unifonnly distributed over the ranges in 
table A-2. Figure A-6 shows the life-cycle costs estimated 
under these assumptions. 
Figure A-5 shows that if NOV costs are as estimated by 
the NASP JPO, there is little risk that an unacceptably 
Table A-2-Ranges of Costs Assumed by OTA 
for Sensitivity Analysis 
Best Case Worst Case 
Development ................... . $3,000 M8 $12,000 M 
Facilities (per NOV) ............. . $25 M $150 M 
Production (first NOV) ........... . $700 M $2,200 M 
(% learning) .......... . 85% 97.5% 
Operations (per NOV-year) ....... . $10 M $60 M 
(per flight) ........... . $0.8 M $4.4 M 
Failures (per failure) ............. . $1,500 M $5,000 M 
aM=miliion. 
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1990. 
unreliable vehicle would be accepted and, as a conse-
quence, the mixed-fleet life-cycle cost (figure A-5) would 
exceed that of the current mixed fleet (the Titan-IV option 
in figure 1-2). 
However, if NDV costs can range up to twice the upper 
bounds estimated by the NASP JPO, figure A-6 shows 
that there could be a significant risk of loss caused by 
accepting an unacceptably unreliable vehicle. For exam-
ple, if only 10 percent confidence is required and actual 
reliability turns out to be 92.5 percent, the median 
life-cycle cost would be about $16 billion more than if the 
NOV were rejected, or not attempted, because the failures 
that would occur in the test flight program would probably 
not reduce the confidence in NDV reliability (over 98.9 
percent, a priori) below 10 percent. If 90 percent 
confidence were required (see figure A-6), or 10 percent 
statistical confidence were required (see figure A-3), or 
prior confidence in NOV reliability were lower, this risk 
could be made negligible, but this would also reduce the 
probability of accepting, and benefitting from, a reliable 
NDV. 
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Figure A-3-Expected Present Value of Mixed-Fleet Life-Cycle Cost H Statistical Confidence Is 
Required and NOV Costs May Be 2X NASP JPO Estimates 
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Agure A-4-Probablllty That Test Vehicles Will Demonstrate Acceptable Reliability If 
Subjective Confidence Is Allowed 
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SOURCE: Offioe of Technology Assessment and National Aero-Space Plane Joint Program Office, 1990. 
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Figure A-5-Expected Present Value of Mixed-Fleet lIfe-Cycle Cost If Subjective Confidence Is 
Allowed and NOV Costs Are As EstImated by NASP JPO 
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Figure A-~Expected Present Value of Mixed-Fleet LIfe-Cycle Cost If Subjective Confidence Is 
Allowed and NOV Costs May Be 2X NASP JPO Estimates 
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